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ABSTRACT 
Male homosexuality can be understood as an expression of the 
gender of the self. Three aspects of the self are proposed in a 
hypothetical model of the homosexual male and compared to the 
heterosexual male and female. One aspect is subjectivity and 
this study hypothesizes that the subjective experience of the 
gender of the self is associated with homosexuality and 
heterosexuality. The remaining two aspects are both 
objectivities. It is hypothesized that sexual preference is the 
objective expression of the gender of the subjective self. It is 
hypothesized that sexual preference is not related to biological - 
sex (sexual identity). 
The two objective attitudes are defined as the extremities of 
a continuum of spontaneity: from involved objectivity to 
detached objectivity. This difference in spontaneity within a 
homosexual group describes the differential development of 
homosexual identification: from a developed homosexual role to 
an under-developed or absent homosexual role. The absence or 
development of the homosexual role are differences in 
spontaneity and these differences are associated with measures 
of psycho- and socio-pathology. 
Traditionally, homosexuality has been understood to be an 
outcome of a different sexuality. This study shows that 
sexuality is not related to homosexuality as a subjective 
expression of self. Sexual preference is, however, the objective 
expression of that subjectivity. 
Sex and gender are confounded in the literature. The 
confusion of the sex and gender literature, and the perplexity 
of the homosexuality literature, is partially resolved by the 
separation of two distinct but inter-related frames 
reference. These are the sociological and the psychological 
frames of reference. 
The results strongly support the conclusion that 
homosexuality is related to the subjective experience of the 
self and that homosexuality is an objective expression of that 
subjectivity as a sexual preference. Homosexuality is not 
synonymous with sexual preference or homosexual role, it also 
includes the psychological precursor of the subjective 
experience of gender, that is, gender identity. 
There is empirical support for a proposed persons-grammar 
theory of personality that uses a psychological frame of 
reference. Overall the results support this theoretical 
development and models of homosexuality, anxiety, and psychosis 
utilizing this theoretical framework. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
No man, for any considerable period, can wear 
one face to himself, and another to the multitude, 
without finally getting bewildered as to which may 
be the true. 
Nathaniel Hawthorne - 
"The Scarlet Letter". 
Psychological research in the 1970's and 1980's has seen a 
proliferation of studies in sexual preferences. This research 
has usually used hypotheses of different social experience to 
account for the differences in adult sexual preferences. A 
weakness of this research has been the lack of differences 
associated with different sexual preferences. Nonetheless, 
theories of differential socialization that purport to account 
for homosexuality dominate this area of research despite a lack 
of empirical support. This may be an example of the observation 
that a theory, even a bad one, is more acceptable than no theory 
(Kuhn, 1962). 
Homosexuality has been perplexing, even disturbing, and there 
is no satisfactory theory of sexual preferences (nor of their 
development during childhood and adolescence) other than the 
assumption that it expresses a different sexuality though this 
has little empirical support. Paralleling this perplexity in 
homosexual research is a confusion in the sex and gender 
literature, a body of literature which is itself crucial to the 
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study of homosexuality. 
Deaux (1985) extensively reviewed the sex and gender research 
literature and concluded that the literature was marked by a 
confusion which is more than just semantics. She found that sex 
is generally held to imply a biological difference and gender a 
sociological difference between men and women, and that the 
"resolution of these controversies is probably not imminent" 
(1985, p. 51). Sex and gender are confused in the psychological 
literature. This literature is central to an understanding of 
homosexuality. It seems likely therefore that the perplexity of 
homosexuality and the confusion of sex and gender are related. 
One aim of this thesis will be to resolve some of this confusion 
and perplexity. (See also Appendix 4 which discusses further 
this and other related theoretical issues). 
Confusion may be defined as a cognitive confounding of two 
frames of reference. If sex and gender have different referents 
then this distinction may bring about some resolution to the 
conceptual confusion of sex and gender. If 'male' (and 'female') 
has a different referent and meaning in sex and in gender 
research then the conceptual distinction of sex and gender may 
also resolve some of the (implicit) semantic confusion of the 
term 'male' (and 'female') which is presently used as though 
'male' (and 'female') has only one meaning since sex and gender 
appear to be conceptually synonymous. 
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In chapter 2 there is a review of the sex literature 
generally and also that specifically relevant to homosexuality. 
Biological sex is not an issue in this thesis: in the empirical 
studies of this thesis homosexual males and heterosexual males 
are assumed to be the same biologically and these males are 
assumed to be biologically different from heterosexual females. 
Sex researchers identify differences between the sexes. While 
some of these anatomical, hormonal and similar differences are 
necessarily related to biology, some differences between the 
sexes are attitudinal and ideational and reflect differences in 
socialization of males and females. These bio-social 
characteristics that distinguish men and women have their 
referent in biological sex. 
In chapter 2 there is also a review of the gender literature 
generally and that specifically relevant to homosexuality. 
Gender researchers identify differences between groups of 
subjects with the same sex, for example, between homosexual 
biological males and heterosexual biological males. This gender 
identity in homosexual males that is different from the gender 
identity of heterosexual males is the same as the gender 
identity in heterosexual females. This difference in gender 
identity of homosexual and heterosexual males is not related to 
differences in biology of these two groups. (There does remain 
the possibility of biological differences between these two male 
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groups. The literature which addresses this possible biological 
difference is not reviewed in this psychological study). These 
gender characteristics that distinguish the homosexual male and 
heterosexual male, but not the homosexual male and heterosexual 
female, have their referent in the different subjective 
experiences of homosexual and heterosexual biological males. 
The conventional interpretation of these gender differences 
(between homosexual and heterosexual males for example) is that 
they arise from socialization differences in the parent-child 
relationships (psychoanalytic theory) and peer-group 
relationships (social learning theory). This interpretation in 
which homosexuality is an outcome of (deviant) social experience 
has gained little empirical support. There has been a 
presumption in the literature (noted by Deaux, 1985) that even 
gender identity is sociological rather than psychological in 
origin. The theoretical frames of sex and gender research which 
have been used to study homosexuality have been sociological 
rather than psychological. Those theories which use a 
sociological framework to explain sexual preferences have not 
gathered empirical support. 
There is in the sex and gender literature an absence of a 
theory of personality which uses a psychological framework and 
which also identifies personality structure. There is needed a 
psychological theoretical framework which will allow the 
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comparison of the personality structure of the homosexual and 
heterosexual at the psychological, as well as the sociological, 
level. This comparison could then identify that psychological 
structure in the personality which is related to the development 
of sexual preferences. Without a personality theory which uses a 
psychological frame of reference there cannot be a theory of 
sexual preferences if sexual preferences are psychological 
rather than sociological in origin. 
A personality theory which uses a psychological framework 
will be presented in chapter 3. This theory predicts a 
relationship between gender identity and homosexuality and a 
null relationship between sexual identity and homosexuality. 
Support for this hypothesis will support the conclusion that the 
observed difference in gender identity of homosexual and 
heterosexual males is not due to differences in socialization. 
Rather, it will be concluded that these observed differences in 
behaviour, attitudes and ideas between homosexual and 
heterosexual males are due to a psychological difference that 
exists prior to these sociological differences. Homosexuality - 
related to gender identity developed by the age of three years - 
would then be predictive of the crossed-sex gender traits 
typical of a homosexual's childhood. This leads to the 
conclusion that homosexuality is psychologically established 
very early in life, probably by the age of three years, and that 
this explains later social 'deviancy' in childhood and the 
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homo-sexual activity of adolescence and adulthood. In this 
psychological theory homosexuality explains, rather than is 
explained by, social 'deviancy'. 
The terms sex and gender have different referents 	in 
biological sex and subjective gender respectively, and sex and 
gender research utilize different sociological and psychological 
frameworks respectively. This distinction is not articulated in 
the literature. Making this distinction supported by a 
theoretical personality structure in a psychological frame of 
reference may help resolve some of the conceptual confusion in 
the sex and gender literature. When applied in empirical test it 
will address the first substantive issue of this thesis, that 
sexual preference is related to gender identity (a psychological 
construct with a psychological referent) and not to sexual 
identity (a sociological construct with a biological referent). 
Besides this conceptual confusion of the terms sex and gender 
there is also a semantic confusion. The first substantive issue 
of this thesis addresses the conceptual, but not the semantic, 
confusion. A psychological theory of personality structure is 
presented in chapter 3 (Theory). This in itself does not 
identify the 'male' or 'female' identity of that proposed 
psychological gender identity hypothesized to be responsible for 
the expression of homo- or hetero-sexual preference. If 'male' 
(and 'female') has a different referent in sex and in gender, 
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then there is likely to be considerable semantic confusion in 
the use of the term 'male' (and 'female') which has a different 
meaning in different contexts. This would be especially so if 
those different contexts appeared to be synonymous and therefore 
'male' (and 'female') appeared to have only the one referent (in 
biological sex for example) and therefore only the one meaning. 
This is presently the case in the sex and gender literature. 
Besides the socialization assumption which has confounded the 
different sociological and psychological frames of sex and 
gender research, there is another assumption in the literature. 
This is the assumption that sexual identity and gender identity 
are normally congruent. This assumption asserts that the 
biological male is gender-male. If the sociological and 
psychological distinction is also made, which is not the case in 
the literature, then it follows from this assumption of 
congruency that he is also sociologically and psychologically 
masculine. The converse of gender femininity for biological 
females is similarly asserted. To test this assumption of 
sex-gender congruency a theory of sexual preferences is 
presented in chapter 3 which predicts the 'male' and 'female' 
identity of the sex and gender identities in homosexuals and 
heterosexuals. The identification of the homosexual male as 
gender-male or as gender-female is the second substantive issue 
of this thesis. 
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This study is important in a number of ways. It is 
anticipated that the clarification and testing of the 
sociological and psychological frames of reference support the 
proposition that sexual preference is related to gender identity 
and not to sexual identity. Furthermore it is anticipated that 
the gender identity of the homosexual male and heterosexual 
female is (gender) male and that of the heterosexual male is 
(gender) female. The assumption of socialization as an 
appropriate frame of reference in gender studies will be 
challenged and with it the postulate common in literary and 
community belief that homosexuality is a form of deviant sexual 
behaviour which is psychologically aberrant compared to 
heterosexuality. It is not the intention to arrive at an 
alternative theory of sexual preference development: the 
theoretical framework of personality structure and the proposed 
psychology of sexual preferences (both discussed in chapter 3) 
use a creativity-spontaneity theory of learning. The 
psychological frame of reference is consistent with this theory 
which, like gender identity, has the subject as its referent. 
The psychological frame is used to identify two different 
ways of thinking about reality. From this study it can be 
concluded that a dimension of spontaneity (as a way of thinking) 
is theoretically and empirically related to anxiety and to 
psychosis. Perhaps different from much previous research of this 
sort is the clarification of a socio- and psycho-pathological 
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dimension and its demonstrated separateness to homosexuality. 
The content of this dissertation is in seven chapters. In 
Chapter 2 relevant literature and research will be reviewed. The 
review will be highly selective since there is a vast literature 
on many aspects of homosexuality: the selection criteria have 
been the relevance and currency of the work. Some of the sources 
of the conceptual and semantic confusion in this literature are 
discussed in this chapter. Chapter 3 outlines the general 
theoretical framework for the present study and the rationale 
for each of the three empirical studies. Chapter 4 discusses the 
methodology of the study and the general hypotheses of each of 
the three studies. The chapter continues with a description of 
each of the three studies including subjects, measures used, 
procedure, and design. A listing of the specific a priori 
hypotheses for each of the studies is given in appendices. 
Chapter 5 presents the results statistically and substantively. 
Chapter 6 is a discussion of the results. The results are 
discussed generally and then specifically for each of the three 
studies. Chapter 7 summarizes and discusses the limitations of 
the dissertation. The implications of this research are 
discussed - for persons who are homosexual, for education and 
therapy, for science, and for further research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Sexual preferences, and homosexuality in particular, have 
remained an enigma. The origins of sexual preferences within the 
homosexual and heterosexual personality remain unclear in the 
psychological literature; this literature has often sought to 
understand sexual preferences using the concepts of sex and 
gender. This literature is itself characterized by confusion 
(Kessler & McKenna, 1978; Money, 1980; Freimuth & Horstein, 
1982; Ross, 1983a; Deaux, 1985). 
If homosexuality is to not remain an enigma it seems likely 
that the confusion in the sex and gender literature needs to be 
resolved. It is the purpose of this thesis to relate sexual 
preferences to a personality structure using the concepts of sex 
and gender. To achieve this aim it is necessary to address the 
confusion in the literature. At least some of this confusion 
will be shown to arise from the confusion between sex and gender 
as concepts and, furthermore, that some semantic confusion 
arises from the incorrect use of the labels 'male' and 
'female'. 
Some resolution of this confusion, and therefore some 
resolution of the confusion which surrounds sexual preferences 
and especially homosexuality, may be found in better defining 
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sex and gender. Sex and gender will be shown to have different 
referents in observable biological sex and in subjectively 
experienced gender respectively. Not making this distinction 
explicit is to confuse sex and gender conceptually. The 
literature does not make this distinction explicit. 
The referent of 'male' (and of 'female') to biological sex is 
different from the referent of 'male' (and of 'female') to 
subjective gender. Having different referents, the term 'male' 
(and 'female') is used to mean different things and this is 
semantically confusing. 
An object - the biological sex of the person's body - is the 
referent of sex. The subject - the subjectivity of the person 
is the referent of gender. Resolution of the confusion is in 
this thesis therefore dependent on the 	clarification 	of 
'subject' and 'object' and the operationalization of these 
concepts in empirical studies. In Chapter 3 the referents of 
'subject' and 'object' will be used to distinguish between two 
frames of reference which are confounded in the literature by 
the use of sex and gender as synonyms. This clarification is 
presented in Chapter 3 (Theory) and operationalized in the 
empirical studies that follow that Chapter. 
This thesis examines homosexuality in the adult male. Because 
of this no attempt is made to relate this literature or this 
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study to the development of sexual preferences or of 
homosexuality. One effect of this is that the concept of 
androgyny with its implications of a developmental process is 
not directly an issue in this thesis. (Some aspects of androgyny 
are discussed however in Appendix 4). 
The concepts of sex and gender have been used to examine 
sexual preferences and homosexuality. Besides sexual preferences 
which are commonly used to define homosexuality and 
heterosexuality, there are three generally recognized aspects of 
sex and gender considered relevant: these are 'biological sex', 
'social sex-role', and 'gender identity' (Shively & DeCecco, 
1977). 
The literature that relates biological sex and homosexuality 
is not directly reviewed in this thesis. The hypothesis of an 
organic functional difference between homosexuals and 
heterosexuals which could explain sexual preferences is not 
examined in the empirical studies which follow. Although 
biological sex may be ambiguous at birth (and even later) it 
will be assumed that 'male' or 'female' are differentiated in 
adult homosexuals and heterosexuals. This means that biological 
'male' and 'female' are assumed to be self-evident in this 
study. Homosexual males and heterosexual males are compared, and 
homosexual males and heterosexual females are compared, using 
variables with sociological and psychological (but not 
biological) frames of reference. 
13 
Unless otherwise stated in this thesis the term 'sexual 
identity' will refer to 'male' and 'female' of biological sex. 
This use of 'sexual identity' to refer specifically to the 
masculinity and femininity of biological sex is different to 
some other ways that it is used in the literature. Shively and 
DeCecco (1977), for example, recognize four components of what 
they call 'sexual identity': biological sex, gender identity, 
social sex-role, and sexual orientation. The use of sexual 
identity in this thesis is specific to the 'male' and 'female' 
of biological sex. 
'Social sex-role' and 'gender identity' are now discussed. 
There is a review of the gender literature in general and of 
those gender studies which are specifically related to male 
homosexuality. Then there is a review of the sex literature in 
general and of those sex studies which are specifically related 
to male homosexuality. 
GENDER 
Gender is a more generic term than sex: biological sex is a 
specific and objective example of gender where the masculine and 
feminine of biological sex are 'male' and 'female'. Gender 
identity is the individual's belief in being 'male' or 'female'. 
This use of 'male' and 'female' is related to the belief of the 
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subject. The referent for 'gender identity' is the subject, and 
'male' and 'female' when used in the context of gender do not 
refer to the objective 'male' or 'female' of biological sex. 
'Male' and 'female' in gender identity and sexual identity have 
different referents, that is, to the subject and to the object 
respectively. 
Gender also has sex as a colloquial meaning. Where sex and 
gender are not differentiated, the meaning of 'male' and 
'female' which have different conceptual referents must be 
semantically confused. Without this distinction of conceptual 
reference in subject and object, the term 'male' used in both 
gender and sex research will appear synonymous (and so on for 
the term 'female'). If 'male' (and also 'female') is used in 
these different conceptual ways without regard to their 
different meanings, semantic confusion is the likely outcome of 
this colloquial use of the terms gender and sex. 
There is a commonly held community belief that normally the 
person who is biologically male (for example) is also masculine 
(implying sociologically and psychologically). There is in this 
belief an assumption that because a person is male-bodied (the 
object), 'he' (the subject) is also male. In other words there 
is in this belief the expectation that the heterosexual male - a 
biological male is also gender-male. Similarly the 
heterosexual female - a biological female - is also thought to 
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be gender-female. This expectation is also present in the 
literature where the gender identity of the homosexual male is 
labelled 'female'. There is an implicit assumption of a sex and 
gender congruency characterizing heterosexuality and a sex and 
gender incongruency characterizing homosexuality. This belief 
that the heterosexual male is gender-male, and the homosexual 
male is gender-female like the heterosexual female, remains an 
untested assumption. 
The literature review will show that the identification of 
the 'male' or 'female' of gender identity beyond the untested 
assumption is largely ignored theoretically and empirically in 
the literature generally and also in studies of homosexuality 
and heterosexuality. Since 'gender identity in male 
homosexuality' is central to this thesis, the theoretical 
construct of gender identity, the relationship of gender 
identity to homosexuality and heterosexuality, the congruent or 
incongruent nature of the relationship between gender identity 
and sexual identity in homosexuality and heterosexuality are 
substantive issues. 
a) General review of gender studies 
Green (1974) defined gender identity as "the individual's 
basic conviction of being male or female". Gender identity is 
generally regarded as having developed by about 3 years of age 
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and attempts to alter this identity after this age are likely to 
have undesirable psychological consequences, particularly 
confusion. It is generally agreed that gender identity is the 
first psychological component of identity to develop and that 
gender identity is "part of the individual's 
self-identification" (Shively & DeCecco, 1977, p. 42). 
Freund, Nagler, Langevin, Zajac, and Steiner (1974) devised 
the 'Feminine Gender Identity' (FGI) scale for measuring 
'feminine' gender identity in homosexual males. These authors 
note that various sex-role scales have been used in the past 
(citing, for example, Terman and Miles in 1936) to measure 
'femininity' in homosexual males but that currently used scales 
(such as the BSRI, PAO, and PD O discussed below) do not include 
items that are indicative of 'femininity' in homosexual males. 
Gender identity is identified as a crossed-sex gender 
nonconformity. Gender identity scales are constructed by 
contrasting subjects of the same biological sex on a number of 
attributes shown by clinical experience to be related to gender 
nonconformity for one's own sex (usually) during childhood. 
These attributes include a preference for playing with toys of 
the female, feminine dressing, preference for girls' games and 
activities, and other indicators that in female-sexed children 
are taken as indicators of a gender identity congruent with 
biological sex. Gender identity scales for male-sexed subjects 
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measure attributes which are not usually associated with 
biological males but which are associated with biological 
females (and parallel scales for biological females). 
The FGI and other gender identity scales use items that 
differentiate biological males from biological males (and not 
biological males from biological females as in the social 
sex-roles scales). The FGI scale is validated by its ability to 
differentiate heterosexual biological males from homosexual 
biological males. Gender identity scale construction identifies 
objectively observable behaviour (which may include affective 
and cognitive components) of biological males that distinguishes 
homosexual and heterosexual males. This behaviour which is 
independent of sexual identity since they are all biological 
males is labelled as 'gender identity' and the presence of this 
nonconforming behaviour infers that the subject has a gender 
identity that is different from the usual (heterosexual) 
biological male. 
Freund et al. (1974) and Freund, Langevin, Satterberg, and 
Steiner (1977) used transsexual males rather than heterosexual 
females (as in social sex-role construction) as the reference 
group to construct the FGI scale (and its 1977 revised version). 
The higher a subject scores on this scale, the more that subject 
is described as having a 'feminine' gender identity, that is, a 
gender nonconformity or crossed-sex gender identity compared 
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with biological male norms. FOI is therefore the 'degree of 
adoption of feminine gender identity ... measured as a departure 
from the usual male pattern toward the pattern typical of 
transsexual males" (1974, p. 250). FGI appears to measure a 
"strong single factor which is reliable and displays a 
substantial discriminant validity" (1974, p. 258). The 
theoretical significance and validity of this 'femininity' 
associated with males is not explained by Freund et al. (1974, 
1977) though they regard gender identity as closely related to 
the "sets of traits measured by the masculinity-femininity 
tests" (1977, p. 508), that is to social sex-roles. 
This gender-difference is variously labelled: as "gender 
nonconformity" (Bell, Weinberg, & Hammersmith, 1981), as 
"crossed-sex gender identity", and as "feminine gender identity 
(FGI) in males" (Freund et al., 1974; Freund, Langevin, 
Satterberg, & Steiner, 1977). Harry (1983) labels this 
"cross-gender role preference". Bell et al. (1981) describe this 
same non-typical behaviour of homosexual males as gender 
nonconformity which while agreeing with the departure from the 
male norm does not label the difference as 'feminine'. 
Measures of this gender nonconformity do not include items 
related to sexual preference. Homosexual and heterosexual 
preferences (sexual fantasies and acts) are not included in 
gender identity measures. The construct of gender identity 
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measured by these scales does not therefore also measure sexual 
preference. Gender identity is thus operationally defined by 
these measures separately from homosexuality and 
heterosexuality. The relationship between gender identity and 
homo- and hetero-sexuality is discussed in the next section 
which reviews gender identity in sexual preference studies. 
In summary, gender identity scales differentiate gender 
conforming biological males from gender non-conforming 
biological males (and similarly for biological females). Gender 
identity is measured as a degree of preference of a subject with 
a biological sex for the attributes and behaviours of the other 
biological sex. The gender identity of homosexual biological 
males is the same as the gender identity of (heterosexual) 
biological females. This gender identity in homosexual males is 
usually labelled as 'feminine'. 
There is an absence of theory in the literature that relates 
sexual preferences and gender identity. There is however some 
empirical support for the observation that sexual preferences 
and gender identity are related. In chapter 3 a theory is 
presented that defines gender identity (as the gender of the 
subject and not of the object, that is, not biological sex) and 
predicts a relationship between gender identity and sexual 
preferences. 
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b) Review of gender studies specific to homosexuality 
The FGI (Feminine Gender Identity) scale was originally 
published in 1974 and was revised and lengthened before 
re-publication in 1977 to extend Part A of the scale that 
differentiates between heterosexual and homosexual males. The 
new scale was validated on two samples of subjects and it 
differentiated between the two groups in both samples. 
The FGI scale has not been used extensively: the meaning of 
'femininity' that distinguishes between male groups has been 
unclear. One study has used it to investigate paedophilia 
(Freund, Scher, Chan, & Ben-Aron, 1982) and found it was related 
to male homosexuality but not to paedophilia. Freund et al. 
concluded that FGI "should be studied in the context of 
homosexuality, rather than in that of pedophilia" (1982, p. 
112). 
Hooberman (1979) compared homosexual (n=37) and heterosexual 
(n=50) male college students on measures of social sex-role, 
self-esteem and FGI. He hypothesized that the FGI scores of 
homosexuals would be higher on average than those of 
heterosexuals. This hypothesis was confirmed. This is consistent 
with the Freund et al. studies previously described. 
Whitam (1980) investigated the pre-homosexual child in three 
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different societies: the USA, Guatemala and Brazil. He 
investigated several indicators of male homosexuality that often 
emerge in childhood: "interest in toys of the opposite sex, 
cross-dressing, preference for girls' games and activities, 
preference for the company of women, being regarded as a sissy, 
and preference for boys in childhood sex play" (1980, p. 87). He 
concluded that these gender nonconforming behaviours did occur 
in pre-homosexual boys in these three societies and at about the 
same rate. Whitam concluded: 
cross-gender behavior on the part of children does 
not appear to be superficially related to sexual 
orientation but appears to be integrally connected 
with the emergence of sexual orientation in 
childhood and its persistence in later life (1980, 
p. es). 
Harry (1983) investigated 'defeminization' in adult 
homosexual males. He used a questionnaire that included 
masculinity and femininity (sex-role) scales and also 
cross-gender scales for childhood and adulthood adapted from 
Whitam (1977) and from Freund et al. (1977). He found that "a 
large majority of gay men have a feminine gender role preference 
during childhood" (1983, p. 17). Some two thirds of those adults 
who were cross-gendered as children became defemininized by 
adulthood so that in adulthood they were virtually 
indistinguishable from conventional males. Thus, while most gay 
men apart from their homosexuality appear gender-conventional in 
adulthood, many have had an unconventional childhood. 
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Harry (1983) concluded that this 'defeminization' is imposed. 
Nonconforming males report being teased and this pressure to 
conform to the masculine norms appears to come from parents and 
peers. There is no direct theory to explain the 'dc-Feminization' 
of the adult homosexual male. 
By 1975 homosexuality research had proved so infertile that 
Bell (1975) recommended a fresh start unencumbered by the 
presuppositions that supposedly accounted for homosexuality. 
Subsequently, Bell, Weinburg and Hammersmith (1981) used a large 
sample of homosexuals (N=979) and heterosexuals (N=477) to 
explore the development of sexual preference - that is 
homosexuality and heterosexuality - in men and women. Their 
findings rejected many of the accepted notions about the 
development of homosexual sexual preference. Some of their 
findings are: 
(i) Gender nonconformity is a powerful predictor of later 
homosexuality. Gender nonconformity is composed of three 
variables. These variables are "how much they disliked typical 
boys' activities, how much they enjoyed typical girls' 
activities" and "how 'masculine' or 'feminine' the respondents 
said they had been while they were growing up" (Bell et al., 
1981, p76). Homosexuals reported more gender nonconformity 
during childhood, adolescence, and adulthood. 
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(ii) Social isolation does not appear to be a factor in the 
development of a homosexual preference. Homosexuality is not the 
result of a lack of development of social skills. Some gender 
nonconformity does apparently result in less peer involvement 
and acceptance but social isolation is not regarded as causing 
homosexuality. 
(iii) Sexual preference seems to be established at least by 
adolescence though individuals may not be sexually active. Adult 
homosexuality appears to be a continuation of homosexual 
feelings and behaviours of childhood and adolescence that cannot 
be regarded as just a passing fancy. These childhood experiences 
seem part of the development of sexual preference - whether 
homosexual or heterosexual. 
(iv) The homosexuals in the study were experienced in 
heterosexual behaviour in childhood and adolescence but found 
this ungratifying. This disinterest supports a conclusion that 
homosexual behaviour and interest is rewarding in itself and not 
just a reaction (fear of heterosexuality) as some have argued. 
In this study, which included many facets of sexual 
preference, the authors concluded that a childhood gender 
nonconformity is common among adult subjects with a homosexual 
preference. This factor was identified from subjects' histories 
as the factor most strongly indicative of emergent 
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homosexuality. Adult homosexual preference was strongly related 
to childhood gender nonconformity while adult heterosexual 
preference was strongly related to childhood gender conformity. 
SEX 
A person is usually assigned a sex at birth by reason of 
their biology. This sexual identity as a male or female is 
usually obvious at birth. This organic functional distinction of 
biological sex is not at issue here. This objective expression 
of the male and female identities of biological sex is however 
the referent for much social behaviour. This class of social 
behaviours - bio-sociality (such as the social sex-roles) _ 
refers to attributes that are differentially and culturally 
associated with biological males or with biological females. 
a) General review of social sex-role studies 
Social sex-role refers to characteristics differentially 
associated with males and females. Shively and DeCecco describe 
the social sex-role as 
largely tied to characteristics of appearance, 
behavior, and personality. Based on cultural 
norms, individuals are 'expected' to behave in 
socially stereotypical ways that are associated 
with their biological sex. That is, males are 
expected to act in ways that will be seen as 
masculine and females in ways that will be seen as 
feminine. Behaviors that deviate from these 
stereotypes are viewed as inappropriate (1977, p. 
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43). 
A number of social sex-role scales have been devised. By 
contrasting the responses of the different sexes on a number of 
items, items which are differentially endorsed by males and 
females are identified. Those items measuring personality and 
behavioural traits, and which show reliable differences between 
the sexes, are used to construct the sex-role scales of these 
questionnaires. The masculinity scales measure traits more 
commonly associated with males and not commonly associated with 
females. Similarly the femininity scales measure traits more 
commonly associated with females and not commonly associated 
with males. Those traits which are equally typical of biological 
males and females may be used to form social desirability 
scales. Groups of males and females tested with these social 
desirability scales should not differ from each other unless the 
groups are in some way unrepresentative of cultural norms. 
Groups of males and females tested with the masculinity and 
femininity scales should differ from each other unless the 
groups are in some way unrepresentative of cultural norms. Three 
of the more commonly used sex role scales are now described. 
The Bern Sex Role Inventory (BSRII Bern, 1974) consists of a 
masculinity and a femininity scale. The femininity scale is 
composed of 20 items measuring a personality trait rated as more 
desirable for women than for men. Conversely, the masculinity 
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scale is composed of 20 items measuring a personality trait 
rated as more desirable for men than for women. Two scores are 
reported for each subject on this inventory: a femininity and a 
masculinity score. These two scores may be used to classify 
subjects into one of four groups: androgynous - high on both 
scales, undifferentiated - low on both scales, sex-typed - high 
only on same-sex scale, and cross-sexed - high only on other-sex 
scale. 
Like the BSRI, the Personal Attributes Questionnaire (PAQ; 
Spence, Helmreich, & Stapp, 1975) also consists of items 
expressing socially desirable traits. A femininity and a 
masculinity score are reported for each subject on this 
questionnaire. Using these scores, subjects can again be 
classified into one of four groups: androgynous, 
undifferentiated, sex-typed, or cross-sexed. 
Antill, Cunningham, Russell and Thompson (1981) devised an 
Australian social sex-role scale. There are six scores for each 
subject on the Personal Description Questionnaire (PDQ): 
masculine positive and negative, feminine positive and negative, 
and social desirability positive and negative. To construct the 
PDQ both negative and positive evaluations of typical 
characteristics of males and females were rated to identify the 
masculine and feminine items. Some items were evaluated 
negatively or positively but did not distinguish males and 
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females: these items were used to devise social desirability 
scales. This questionnaire, which is used in this study, is 
fully described in chapter 4. 
According to Anastasi the "validity of a test concerns what 
the test measures and how well it does so" (1982, p. 131). The 
social sex-role scales are validated by their ability to 
differentiate male and female groups - the 'how well' of 
validation. While these scales are labelled 'masculine' and 
'feminine' there is a lack of external validation to show 'what' 
these scales measure. The social sex-role scale is substantially 
unrelated to other classes of attributes and behaviours. Beaux 
concluded that 
less convincing evidence has been offered to 
support the assumption that these trait measures 
are substantially related to other classes of 
gender-related attributes and behaviors associated 
with the broader concepts of masculinity and 
femininity (1985, p. 59). 
Despite the general unrelatedness of the social sex-role 
scales to other attributes and behaviours some studies have 
supported the external validity of these scales. Bern and Lenny 
(1976), for example, found that sex-appropriate activities were 
preferred by sex-typed individuals even when barriers to 
cross-sexed activity had been removed. Also supporting the 
social sex-role construct of different cultural norms and 
expectations for male and females, Costrich, Feinstein, Kidder, 
and Pascale (1975) found that popularity and psychiatric 
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adjustment were threatened when an individual acts counter to a 
sex-role stereotype. Ross (1983b) found a hypothesized 
relationship between homosexual sex-role rigidity and a higher 
proportion of sex-typed individuals in a cross-cultural study 
and postulates that sex-role (which he labels gender-role) "has 
a strong societal component" (p. 287). 
The social sex-role scales measure an outcome of social 
learning experience. These measures are generally agreed to be 
"socio-cultural" (Hooberman, 1979). The masculine and feminine 
traits of the social sex-role scales have their origins in 
enculturation, a process of learning the cultural norms and 
expectations associated with being male-sexed or female-sexed in 
a particular society. 
The meaning of these masculine and feminine social sex-role 
terms is not clear: there is a lack of external validation of 
these scales. According to Bakan (1966) 'agency' is associated 
with masculinity and 'communion' is associated with femininity. 
According to Deaux (1985) a more masculine person is more 
'dominant' and 'self-assertive' and a more feminine person is 
more 'nurturant' and 'interpersonally warm'. 
b) Social sex-role studies specific to homosexuality 
Heilbrun and Thompson (1977) compared homosexual and 
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heterosexual males, homosexual and heterosexual females, and 
college students on five measures. These measures were: a 
Masculinity Femininity Scale derived from the ACL, a 
Heterosexuality Scale, an Identification Scale, a Parent 
Sex-Role Model Score, and Interpersonal Role Consistency. 
Chi-square comparisons between the homosexual females and 
heterosexual females showed significant differences in four of 
the measures. Compared to the heterosexual women in the study, 
the lesbians showed more masculine and lower feminine and 
undifferentiated sex-roles. Between the homosexual and 
heterosexual men however there were no significant differences 
on these measures. 
Bernard and Epstein (1978) compared matched homosexual and 
heterosexual males on the BSRI. Half of each of the pairs were 
paid participants and the other half were volunteers. Overall 
the homosexual sample was androgynous and this applied to both 
the paid and volunteer subsamples. The heterosexual sample was 
not androgynous and was highly masculine sex-typed and this 
applied to both the paid and volunteer subsamples. 
Hooberman (1979) compared social sex-role (BSRI), 'feminine' 
gender identity (FGI) and self-esteem in homosexual and 
heterosexual paid volunteer male students. Relatively more 
homosexuals were in the feminine and androgynous categories and 
more of the heterosexuals were in the masculine category. A 
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significant positive correlation was found between FOI and 
femininity for the heterosexual students but not for the 
homosexual students. The groups did not differ overall on the 
measure of self-esteem. Significant correlations were found for 
both groups between self-esteem and masculinity but not between 
self-esteem and femininity. FGI differences were found between 
the homosexuals and heterosexuals. Overall sexual preference was 
not predictive of sex-role to any great extent though it was of 
FGI. 
Carlson 	and Baxter (1984) investigated social sex-role 
(BSRI), self-esteem (Self-Esteem Scale) and depression (Zung's 
Self-Rating 	Depression 	Scale) 	in 	Irish homosexuals and 
heterosexuals. The results showed homosexuals were more 
androgynous and did not differ from the heterosexuals in 
depression or self-esteem. Sex-role category was associated with 
these psychological health measures though sexual preference was 
not. Sex-role is more predictive of psychological health than is 
sexual preference. 
Boyden, 	Carroll 	and 	Maier (1984) investigated sexual 
attraction in homosexual partner preferences using the BSRI. The 
results suggest that partner preference does not reflect any 
fundamental characteristic of sex-role. It seems that homosexual 
and heterosexual attraction are fundamentally similar. Because 
heterosexual male controls were not used this study does not 
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allow a comparison of homosexual - heterosexual levels of 
masculinity and femininity. 
Storms (1980) reviewed the literature related to sex-roles 
and concluded that, as an area of research, it has provided 
little as an explanatory device of homosexuality. He measured 
social sex-role using the PAQ in response to a finding by Ward 
(cited by Storms) that a sample of homosexual men and women 
showed sex-role inversion compared to college students. Storms 
found no significant differences on the three subscales of the 
PAQ between the homosexuals, bisexuals, and heterosexuals. He 
says in examining his data that "very weak support could be 
claimed for the sex role hypothesis, but only with the dubious 
suspension of conventional statistical safeguards" (1980, P• 
787). 
Social sex-role research has failed to demonstrate any major 
reliable differences between homosexuals and heterosexuals. 
Social sex-role measures do not reliably differentiate 
homosexuals and heterosexuals: the homosexual male and 
heterosexual male are both typically masculine and both are 
typically different to the feminine heterosexual female. Of the 
five studies which compare homosexual and heterosexual males, 
three studies show homosexual males are more androgynous than 
heterosexuals. One of these studies shows that homosexual males 
may be more 'feminine'. The number of studies in the literature 
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using the sex-role methodology to investigate homosexuality is 
small. Overall, the social sex-role scales differentiate the 
sexes and not groups that differ in sexual preferences. 
The rationale in the literature for testing homosexuals using 
social sex-role scales is poorly articulated. Current sex-role 
scales do not contain items that discriminate between homosexual 
males and heterosexual males (Freund, Nagler, Langevin, Zajac, Be 
Steiner, 1974). Implicit in these studies is that in some way 
the homosexual male is sexually different - somehow more 
'feminine' and/or less 'masculine' 
- 
and therefore the 
homosexual male should in some way be similar to the 
heterosexual female and different from the heterosexual male. 
That the homosexual male is in some way more feminine and less 
masculine 
- 
a sexual invert - is a popular belief. Perhaps the 
homosexual is expected to deviate from the social sex-role norms 
because he is often regarded as deviant and "behaviors that 
deviate from these stereotypes are viewed as inappropriate" 
(Shively fle DeCecco, 1977, p. 43). 
There is little empirical support for a hypothesis that 
states that the homosexual male is in some way 'sexually 
feminine' when this is measured by the social sex-role scale 
which has its referent in biological sex. There is, however, in 
the gender literature reviewed above quite substantial empirical 
support for the homosexual male being in some way 'gender 
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feminine'. 
The heterosexual male typically regards himself, and is 
typically regarded by others, as being male. The sex and gender 
literature supports the heterosexual male being biologically 
male, gender male, and socially masculine. Similarly, female 
heterosexuals are typically female, that is, biologically 
female, gender female, and socially feminine. The homosexual 
male typically regards himself as male. The sex and gender 
literature supports the homosexual male being biologically male 
and socially masculine. The homosexual male's belief in being 
male is, however, at variance with a small but impressive body 
of empirical gender research showing the homosexual male being 
gender-different to the heterosexual male. 
Discussion of Gender and Sex Research 
In a recent 'Annual Review of Psychology' Deaux (1985) 
extensively reviewed the psychological literature related to sex 
and gender in a paper called 'Sex and Gender'. Deaux concluded 
from this extensive review that: 
in general, more consistent use of terms would 
clarify many of the discussions in this area. The 
confusion, however, is not merely an issue of 
semantics. Frequently underlying the debate on the 
use of sex versus gender, for example, are 
assumptions about the determinants of differences 
between men and women, whereby sex often invokes 
biological causes while gender invokes 
explanations based on socialization (1985, p. 
34 
51). 
Historically the assumed 'determinants of differences between 
men and women' have been sex and gender. Historically the 
assumed determinants of differences between homosexuals and 
heterosexuals have been sex, and more recently, gender. There 
are, however, no well established sex differences between 
homosexual and heterosexual males that also account for sexual 
preference differences. The homosexual male appears to be 
biologically male and socio-culturally masculine like the 
heterosexual male. Homosexual and heterosexual males do differ 
in their subjective experience and this difference in gender 
identity has been found to be associated with differences in 
adult sexual preferences. 
Deaux (1985) draws attention to the biological and 
socializational assumptions that appear to underlie the assumed 
determinants of sex and gender differences and to the confusion 
in the literature that is 'not merely an issue of semantics'. It 
is this confusion, both conceptual and semantic, which is now 
addressed and the purpose of this discussion is to resolve, at 
least partially, this confusion and thereby to lead to an 
understanding of homosexuality. 
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a) Conceptual confusion of sex and gender 
If sex and gender had the same referent then there would be 
no sensible distinction between them and conceptually they would 
be synonyms. It would also follow that 'male' (and also 
'female') would have the same meaning in the sex and gender 
literature referring to the 'male' (and 'female') of biological 
sex. In this literature where there is no explicit conceptual 
distinction between sex and gender and where the biological male 
is necessarily male gendered, the proposition of a biological 
male who is female gendered must be confusing as this 
proposition contradicts the implicit rationale of biological and 
gender identity congruency (i.e., male bodied therefore male 
gender identity). This implicit rationale is however 
contradicted by empirical studies which support the proposition 
that the homosexual biological male is also gender-female. 
A person who is both 'male' (sexed) and 'female' (gendered) 
is contrary to the assumption of sexual and gender identity 
congruency, and furthermore, contrary to a conceptual 
equivalence of sex and gender and a rationale implicit in the 
literature which equates 'male-sex' and 'male-gender' (and 
similarly 'female') in the same referent of biological sex. This 
proposition of homosexual 'femininity', when using this implicit 
rationale of sexual and gender congruency, must be confusing 
since there is no way of thinking about 'female' (or 'male') 
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that is separate to 'female' (and 'male') of biological sex. 
With this rationale it is not possible to conceptualize a 
biological male who is also gender-female. 
The male and female of sex research - both biological 
research and social sex-role research - use the objectively 
observable male and female identities of biological sex, that 
is, sexual identity is their referent. The male and female of 
gender research uses the subjectively experienced gender 
identity 	as 	their referent, an experience which has an 
objectively observable expression in gender 	nonconformity. 
'Male' 	(and 'female') has two different referents in sexual 
identity and in gender identity. With this distinction it is 
possible to conceptualize a biological male who is also female 
gendered but this rationale is poorly developed in the sex and 
gender literature. A theory is described in Chapter 3 which uses 
a psychological frame of reference and which identifies these 
two rationales as different ways of thinking. 
Subjective is an adjective used to qualify nouns whose 
referent arises from one's own mind, and which do not correspond 
to, nor are caused by, external reality. The referent of male 
(or female) of gender identity is the mind of the subject. It 
can be inferred from gender identity studies that the homosexual 
and heterosexual male have different psychological experiences 
of themselves related to being gender-male or gender-female. The 
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reference for this male and female is in the mind of the subject 
and it may or may not correspond to the biological male and 
female of external reality. 
Gender has usually invoked socializational explanations 
(Deaux, 1985). Since the socialization process has its origins 
in the external reality of social experience and does not arise 
primarily in the subject's own mind, the assumption of 
socialization as a causative agent in gender identity formation 
is probably erroneous. A theory will be proposed in Chapter 3 
that describes an internal reality. This theory will use a 
psychological rather than a biological or sociological frame of 
reference. 
Objective is an adjective used to qualify nouns whose 
reference relates to objects which exist independently of the 
mind. The masculine and feminine social sex-roles have their 
origin in socialization and their referent is in the objectively 
observable male and female identities of biological sex. 
The male (and female) of sex and gender research has 
different referents and therefore the concept of male (and 
female) in the context of sex is different to the concept of 
male (and female) in the context of gender. The concept of male 
(and of female) has two different meanings since male has two 
different referents. It is not the purpose of this thesis to 
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elaborate the different meanings of male (or of female) in the 
sex and gender contexts. The purpose of this discussion is to 
show that sex and gender are conceptually distinct: male (and 
female) has a different meaning when used in the different 
contexts of sex and gender. 
This conceptual distinction has not been made in 	the 
psychological literature. If this distinction is not made then 
the potential for semantic confusion is high when a term which 
appears to have only the one meaning has two different meanings. 
This has been the case in the psychological literature when male 
(and female) appears to refer to the biological meaning of male 
and not also to a psychological meaning of male (and of female). 
It is this semantic confusion in the literature that is now 
discussed. 
b) Semantic confusion of sex and gender 
The referent for gender identity is in the subjectivity or 
mind of the subject. According to gender research literature 
gender identity and sexual identity are generally congruent, 
that is for example, male-sexed and male-gendered. This 
congruent relationship between sex and gender is not always so. 
The gender research reviewed above shows that the homosexual 
male has a gender identity different to that of the heterosexual 
male. The relationship between sex and gender is not always 
39 
congruent as (some) transsexuality demonstrates. Shively and 
DeCecco found that gender identity is "not entirely contingent 
upon the individual's biological sex. Occasionally boys develop 
the conviction of being female and girls of being male" (1977, 
p. 41). 
Because the term male (and female) has different referents 
the observation that a person is biologically male does not 
imply that this person is gender-male (and similarly for 
females). There is, however, an assumption in the literature 
that the biological male is also normally male gendered. This 
assumption is untested and this has had two effects. One effect 
is the labelling of the homosexual male as gender-female. 
Another effect is that the rationale implied by the making of 
this assumption has remained unchallenged in the literature. 
This rationale which has the referent for 'male' (and 'female') 
only in biological sex and not also in the mind of the subject 
has been discussed above. 
It is assumed that the heterosexual male is biologically male 
and gender-male, that is, there is a congruency of biological 
sex and gender identity in male heterosexuality (and a similar 
congruency in female heterosexuality). The homosexual male is 
biologically male (and socially male) like the heterosexual 
male. The homosexual male is however distinguished by a 'gender 
nonconformity' which is strongly related to homosexuality. 
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Because this 'gender nonconformity' relates to behaviours 
typical of biological females this gender identity is labelled 
'feminine' by Freund et al (1974, 1977). The datum for defining 
male and female is biological sex and the labelling of gender 
identity as male or female follows on from the assumption that 
heterosexuality is characterized by sex and gender congruency 
and homosexuality by sex and gender incongruency. There is no 
empirical evidence to support this assumption: the rationale 
that only uses biological sex as the referent for 'male' (and 
'female') remains untested. 
There are two points to be considered: 
(i) A theory of a 'male' (and a 'female') identity that does not 
have its referent in biological sex would be contrary to the 
implicit rationale of the sex and gender literature. Empirical 
support for this theory which has the subject as its referent 
would indicate considerable semantic confusion in the literature 
of the sex and gender concepts of 'male' (and of 'female') and 
prbbably a similar confusion in society generally. 
(ii) The referent for 'male' (and 'female') in social sex-roles 
is male (and female) biological sex. Gender identity and the 
gender differences of 'male' and 'female' reviewed in the 
literature are regarded as being due to socialization (Deaux, 
1985). The frame of reference for social sex-roles and for 
gender identity research has been sociological, and the meaning 
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of 'male' (and 'female') in both areas of research comes from 
its implicit referent to 'male' (and 'female') of biological sex 
which is theoretically incorrect in gender identity. This 
implicit referent to biological sex comes from the sociological 
frame of reference used to interpret male and female gender 
sociologically instead of psychologically. There is an absence 
of theory in this literature which uses a psychological frame of 
reference and where the referent for 'male' (and 'female') is 
not biological but psychological, that is, in the mind of the 
subject. Empirical support for this psychological theory which 
has the subject as the referent would support the rationale of 
this theory and not support the rationale implicit in the 
literature. 
While there is some empirical support that relates sexual 
preference to gender identity in the literature reviewed, there 
is an absence of a psychological theory that integrates sexual 
preferences and gender identity. Traditional theories of 
homosexuality - social learning theory and psychoanalytic theory 
have emphasized socialization as explaining adult 
homosexuality but have not received substantial empirical 
support. 
Conclusions 
There are two dependent variables commonly used: 
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(a) social sex-role (and similar bio-social variables 
with their referent in biological sex), 
and (b) gender (male and female gender identity). 
There are two independent variables commonly used: 
(a) biological sex, 
and (b) sexual preference 
(homosexuality and heterosexuality). 
There is an absence of empirical relationship between sexual 
preference and social sex-role (and other bio-social variables). 
There is an empirical relationship between sexual preference and 
gender identity but theoretical support for this observation has 
not been forthcoming. 
The meaning of 'male' (and of 'female') from social sex-role 
research and the meaning of 'male' (and of 'female') from gender 
identity research are semantically different since the concepts 
of sex and gender are conceptually different. The relationship 
in homosexuality and heterosexuality between the 'male' of sex 
and the 'male' of gender (and similarly for 'female') remains 
untested in the sex and gender literature. The assumption that, 
for example, the heterosexual male is gender-male remains an 
untested 'rule of thumb'. This is perhaps not surprising since 
the sex and gender literature is oriented in a sociological 
frame of reference. Sexual preferences may be oriented in a 
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psychological frame of reference. 
Homosexuality has often been construed as a deviant sexual 
identity. This review of social sex-role literature thus 
contradicts this commonly held belief: homosexual and 
heterosexual males are generally masculine compared to 
heterosexual females who are characteristically feminine. There 
is some support for the proposition that the homosexual male is 
'sexually feminine' since some three of five social sex-role 
studies show him to be more androgynous and one that he is more 
feminine. There is however no empirical support for a 
relationship between this 'femininity' and homosexuality. The 
meaning of this 'femininity' is probably communion or 
inter-personal warmth: there is no obvious reason why this 
characteristic should be theoretically explanatory of male 
homosexuality and female heterosexuality. 
The literature does show that homosexuality is related to a 
nonconforming, or 'deviant', gender identity. Since 'sexuality' 
is oriented in the objectivity of biological sex and gender 
identity is oriented in the subjectivity of the mind, this 
thesis examines homosexuality from the different perspectives of 
subjectivity and objectivity. To meet this aim it is necessary 
that the following conditions be met. 
First, that subject and object be defined and in such a way 
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that the two frames of reference are clearly identified. 
Second, that the two frames of reference be integrated by 
some unifying theory that shows the relation of subject and 
object in some meaningful way that is not just semantic. 
And third, that these definitions and frames of reference be 
operationalized and tested empirically with homosexual males 
(and heterosexual comparisons). 
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CHAPTER 3 
THEORY 
Homosexuality has remained an enigma. Perhaps some of this 
enigma may be resolved by untangling the confusion that 
surrounds homosexuality. This confusion appears to arise from an 
assumption in the gender literature of a sociological 
explanation of homosexuality and an absence of a psychological 
frame of reference. The dialectic of 'I' and 'Me' as an 
expression of the self in subjectivity and objectivity may be 
useful to the resolution of the confusion where 'male' (and 
'female') has one referent in an object (the male of biological 
sex) and another referent in the subject (the male of gender 
identity). 
The theory presented will be that personality, and therefore 
the homosexual male personality, is both subject and object and 
that he is oriented in both the sociological and the 
psychological frames of reference. The use of an explicit 
psychological frame of reference is a departure from the 
traditional sociologically oriented rationale of the sex and 
gender literature reviewed in Chapter 2. The 'I' and the 'Me' 
refers to myself as a subject and as an object respectively. 
There is in this dialectic a person who is both subject and 
object and yet a person who remains only the one person. 
Confusion has arisen in the sex and gender literature when 
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sex and gender are regarded as synomyns, for example, when 
sexual identity and gender identity are supposed to be identical 
(male-sexed therefore male-gendered, and female-sexed therefore 
female-gendered) but the homosexual male appears to be a deviant 
(male-sexed but female-gendered). Clearly, if sex and gender are 
synonyms and there is no meaningful distinction between sex and 
gender (and therefore between sexual identity and gender 
identity) then homosexuality must remain enigmatic since the 
homosexual appears to be a confound of male (biologically and 
socially) and female (psychologically). Some of this confusion 
may be resolved, firstly, by developing a theory that 
differentiates the sociological and psychological frames of 
reference with their different referents and concepts of 'male' 
(and 'female'), and secondly, by testing that theory 
empirically. 
Mead, according to Morris's introduction to the book "Mind, 
self, and society", sees man as a "role-taking animal" (Mead, 
1934, p. xxi) where roletaking is 'taking the attitude of other 
to self'. Mead uses role as a set of internalized expectations. 
Mead sees the individual as taking an 'impersonal' 
'non-affective' attitude toward self. He maintains that it is 
from this attitude that the 'I' and 'me' arises. He says that: 
the 'I' reacts to the self which arises through 
the taking of the attitudes of others. Through 
taking those attitudes we have introduced the 
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and we react to it as an 'I' (Mead, 1934, p. 
174). 
Mead regards the 'me' as 'conventional' and 'adjusted' and the 
person with 'I' development as the person with 'personality'. 
For Mead the SI, and the 'me' are 'two constantly appearing 
phases' in the self. 
A relationship between two different people is an 
inter-personal relationship, for example, the enactment of 
sexual preference in a homo- or hetero-sexual relationship. It 
is the inter-personal relationship that is described in the 
sociological frame of reference. This sociological frame of 
reference is shown in the following diagram with two other 
persons in an inter-personal relation. The self is shown as the 
uninvolved observer, that is, the observer who does not 
participate. The self (e.g., myself) is here in a third-person 
attitude in relation to the two participants. 
Figure 1. 
Two other persons in social interaction: the sociological .rame  
of reference.  
uninvolved self 
as observer 
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Here the observer of this interaction is outside the field of 
the two participants: the observer does not interact with the 
participants. The observer is here taking a non-involved 
detached or impersonal third-person attitude (defined herein as 
meaning a spatial position as a point of view) towards the 
participants. 
There is also the situation when one of the participants in 
the interaction is myself: a social interaction between myself 
and some other person. This is shown in the following figure. 
	
OTHER PERSON 
	
SELF 
Figure 2. 
Another person and 	myself 	It social 	interaction: 	ILE 
sociological frame of reference. 
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Figure 2 shows an 'I-you' relationship between myself and 
some other person. This implies that 'I' am the subject and the 
other person is the object 'you'. Figure 2 also shows what may 
be described as a 'me-you' relationship between myself and some 
other person. This implies that both 'me' and the other person 
'you' are objects. When two people are in interaction and one of 
those persons is myself, there is implied in the relationships 
of 'I-you' and 'me-you' a person (myself) who is both subject 
and object and yet a person who remains only the one person. 
Whereas in Figure 1 the observer (myself) is outside the 
field of interaction, in Figure 2 the observer (myself) is 
inside the field as a participant-observer. The observer is here 
participating, that is, taking an involved attitude in the 
interaction with 'the two constantly appearing phases' (Mead, 
1934) in myself of the subject 'I' and object 'Me'. 
In these situations the frame of reference is sociological, 
that is as previously defined, the frame of reference is the 
inter-personal relationships of the external world between two 
separate persons. In the sociological frame of reference a 
person may take the subjective (1st person) and objective (2nd 
person) attitude of participant-observer in relation to some 
other person in involved interaction (Figure 2), and they may 
also take the objective (3rd person) attitude of detached 
observer towards others (Figure 1). 
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Mead asks this question: "How can an individual get outside 
himself in such a way as to become an object to himself?" (1934, 
p. 138). Mead recognized this as an essential psychological 
problem. He says: 
The apparatus of reason would not be complete 
unless it swept itself into its own analysis of 
the field of experience; or unless the individual 
brought himself into the same experiential field 
as that of other individual selves in relation to 
whom he acts in any given social situation (1934, 
p. 138). 
Mead's answer to his question is by 'taking the role of other to 
self'. The 'role of other' implies a social frame of reference 
whereas taking this role 'to self' implies a psychological frame 
of reference. Mead's theory describes a confound of both the 
sociological and psychological frames of reference. 
A Theory of Persons-grammar: a psychological frame of reference 
Whereas the sociological frame of reference has its referent 
in the inter-personal relationships of social activities, the 
psychological frame of reference has its referent in the 
intra-personal relationships within the individual. More 
specifically, these psychological relationships have their 
referent in the subjectivity of the self, that is, in the 'I' of 
the 'I-I', 'I-you', and 'I-he' (-she, -it) relationships of the 
first-, second-, and third-persons respectively. The dialectic 
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of 'I' and 'Me' (and the implied third-person self of Mead's 
theory), when examined from an inner individual perspective, 
establishes a psychological frame of reference with the 
subjective 'I' as its referent. It is this psychological frame 
of reference using the first-, second-, and third-persons of 
grammar, which is now discussed. The examination of 
homosexuality by the application of this psychological 
theoretical frame in empirical studies is then discussed in the 
'Rationale' which follows the theory of persons-grammar and a 
psychology of sexual preferences. 
The persons-grammar is an organization of 'persons' within 
the functioning whole or self (traditionally called a trinity). 
These 'persons' are structural principles, that is, meta-roles, 
providing organization to the personality through the functions 
that they perform. The function of the 'person' is shown by the 
relationships between the 'persons' within the personality. 
These functions and relationships are summarized in the 
following table. The term 'role' can refer to both the notion of 
'function' and to the notion of 'expectation'. Herein 'role' is 
used in the functional sense which includes the enactment of 
social expectation (social role) as a functional form. 
OTHER SELF 
psychological frame of reference 
Figures 1 and 2. 
implied but not explicit in 
Intra-perbcr 	el 
lationships 
terpersonal 
1=-4 
relationship 
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Table 1. 
Meta-roles and meta-role relations af. tha psychological frame. 
PERSON 	META-ROLE 	META-ROLE IN RELATION 
(META-ROLE) 	RELATION TO SELF ('I-') 
1st 	I - I 	subject 
2nd I - you object 
3rd 	I - he 	object 
(also -she, -it) 
To avoid confusion the psychological meta-roles will be 
identified as 'persons' (not persons). This table is now shown 
in diagrammatic form to emphasize the distinction between the 
sociological and psychological frames of reference. The purpose 
of Figure 3 which follows is to identify and separate a 
Figure 3. 
iha sociological aal psYchological frames of reference: the 
expansion 2j the self into the three 'persons'.  
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Each of these 'persons' and their relations is now discussed. 
Though each is discussed in order from first to third, this 
ordering should not be construed as implying any developmental 
sequence. This ordering is only a means to an end, that is, to 
eventually describe a personality structure of the adult which 
uses a psychological frame of reference and whose referent is in 
the subjective 'I'. As these 'persons' all have their referent 
in one's self they all share only the one sexual identity. 
The 'first-person' in this psychological frame of reference 
is the subject in relation to the self. The 'I' is both self and 
subject and this is described by the 'I-I' relationship of the 
'first-person' and the self. In Figure 3 the self is the subject 
in intra-personal relations because of the identity of self and 
subject in the 'I-I' relationship. In Figure 1, however, taking 
the uninvolved attitude the self takes the third-person attitude 
of the object: the self is an object to the other. The self 
takes two forms as subject and object, and this equivalence of 
contraries (subject and object appearing to be different and 
therefore contrary) may eventually explain some of the confusion 
that arises in the literature from the confusion of two frames 
of reference which have different referents in the subject and 
in the object. 
It is the 'I' as subject - the meta-role of 'first-person' in 
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a psychological framework - that is now discussed, and not the 
self as an object in a sociological framework (as shown for 
example in Figure 1). This distinction between the sociological 
and psychological frames of reference is important to the 
theoretical development of this thesis. 
It is axiomatic of this theory that the 'first-person' is the 
locus of creativity. The function of the subject is 
role-creating and implicit in each role is a construct. 
I have a biological father who exists separately to me in a 
social context as a flesh-and-blood person. Separate to this 
flesh-and-blood father is another 'father' who is my idea or 
construction of 'father' and who exists as my thought of 
'father' and is not my biological flesh-and-blood father. This 
'father' is the product of my own thinking - a psychological 
construct (i.e., an abstract thought). It is the function of the 
subject to creatively produce roles, such as, 'my father' role 
(and also 'my mother', 'my sister', 'my brother', 'my cat', , my 
house', 'my car', etc., roles). The role of 'my father' is a 
product of my own creativity and imagination that has a separate 
existence to my biological father: my thinking (in this case the 
construct of 'father') and my biological father are conceptually 
different. (In a circumstance where my biological father 'has 
died while I am an infant and there is no father substitute it 
may be difficult to form the thought of 'my father'. In this 
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circumstance however the distinction between biological father 
and the role of 'my father' as a psychological construct are 
more clearly and separately defined since the flesh-and-blood 
father had existence even if the role of 'my father' and its 
implicit construct 'father' does not). 
The 'first-person' creates the role. The 'second-' and 
'third-persons' are objects in relation (including null 
relation) to the role-creating 'first-person'. The theory of 
persons-grammar has two subject - object relationships, the 
relationship between the 'first-' and 'second-persons', and that 
between the 'first-' and 'third-persons'. These two 
psychological relationships and the meta-role functions of the 
'second-' and 'third-persons' are crucial to this thesis (and 
empirical Studies). Both subject - object relationships and the 
functioning of the objective meta-roles (i.e., 'second-' and 
'third-persons') are now discussed and examples given. 
The 'second-person' is an object in relationship to the 
'first-person' subject. The nature of this relationship is 
interactive: the 'I-you' relationship of these meta-roles is a 
meeting of two 'persons' - an involvement. An example is now 
given. 
My biological father can be addressed directly in social 
interaction. I can however also, and separately, address 'my 
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father' role. I am in a room without my biological father 
present. I think about him and, in my inner self-talk, I begin 
to address him. I begin to tell him about the finished and 
unfinished events of days gone by, and then about those 
particular events of yesterday. I begin to speak to him out loud 
and address the place where I imagine him to be in this room. I 
address 'him' - 'my father'. 
The role of 'my father' is created by the subject 'I'. In 
this example 'I' the subject have addressed, not my biological 
father, but my own construction of him as 'my father' role. 
Although the role of 'my father' is created in thought by the 
subject, the idea of 'my father' becomes separated (i.e., 
becomes objective) from the subject in this example just given. 
The idea of 'father' has become abstracted as the construct of 
my subjectively experienced role of 'my father'. This object of 
my thoughts, the abstract 'father', is addressed directly and is 
an example of the 'I-you' relationship. This intra-personal 
relationship is shown in the following figure. 
interpersonal 
relationship 
BIOLOGICAL 
FATHER 
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Figure 4. 
Exoansion of the self til show the object ('second-oerson')  
relationship with the subject ('first-oerson'). 
These psychological objects (such as 'my father') that exist 
in a relation to the subject are the meta-roles of the 
'second-person'. In the example just given the 'my father' role 
is created by the subject and is addressed directly as an 
object. 'My father' is created in subjectivity and is manifested 
In thought as an object, that is, the 'second-person' meta-role. 
In this psychological framework the function of the 
'first-person' is to create the role (e.g., 'my father') and the 
function of the 'second-person' is to take the role created. In 
the example given 'my father' is present as an object which is 
addressed. 'I' the subject have created this object and am able 
to address 'him', that is, to objectify (create thought which is 
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manifest as 'my father' in the given example). Generalizing from 
this example, the function of the 'second-person' is to take the 
subjectively created role, that is, to take one's own role and 
its implicit construct. 
The 'third-person', like the 'second-person', is an object to 
the 'first-person' as subject. The nature of this relationship 
is not interactive: the 'I-he' relation ('-she', '-it') of these 
meta-roles describes an absence where 'he' (for example) is 
absent from the 'I'. This is a null-relationship since it 
indicates a detachment - an absence of encounter - of the two 
'persons'. An example is now given. 
My biological father can be addressed directly in social 
encounter. I am, however, in a room without my biological father 
present and I cannot speak to my flesh-and-blood father since he 
is not here. I imagine him and what I would like to say to him 
were he present in this room. I could tell him about the 
finished and unfinished events of days gone by, and then about 
those particular events of yesterday. I wish to speak out to him 
and address him but he is not really here. Perhaps I will be 
with him tomorrow and talk to him then. Then I will be able to 
speak to my father. I cannot now speak with him because he is 
not here. 
In this example 'I' the subject in the room have addressed 
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'my absent father' and not 'my father'. My construction is that 
'he' is absent. While it is factually correct that my 
flesh-and-blood father is not present, in this example it is as 
though 'my father' is absent and cannot be, and is not, 
addressed. The flesh-and-blood father of the sociological frame 
of reference is confounded with the construct of 'my father' of 
the psychological frame of reference. This object of my 
thoughts, the abstract 'my father', is absent and this is an 
example of the 'I-he' relationship. My flesh-and-blood father is 
absent in this example but this 'he' (flesh and blood father) is 
an object in a different (i.e., sociological) frame of 
reference: my biological father appears to be the referent and 
not 'he' of my own 'my father' role. 
The role of 'my father' is created by the subject 'I'. In 
this example 'I' have not addressed 'my father' as the role of 
'my father' appears to me in this 'third-person' attitude to be 
located in my flesh-and-blood father and not within myself. My 
thinking is confused: the role of 'my father' (a construct) is 
confounded with what appears to be my (biological) father. The 
role of 'my father', and therefore my thinking, is dissociated. 
This dissociated thinking is expressed as the null-relation of 
'I' and 'he' ('she', 'it'). 
This theory has been described from the point of view of the 
'first-person' since the referent for this theory is in the 
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subject '1'. It may however be useful for the sake of some 
clarity (if one can have clarity about confusion) to examine 
this 'third-person' meta-role a little further. Mead describes 
the meta-role of the 'third-person'. 
Mead considered how an individual can become an object to 
himself. The individual does so by roletaking, defined by Mead 
as 'taking the role of other to self'. The individual 
objectifies himself according to Mead by taking an 'impersonal', 
'non-affective' attitude towards self. This attitude - where the 
observer is outside the field of interaction and does not 
interact with the participants - has been previously described 
and shown in Figure 1. Now, however, the participants are not 
other flesh-and-blood people but the 'first-' and 
'second-persons' of the self. In 'taking the role of other to 
self' Mead says that the observer (role of other) is also 
observed (the self). 
A central concern of this thesis is the concept of confusion 
arising from the confounding of two frames of reference. It is 
the purpose here to present the taking of this 'third-person' 
attitude as an example of confused thinking which arises from a 
confound of two frames of reference. This author appreciates 
that the following figure cannot occur in reality but to the 
extent that it does actually happen it identifies a confound and 
subsequent confusion (and departure from reality) in the 
individual who thinks this way. 
interpersonal 
relati 
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3rd 'person' takes role 
to self as though an 
nterpersonal 
relationship. 
Figure 5. 
lbg, 'third-person' taking the role of other to the self. 
By assuming an inter-personal relationship with one's self, 
the 'third-person' appears to be outside of the self. The 
'third-person' takes an attitude to self that mimics the self 
observing the inter-personal relationships shown in Figure 1. In 
Figure 5 however the participants are one's self whereas in 
Figure 1 the participants are other people (not self). Taking 
the 'third-person' attitude - taking the role of other to self - 
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makes believe that I can have an inter-personal relationship 
with myself. To construe, as does the 'third-person', the 'I' 
and 'me' relationship as inter-personal and not intra-personal 
is to think of the self as an object in the uninvolved (Figure 
1) sociological frame of reference and not as the subject in a 
psychological frame of reference. The 'third-person' uses an 
inappropriate frame of reference. The 'third-person' is an 
example of a confound: an individual who uses this way of 
thinking confounds two frames of reference. 
The 'third-person' describes the taking of some role whose 
referent is external to the mind. The referent is sociological 
rather than psychological. The role whose referent is 
sociological is the social role. Generalizing from the example 
and the discussion, the function of the 'third-person' is to 
take, not one's own role, but to take the role of other, that 
is, to take the social role. 
Within this persons-grammar psychological frame of reference 
there are two relationships (or ways of thinking about reality): 
the 'second-person' psychological relationship and the 
'third-person' sociological relationship. The 'third-person' 
takes the social role (role of other) and is dissociated from 
the creativity of the self in the 'first-person'. There is no 
relationship between the 'first-' and 'third-persons': the 
referent for this meta-role is in the external reality of social 
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relationships. Because of this absence of meeting with the 
subject the 'third-person' describes a construct of detached 
objectivity. 
To take the 'second-person' attitude is to take one's own 
role. The involved objectivity of the 'second-person' is 
integrated with the creativity of the self as the 
'first-person'. Because of the reciprocity or meeting with the 
subject the 'second-person' describes a construct of involved 
objectivity. 
A fourth relationship is implied as the 'you-he' or 
'second-person' - 'third-person' relationship. The relationship 
between these two psychological 'persons' implies a scale of 
objectivity that has two polar extremes. At one polar extreme is 
the involved objectivity of the 'second-person' whose referent 
is in the creativity of the 'first-person'. At the other polar 
extreme is the detached objectivity of the 'third-person' whose 
referent is in the culture of the society. Between these two 
polarities there is implied a psychological continuum. At one 
extreme is the taking of one's own created role (involved 
objectivity) and at the other extreme is the taking of a social 
role (detached objectivity). The fourth relationship is a 
theoretical dimension of thinking from the involved objectivity 
(integrated thinking) of the 'second-person' to the detached 
objectivity (dissociation) of the 'third-person'. 
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The term spontaneity refers to one's own free will, that 
which is self-originated and which is without external cause. As 
the 'third-person' the individual acts out the social role. In 
taking the social role the person enacts the socio-cultural 
origins of the role in social conditioning. This role is not 
self-originated, it is of an external (i.e., social) cause, and 
it may not reflect the person's free will. As the 
'second-person' the individual acts their own role. In taking 
their own role the person embodies the creative origins of this 
role in their self. This role is self-originated, it is without 
external cause and the full enactment of this role involves the 
individual's free will. This fourth relationship from 'you' 
('second-') to 'he' ('third-person') describes a continuum of 
decreasing spontaneity associated with an increasing 
dissociation of thought. 
The persons-grammar is a unified theory of reality that uses 
a psychological frame of reference. Within this unified theory 
is another theory of reality, that is, the socio-cultural 
thinking of the 'third-person' using a sociological frame of 
reference. The psychological framework provided by the 
persons-grammar dialectic integrates both of these ways of being 
as endpoints of a theoretical continuum of thinking and 
spontaneity. This general theory is now applied in a psychology 
of sexual preferences. (The Theory of Persons-grammar is 
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developed further in Appendix 4). 
A Psychology of Sexual Preference 
Homo- and hetero-sexual preference is an expression of the 
self ('I') towards another person (the object). Sexual 
preference has its origins in the individual's psychology though 
this preference is expressed to another, that is, socially. To 
define homosexuality (and heterosexuality) - which exists in a 
psychological frame by sexual preference which is 
conventionally regarded as an inter-personal (social) 
phenomenon, may be to confuse the two (psychological and 
socio-cultural) relationships and therefore the psychological 
and sociological frames of reference. 
There are two substantive issues addressed in this 
dissertation. The first is the origin of homosexuality (and 
heterosexuality) in the psychological theory of persons-grammar. 
The second concerns the male or female gender identity of the 
homosexual and heterosexual. 
The psychology of sexual preference is discussed in two 
parts. The relationship between homosexuality and gender 
identity in the theory of persons-grammar is discussed first. 
Then the identification of gender identity as a male or female 
entity in homosexuals and heterosexuals is discussed. 
66 
(i) Sexual preference and gender identity 
Homosexuality (and heterosexuality) is an expression of the 
gender of the self. It is part of the creating and taking of 
one's own self as the 'first-' and "second-persons'. The self, 
and its gender, exists in a psychological frame of reference 
independent of the sociological frame of reference and therefore 
separately from sexual identity and constructs with their 
referent in biological sex. 
Homosexuality is not therefore a taking of the role of other 
where this 'third-person' social role is the social learning 
(social sex-role for example) associated with biological sex. 
Sexual preference is therefore predicted from gender identity 
and not from social sex-role. Homosexuality (and therefore 
homosexual preference as an inter-personal phenomenon) has a 
psychological origin in the personality of the subject. This is 
the first substantive issue of this thesis - the relationship 
between homosexuality and gender identity and the predicted 
absence of relationship between homosexuality and social 
sex-role. 
From this theory with its relationship of 'first-' and 
'second-persons' it is predicted that homosexuality (and 
heterosexuality) should be empirically associated with 
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differences in gender identity since the 'second-person' takes 
his own role created by the 'first-person'. It is also predicted 
from this theory that when the individual takes the role of 
other, this role will have no relationship to the subject in the 
psychological frame of reference even though this social role 
will have some relationship to the self as object in the 
sociological frame of reference. The 'third-person' in the 
social role is dissociated from the self (as subject): the 
persons-grammar theory predicts that there is no relationship 
between the 'first-' and 'third-persons' and therefore in this 
psychology of sexual preferences there is no theoretical or 
statistical association predicted between social-sex role and 
homosexuality (and heterosexuality). 
Empirical support for these hypotheses would therefore 
support the proposition that gender identity - the gender of the 
self as subject in the psychological frame of reference - is 
causative of adult homo- and hetero-sexuality. This empirical 
support would contradict the conventional theories of 
homosexuality which theorize that sexual identity and social 
sex-role are causative of adult homo- and heter-sexuality. 
Socio-cultural variables related to the biological sex of the 
self as object do not predict homo- and hetero-sexuality. 
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(ii) The maleness or femaleness of homosexual gender identity 
	
Empirical support for (i) above would demonstrate 	the 
theoretical 	relationship 	between homosexuality and gender 
identity. It would show that heterosexual females and 
homosexual males have the same gender identity that is different 
to the gender identity of heterosexual males. 
Such empirical support would not however identify whether 
this gender identity is male or female (and vice versa in the 
heterosexual male). The gender of the 'first-person' (the 
subject) as male or female remains to be tested and identified 
in homosexuals and heterosexuals and not just assumed as is 
presently the case in the literature reviewed. This is the 
second substantive issue of this thesis: the identification of 
the gender identity of the homosexual male as male or female. 
This issue will be addressed (and tested empirically) by 
identifying whether the sex partner as an object to the subject 
('/') takes the 'second-' or 'third-person' role in the 
subject's psychological frame of reference. 
There is a commonly held belief in sex and gender congruency, 
that is for example, the heterosexual male is biologically and 
in other ways (sociologically and psychologically) male. 
Although this belief remains untested the gender identity of the 
homosexual male has been labelled female in the sex and gender 
69 
literature (for example, by Freund et al., 1974; 1977). The 
model of personality implicit in the literature assumes that the 
homosexual male is gender-female like the heterosexual female 
and unlike the heterosexual male who is assumed to be 
gender-male. In the model of homosexual personality proposed 
herein the homosexual male and heterosexual female are 
gender-male and the heterosexual male is gender-female. These 
models of personality structure are now discussed and verifiable 
hypotheses are proposed. 
Personality models implicit in the literature 
Implicit in community beliefs and in the literature is the 
theory that sex and gender congruency is normal and that sex and 
gender incongruency is deviant. Using this implicit theoretical 
position Freund et al. (1974; 1977) nominally define the gender 
identity of the homosexual male as female. The labelling of the 
homosexual and heterosexual identities in the following Models 
of personality is implied by this assumption. 
70 
Table 2. 
Identity in the implicit models of personality  
ASSUMED OBSERVED OBSERVED SEXUAL 
GENDER SEXUAL 	IDENTITY OF PREFERRED 
IDENTITY IDENTITY SEX PARTNER 
Heterosexual male 	male 	male 	female 
Heterosexual female 	female 	female 	male 
Homosexual male 	female male 	male 
In the psychological frame of reference of the heterosexual 
male subject the 'first-person' ('I') is male and the sexual 
identity of the preferred sex partner is female. In this 
personality model with the subject as the frame of reference the 
heterosexual preference of this male-sexed subject is expressed 
as the 'I-she' relationship of the 'third-person'. The 
heterosexual preference of the female-sexed subject is expressed 
as the 'I-he' relationship of the 'third-person'. The homosexual 
male's sexual preference is also an expression of the 'I-he' 
relationship of the 'third-person' (same as heterosexual 
female). In these implicit models both heterosexual and 
homosexual sexual preferences are theoretically expressions of 
the 'third-person' relationship. 
In the social frame of reference the heterosexual male is 
objectively male (sexual identity) and the objective sexual 
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identity of his preferred sex partner is female. The 
heterosexual female is objectively female (sexual identity) and 
the objective sexual identity of her preferred sex partner is 
male. In this inter-personal 'object - object' frame the 
homosexual male is objectively male (sexual identity) and the 
objective sexual identity of his preferred sex partner is male. 
In this implicit model which has labelled the homosexual male as 
gender feminine, homosexuality as a sexual preference for the 
same-sex partner is deviant to the opposite male and female 
relations of heterosexuality. This apparently deviant 
relationship has been used (socially, legally, etc) to imply a 
deviancy in homosexual preference. There is however, apart from 
this 'deviant relationship', scant evidence of any deviancy 
separate from this relationship itself and a nonconformist 
gender identity. This social frame theory (in which the 
homosexual is gender feminine) predicts that homosexual males 
should show deviancy compared with heterosexual controls. 
Sexual preference in the psychological frame (and labelling 
as in Table 2) defines sexual preference as an expression of the 
'third-person' relationship. In this frame the sexual identity 
of the sex partner is an object in the 'third-person' to the 
subject and there is no essential difference between homosexual 
and heterosexual preference. In this frame homosexuality is not 
deviant and increased deviancy (defined herein as socio- and 
psycho-pathology) associated with homosexuality is not expected. 
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The lack of empirical evidence in the literature to support a 
theory of homosexual deviancy argues against a social frame 
theory of sexual preference. 
This implicit theory of sexual preferences which models (for 
example) a heterosexual male's sexual identity - gender identity 
congruency, predicts the homosexual male is gender-female. This 
theory asserts that sexual preferences are theoretically related 
in the psychological frame to the sex partner taking the role of 
other to self, that is, the subject manifesting the 
'third-person' meta-role of detached objectivity. In this theory 
of sexual preferences the individual takes the 'third-person' 
meta-role of detached objectivity, that is, has the 
socio-cultural thinking of the 'third-person' relationship. 
Proposed personality models 
A theory of sexual preferences is proposed whereby the sexual 
partner takes the meta-role of the 'second-person' relative to 
the subject. This theory predicts models of personality in which 
heterosexuality is characterized by sex-gender incongruency and 
homosexuality by sex-gender congruency. These models of 
personality are shown in the following table. 
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Table 3. 
Identity in the proposed models of personality  
PROPOSED OBSERVED OBSERVED SEXUAL 
GENDER 	SEXUAL 	IDENTITY OF PREFERRED 
IDENTITY IDENTITY SEX PARTNER 
Heterosexual male 	female 	male 	female 
Heterosexual female 	male 	female 	male 
Homosexual male 	male 	male 	male 
In the psychological frame of reference of the heterosexual 
male subject the 'first-person' ('I') is female and the sexual 
identity of the preferred sex partner is also female. In this 
personality model with the subject as the frame of reference the 
heterosexual preference of this male-sexed subject is expressed 
as the 'I-you' relationship of the 'second-person'. The 
heterosexual preference of the female-sexed subject is also 
expressed as the 'I-you' relationship of the 'second-person'. 
The homosexual male's sexual preference is also an expression of 
the 'I-you' relationship of the 'second-person'. In this 
proposed theory of sexual preferences both the heterosexual and 
homosexual sexual preferences are expressions of the 
'second-person' relationship. The sexual identity (male or 
female) of the sex partner is the same as the gender identity 
(male or female) of the subject in both homo- and hetero-sexual 
relationships: the sex partner takes the subject's own role in 
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terms of own subjective gender identity. The sexual identity of 
the preferred sex partner is a manifestation of the subject's 
gender. 
In the social frame of reference the heterosexual male is 
objectively male (sexual identity) and the objective sexual 
identity of his preferred sex partner is female. The 
heterosexual female is objectively female and her preferred sex 
partner is male. The homosexual male is objectively male and his 
preferred sex partner is also male. In this inter-personal 
'object - object' frame the homosexual male is, as in the 
implicit social frame, deviant to the opposites relationships of 
heterosexual sexual identities. In this proposed theory, as in 
the implicit theory, the social frame predicts the deviancy of 
homosexuality. This social frame theory (in which the homosexual 
is gender-male) predicts the homosexual male should show 
deviancy compared to heterosexual controls. 
Sexual preference in the psychological frame (with the 
identities as labelled in Table 3) defines sexual preference as 
a manifestation of the 'second-person' relationship. In this 
frame the sexual identity of the sex partner is an object in the 
'second-person' to the subject and there is no essential 
difference between homosexual and heterosexual preference. In 
this frame homosexuality is not deviant and increased pathology 
associated with homosexuality is not expected. The lack of 
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empirical evidence in the literature to support a theory of 
homosexual deviancy argues against a social frame theory of 
sexual preference. 
This proposed theory of sexual preferences which models, for 
example, male heterosexuality as a sexual identity - gender 
identity incongruency, predicts that the homosexual male is 
gender-male. This theory asserts that sexual preferences are 
theoretically related in the psychological frame to the sex 
partner taking the subject's own role, that is, the subject 
manifesting the 'second-person' meta-role of involved 
objectivity. In this theory of sexual preferences the subject 
takes the 'second-person' meta-role of involved objectivity, 
that is, has the psychological thinking of the 'second-person' 
relationship. 
In summary, the implicit theory and the proposed theory of 
sexual preference predict that the homosexual male is 
gender-feminine and gender-male, respectively. Both theories 
predict homosexual deviancy in the social frame of reference: 
when heterosexuality is defined as normal then homosexuality is 
by implication also defined as deviant. The lack of evidence in 
the literature to show a criterion-referenced deviancy in 
homosexuals does not support a social frame theory of sexual 
preferences. (The socio-cultural moral deviancy hypothesis has 
no criterion-referenced support: it remains a tautology that 
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what is different is per se deviant). Social frame theories of 
sexual preference based on sexual identity alone cannot predict 
the subjective gender identity of the subject (nor differences 
in gender identity which could then be empirically tested). 
The persons-grammar is a unified theory which identifies an 
involved and a detached construct of reality - a psychological 
and a socio-cultural way of thinking respectively - within a 
psychological frame of reference. The involved construct of 
reality predicts that sexual preference manifests a 
'second-person' relationship within the subject's psychological 
world. This construct of reality predicts that the homosexual 
male is gender-male (Table 3). The detached construct of reality 
predicts that sexual preference manifests a 'third-person' 
relationship within the subject's psychological world. This 
construct of reality predicts that the homosexual male is 
gender-female (Table 2). Validation of one of these constructs 
of reality would provide empirical support to that construct and 
therefore to one of the theories of sexual preference. Since 
these theories predict either reality of a male or female gender 
identity then the external validation of one theory also 
confirms the gender identity of the homosexual male and 
heterosexual female as a male or female (and vice versa for the 
heterosexual male). 
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Rationales 
(i) Study 1. 
Conventional theory predicts that homosexuality is related to 
a deviant 'sexual' identity, that is, the homosexual male is 
sexually feminine. This theory is not supported by empirical 
studies, and furthermore, empirical studies support a 
relationship between male homosexuality and a gender identity 
that is typical of biological females. There has been, however, 
an absence of 'gender theory' to support these empirical studies 
of gender in homosexuality. (An 'Androgynous Theory of Gender' 
is presented as part of Appendix 4). 
If 'sexuality' explains home- and hetero-sexuality then the 
homosexual male and heterosexual male should not have the same 
masculinity whose referent is sexual identity (biological sex). 
Similarly, the homosexual male and heterosexual female should 
have the same femininity whose referent is sexual identity. If 
'sexuality' which has its referent in sexual identity predicts 
homo- and hetero-sexuality then sexual preference differences 
should not be related to gender identity which has its referent 
in the gender of the psychological self (i.e., self as 
subject). 
If the gender of the psychological self explains homo- and 
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hetero-sexuality as predicted by the psychological theory of 
persons-grammar then the homosexual male and heterosexual male 
should not have the same gender identity with its subjective 
referent. Similarly, the homosexual male and heterosexual female 
should have the same gender identity. If gender identity is the 
psychological precursor of homosexuality (and heterosexuality) - 
and this is the first substantive issue of this thesis - then 
homo- and hetero-sexuality should not be related to sexual 
identity or to social sex-role or other sex-difference traits 
that have their referent in sexual identity. 
Empirical support for the gender identity hypothesis of 
sexual preferences, over a hypothesis of deviant sexuality, 
would show that the homosexual male and heterosexual female have 
the same gender identity that is different to the gender 
identity of the heterosexual male, and that it is this identity 
of the self that is manifest in the subject's sexual preference. 
If these hypotheses can be tested and confirmed in one empirical 
test then this finding would also support the theory of 
persons-grammar that distinguishes sex and gender as having 
different bio-social and psychological referents. This result, 
however, would not in itself identify this gender identity in 
the homosexual male as male or female. Even though the reviewed 
literature claims this identity is 'feminine' there is no 
explicit theory and no empirical test to substantiate this 
claim. 
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(ii) Study 2. 
The first substantive issue of this thesis is the theoretical 
and empirical relationship between homo- and hetero-sexuality 
and gender identity, and the theoretical and empirical 
null-relationship between homo- and hetero-sexuality and 
'sexuality' (social sex-role and other sex-difference traits 
whose referent is biological sex). These conflicting hypotheses 
are substantially supported in the results of Study 1. Study 2 
attempts to repeat this finding. 
The 	second 	substantive 	issue of this thesis is the 
identification of the homosexual male's gender identity as male 
or female (and the gender identity of the heterosexual male and 
female). The model of personality implicit in the literature is 
that the homosexual male is gender-female (like the heterosexual 
female). The model proposed in this thesis is that the 
homosexual male and the heterosexual female are male gendered 
and that the heterosexual male is female gendered. 
If homosexual males are deviant then a comparison of the 
homosexual male with heterosexual male and female comparisons 
should find evidence of increased deviancy in homosexual males 
in measures of socio- and psycho-pathology. Results which show 
differences in pathology in the expected direction between homo- 
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and hetera-sexuals would support the conventional socio-cultural 
belief of homosexual deviancy. Studies that test the 
socio-cultural belief of homosexual male deviancy have not 
produced empirical support that defend this belief (a way of 
thinking and constructing reality identified as the 
'third-person' relationship). 
The implicit and proposed psychologies of sexual preference 
(discussed above) predict that the homosexual male is 
gender-female and gender-male respectively; however, both 
psychologies predict a homosexual deviancy when using only the 
social frame of reference. A finding of significant pathological 
differences between homosexuals and heterosexuals would support 
a deviancy hypothesis and the social frame theory (i.e., 
'third-person' socio-cultural thinking) that predicts it. A 
finding of no significant pathological differences between 
homosexuals and heterosexuals would discredit the social frame 
theories of homosexuality which theorize (use 'third-person' 
thinking) the origins of sexual preferences in 'sexuality' 
(bio-sociality). 
The social frame prediction of homosexual deviancy is common 
to both the implicit and proposed psychologies of sexual 
preference. While a finding of no deviancy does not support the 
sociological frame hypothesis of 'sexuality' neither does it 
support or discredit either of the psychologies (implied or 
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proposed) which predict female or male gender identity 
(respectively) in homosexual males. 
A finding of no significant difference in pathology between 
homosexual males and heterosexual comparisons would lead to two 
main conclusions. First, this finding could be interpreted to 
mean that homo- and hetero-sexuality is an outcome of gender 
identity as predicted and not of a deviant sexuality. This would 
mean that the community belief of heterosexual 'normality' and 
of homosexual 'deviancy' is untenable and that it is this belief 
(the 'third-person' socio-cultural thinking) that is deviant. 
The belief of homosexual deviancy 'predicted' by socio-cultural 
belief is tautological: the observation that a person is 
socially different (homosexual or heterosexual) is not evidence, 
per se, of deviancy unless heterosexuality remains defined as 
'normal', that is, a socio-cultural morality. That the 
'third-person' relationship is deviant thinking (and not 
homosexuality that is deviant) is tested in Study 3. In Study 3 
it is predicted that socio-cultural thinking (the 'third-person' 
relationship) is 'deviant' (associated with socio- and 
psycho-pathology). 
The second conclusion concerns the male or female gender 
identity of the homosexual male. The sociological frame theories 
of reality within both the implicit and proposed psychologies of 
sexual preference predict homosexual deviancy. The absence of 
82 
empirical support argues against a sociological understanding of 
homosexuality. A test of the two psychologies at the 
psychological level with their different predictions of female 
and male gender identity is required. This is discussed in Study 
3. 
(iii) Study 3. 
The theory of persons-grammar is a unified theory of reality 
which integrates two psychological relationships: the 'first-' 
and 'second-person' construct of involved objectivity and the 
'first-' and 'third-person' construct of detached objectivity. 
These relationships define the polar extremes of a continuum of 
spontaneity. The 'third-person' relationship is the theoretical 
absence of spontaneity associated with dissociated thinking 
whereas the 'second-person' relationship is the development of 
spontaneity associated with integrated thinking. 
Detached objectivity describes a person's dissociation from 
their self as subject as they enact the culturally approved 
social role ('third-person' meta-role). Involved objectivity 
describes a person's involvement in the integration of the 
creativity of role-creation ('first-person') and the spontaneity 
of taking one's own role ('second-person'). If taking one's own 
role entails disapproval whereas taking the social role merits 
approval, then a person faced with this dilemma has a conflict 
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of individual versus social interest. The absence of spontaneity 
in detached objectivity should be associated with anxiety and 
the presence of spontaneity in involved objectivity should not 
be associated with anxiety. Deviancy - a deviation from 
spontaneity and creativity - is then related to detachment and 
not to involved objectivity, and this deviancy should be 
associated with anxiety. 
The involved and detached objectivity constructs of 
psychological reality should have social manifestations. The 
homosexual male who takes his own role in relation to his gender 
identity enacts the socially disapproved, and often the legally 
and religiously constrained, role of the homosexual. The 
homosexual male who takes the approved role of passing as 
'heterosexual' dissociates from his own gender role expressed in 
his homosexuality. Even though the former may receive opprobrium 
and the latter approval, the theory of persons-grammar predicts 
that the taker of the social role is less spontaneous, and 
therefore, more anxious. 
In Study 3 homosexual males who take these different involved 
and detached attitudes to their homosexual-self are compared. It 
is hypothesized that the less spontaneous detached attitude is 
associated with more anxiety. Empirical support for this 
hypothesis would support the 'first-' and 'second-person' 
relationship as a description of psychological reality rather 
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than the 'first-' and 'third-person' null-relationship as a 
description of psychological reality. This finding would support 
that psychology of sexual preference which proposes that the sex 
partner takes the 'second-person' role in the psychological 
reality of the subject whose mind is imbued with creativity and 
spontaneity. This finding would also support the proposed 
psychology of sexual preference which uses the involved 
objectivity construct as a psychological reality and which 
predicts that the gender identity of the homosexual male is 
male. 
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CHAPTER 4 
METHODOLOGY 
The purpose of this thesis is to show the relationship 
between gender identity and homo- and hetero-sexuality, and to 
show the non-relationship between homo- and hetero-sexuality and 
bio-social variables (such as social sex-role) which have their 
referent in biological sex. These two relationships are the 
first substantive issue. (The term bio-sociality includes social 
sex-role and other sex-difference traits which have their 
referent in the sexual identity of biological sex). 
It is also intended to show that this psychological gender 
identity of the homosexual male and heterosexual female is male 
whereas that of the heterosexual male is female. This is the 
second substantive issue. There are three research studies. 
Study 1 will consider gender identity within the homosexual 
male and the two heterosexual male and heterosexual female 
comparison groups. In Study 1 it is hypothesized that sexual 
preference is predictive of gender identity: the homosexual male 
should have a gender identity like the heterosexual female and 
different from the gender identity of the heterosexual male. It 
is also hypothesized that sexual preference is not predictive of 
bio-sociality (such as masculine or feminine social sex-role): 
the homosexual male should be bio-socially like the heterosexual 
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male (e.g., masculine social sex-role) and bio-socially 
different from the heterosexual female. 
In Study 2 gender identity and bio-sociality are examined 
within the same three populations as Study 1. The purpose of 
Study 2 is threefold: 
(i) It replicates the findings of Study 1: gender identity is 
predicted by sexual preference - male homosexuality is - related 
to gender identity and not to bio-sociality. 
(ii) Study 2 is a cross-validational study which shows that 
sexual preference is also predicted by gender identity. This 
finding shows the interrelation of gender identity and sexual 
preference rather than the singular finding of Study 1 that 
sexual preference predicts gender identity. 
Ciii) Study 2 proposes the null-hypothesis that there are no 
differences between homosexuals and heterosexuals apart from 
sexual preference and gender identity. Tested with a large 
number of variables related to pathology, such a finding 
supports the hypothesis that homosexuality is not, per se, 
pathological, and this finding discredits social frame theories 
which propose that homosexuality is a deviancy. 
Studies 1 and 2 aim to show that the sexual preference 
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difference between homosexual and heterosexual is strongly 
related to the subjective experience of the gender of the self 
as subject and not to the biological sex of the self as object. 
This finding supports the theory of persons-grammar and the 
conclusion that homo- and hetero-sexuality are outcomes of the 
psychological (intra-personal) relationships within the self and 
are not outcomes of the sociological (inter-personal) 
relationships. Study 2 also shows that these differences between 
the homo- and hetero-sexual groups (gender identity and sexual 
preference) are not related to socio- and psycho-pathology. 
The overall purpose of Study 3 is to identify the homosexual 
male as gender-male or gender-female. In Study 3 it is shown 
that there is a main variation within the homosexual group that 
is related to the homosexual male taking, and not taking, his 
own role. The proposed psychology of sexual preferences predicts 
that taking his own role (and where the homosexual male is 
gender-male) is empirically associated with spontaneity as a 
capacity for abstract thinking. This theory also predicts that 
not taking his own role (and where the homosexual male is 
gender-female) is empirically associated with loss of 
spontaneity and dissociation. The empirical association of 
socio- and psycho-pathology with not taking his own role 
supports the proposed psychology predicting the homosexual male 
is gender-male. 
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Only comparisons within the homosexual male group are made. 
Since there is no heterosexual equivalent to the Cass (1984) 
'Homosexual identity formation' scale, no within-heterosexual 
group comparisons are made. 
Study 3 compares three homosexual male groups which vary in 
degree of homosexual identity formation. Homosexual 
identification ('Homosexual identity formation'; Cass, 1984) is 
a variable degree of development of the sociodramatic homosexual 
role compared to an underdevelopment or even absence of this 
individuated role (for example, passing as though 
'heterosexual'). This scale operationalizes the objective 
continuum from involved objectivity to detached objectivity. 
This means that subjects who take their own role (with respect 
to gender identity) and who therefore have an involved 
objectivity are expected to score higher on the Cass scale than 
subjects who do not take their own role and who have a detached 
objective relationship towards their subjective self's gender 
identity. In study 3 it is hypothesized that the degree of 
objective involvement of the person with his self as subject is 
inversely related to level of anxiety. There are three general 
hypotheses in Study 3: 
(i) Homosexuality, measured by gender identity (FGI), is 
hypothesized to not vary between the three homosexual groups 
which do vary in level of enactment of the homosexual role 
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measured by 'Homosexual Identity Formation' (Cass 1984). If 
homosexuality is a (deviant) sexual identity as the literature 
generally supposes then more 'homosexual identity' should 
predict more (deviant) gender identity. The psychological theory 
of persons-grammar predicts that homosexuality is related to the 
gender of the subject, a relationship which is separate to the 
degree of identification with that gender. The experimental 
hypothesis therefore predicts no difference in gender identity 
between the homosexual male groups. 
(ii) Studies 1, 2 and 3 all hypothesize the non-relationship 
of the psychological phenomenon of homosexuality with the 
sociological phenomenon of bio-sociality (such as social 
sex-role). It is scientifically sufficient to show a null 
relationship as that proposed between homosexuality and 
bio-sociality. It is, however, of some importance scientifically 
when this null-relationship is predicted by the proposed 
psychological theory of persons-grammar whereas conventional 
theories of homosexuality propose a theoretical relationship and 
therefore an empirical association. 
(iii) In Study 3 only groups of homosexual males are compared 
to show that the thinking that uses the socio-cultural frame of 
reference (the 'third-person' relationship) is related to 
anxiety whereas the thinking that uses the psychological frame 
of reference (the 'second-person' relationship) is not related 
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to anxiety. This finding supports the psychology of sexual 
preference which uses the subject (e.g., gender identity) and 
not the object (e.g., sexual identity) as the frame of 
reference; a psychology of sexual preferences which nominally 
defines the identity of the homosexual male as gender-male. This 
result would identify a dimension of spontaneity related to 
thinking: deviancy (as pathology) would be shown to be linked 
to an absence of spontaneity as a style of thinking and not to 
homosexuality. 
These three studies are now separately described. 
STUDY 1 
Subjects 
Heterosexual males (n=41), heterosexual females (n=38), and 
homosexual males (n=36), 25 years or older, were recruited via 
friendship networks. Subjects less than that age were not 
included as their inclusion would possibly introduce a 
developmental component that could confound the study. Two 
subjects did not complete the questionnaires fully and in the 
analysis n=41, n=37, and n=35 respectively were used. 
The biographical information required of subjects was sex, 
age, and years of education. Sex of subject and a modified 
Kinsey scale (Heterosexual - Homosexual rating scale: Kinsey, 
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Pomeroy & Martin, 1948) was used to classify subjects into one 
of the three groups. The age distribution of the three groups 
was matched. Responses to questionnaires on sexual themes 
probably differ with different educational backgrounds: years of 
education was used to ensure matching of the three groups. Age 
at first sexual intercourse was used as a dependent variable 
(after Eysenck, 1976): the groups were not matched on this 
variable. No significant difference was subsequently found on 
this variable. 
 
The three matched groups were then compared using 22 
variables: one of these variables is gender identity predicted 
to discriminate between homosexuals and heterosexuals. Of the 
remaining 21 (bio-social) variables a number show distinct male 
- female differences, such as the masculinity and femininity 
scales of the P1308 (Antill et al., 1981) and Eysenck's (1976) 
masculinity - femininity scale. These scales should discriminate 
between biological females and males and not between homosexual 
males and heterosexual males. Some of these 21 variables have 
been included as moderator variables, such as the social 
desirability scales of the PDE1 and age at first intercourse, and 
should not show differences between the groups. It is predicted 
that the homosexual males will be differentiated from the 
heterosexuals by the homosexual's characteristic 'crossed-sex' 
gender identity and that males and females will be 
differentiated by characteristic bio-social differences (such as 
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social sex-role and sex-difference traits). There is only one 
measure of 'crossed-sex' gender identity readily available in 
questionnaire form, that is, the FOI (Freund et al., 1974, 
1977). It is this measure that is hypothesized to differentiate 
homosexuals and heterosexuals. This measure of gender and the 
other variables are now discussed in detail. Then follows an 
outline of the procedure, the design of Study 1 ., and the 
specific hypotheses that are tested in Study 1. 
Measures  
The active variable of sexual preference was measured using a 
modified Heterosexual - Homosexual Rating Scale (Kinsey et al., 
1948). The original Kinsey scale is a seven-point scale from 0 
to 6 where 0 indicates exclusive heterosexuality and 6 indicates 
exclusive homosexuality. These ratings take both overt behaviour 
and psychological factors (thoughts and feelings) over the past 
3 years into account. This scale was reported in "Sexual 
behavior in the human male" (Kinsey, et al., 1948). 
The Kinsey scale was modified for use as a self-rating scale. 
The modified scale point 1 'exclusive heterosexuality' is given 
as an example: 
Over the last three years I have not responded 
sexually in thought, feeling, or behaviour, to 
members of my own sex. I am exclusively 
heterosexual. 
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This uses both behavioural and psychological factors and 
restricts the subject to the last three years. In 1948 the terms 
homosexual and heterosexual were probably not in common usage: 
this modified scale is a simplified self-rating version of the 
original that assumes the terms homosexual and heterosexual are 
now in common usage. 
Nearly all subjects were known to the experimenter. The 
sexual preference of the subjects was largely known beforehand. 
Since there was a questionnaire for each group - to take account 
of male and female, and homosexual and heterosexual, versions of 
the questionnaires - the classificatory accuracy of this scale 
could be checked: there were no discrepancies. There is no 
reason to doubt the utility of the modifications. Furthermore 
this scale is used here only to establish a dichotomy between 
heterosexual and homosexual whereas Kinsey et al. (1948) used 
the seven categories established by the scale. 
This modified scale is a 7 point scale. Subjects 
self-classify using the numbered descriptors. Only those 
subjects who indicated exclusive or predominant heterosexuality 
(1 or 2), and predominant or exclusive homosexuality (6 or 7) 
were included for analysis. Subjects indicating intermediate 
scores (3, 4, or 5) were not included. One subject was thereby 
excluded. 
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In addition, three questionnaires were used. These are now 
described. 
Part A of the FGI or 'Feminine Gender Identity Scale for 
Males' (Freund et al., 1977) is a 19-item questionnaire which 
was given to all the male subjects. Its parallel form, the MGI 
or 'Masculine Gender Identity in Females' (Blanchard & Freund, 
1983), was given to all female subjects. The term 'cross-gender 
identity' is used to label that variable which accounts for 
female sex-typed behaviours observable within a population of 
anatomical males. The greatest degree of 'cross-gender' identity 
is expected in those transsexual homosexual individuals who 
experience a sense of being the opposite gender (i.e., 'female') 
In all but bodily appearances. In males a zero score indicates 
no FGI and successively higher FGI scores indicate more FGI. The 
construct validity of these scales is supported by the reliable 
discrimination of those three groups expected to show increasing 
amounts of 'crossed-sex' gender identity: heterosexuals, 
nontranssexual homosexuals, and transsexual homosexuals. 
The FGI scale was originally published in 1974 and was 
revised before re-publication in 1977 to extend Part A of the 
scale that discriminates between heterosexuals and homosexuals. 
19 of the original pool of 25 items were retained on the main 
criterion of a significant F value in discriminating between 
heterosexuals and homosexuals (transsexuals excluded). Item 
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validity was also evaluated by (i) a respondent response rate in 
excess of 80%, (ii) a part-remainder correlation less than 0.20, 
(iii) a factor loading less than 0.30 on the largest factor 
extracted, (iv) correlations greater than 0.30 with either the L 
Scale or K Scale of the MMPI (Freund et al., 1977). Two samples 
of subjects were used to cross-validate the scale. Discriminant 
function analysis gave 66.95% correct predictions of 
heterosexuals and homosexuals in sample 1, and 81.42% in sample 
2. The discriminant validity is adequate. 
The original scale was used (Freund, Langevin, Laws, & 
Serber, 1974) to investigate "femininity and preferred partner 
age in homosexual and heterosexual males". In this paper the 
authors cite a number of (early) studies which support the 
association of 'femininity' and homosexuality in males: usually 
based on prison populations and using masculinity - femininity 
scales such as the Mf of the MMPI. (Scales that do not measure 
masculinity and femininity independently). These authors 
observed in devising this scale that "the degree to which 
particular questions or clinical items represent feminine gender 
identity vs. another kind of femininity is unknown" (1974, 
p442). The results of the test supported the use of the FGI 
scale even though the 'type' of femininity demonstrated to be 
typical of homosexual males was unknown. 
The items selected for the FGI (and MGI) were those that 
96 
discriminated among members of the same sex. In reviewing the 
use of the FGI, Blanchard and Freund summarize the available 
evidence as indicating "that the FGI is a better measure of 
gender identity in males than conventional masculinity 
femininity scales, which are constructed (with slight 
variations) by selecting items differentially endorsed by 
anatomical males and females" (1983, p. 205). A 20th item was 
included in the MGI scale published after the FGI scale. Since 
this did not have a parallel in the FGI it has not been included 
in these studies. 
Item analysis showing affectivity (traditionally, the 
difficulty) of the 19 items of the FGI (and MGI) is shown in 
Table 4. Item 13 is the most affective and 9 the least affective 
for males. Example are given after the table. 
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Table 4. 
Affectivity of the FG1 and MGI test items for males and females  
respectively ranked bi the 'o' values of the items.  
QUESTION MALES (FGI) QUESTION FEMALES (MGI) 
NUMBER P q 	 NUMBER P 	cl 
13 0.045 0.995 9 0.023 0.974 
12 0.066 0.934 13 0.053 0.947 
17 0.078 0.922 3 0.079 0.921 
10 0.104 0.896 16 0.105 0.895 
11 0.104 0.896 15 0.132 0.868 
19 0.208 0.798 18 0.132 0.868 
4 0.221 0.779 12 0.144 0.856 
8 0.221 0.779 14 0.158 0.842 
2 0.292 0.708 11 0.224 0.776 
1 0.305 0.695 6 0.237 0.763 
6 0.331 0.669 10 0.250 0.750 
5 0.442 0.558 19 0.263 0.737 
le 0.506 0.494 2 0.316 0.684 
7 0.552 0.448 8 0.324 0.676 
14 0.597 0.403 5 0.329 0.671 
16 0.623 0.377 1 0.406 0.594 
15 0.727 0.273 7 0.500 0.500 
3 0.805 0.195 4 0.539 0.461 
9 0.818 0.182 17 0.649 0.351 
In the following examples of FGI test items the scoring key 
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is given for each of the possible subject responses. This key 
was originally based on clinical experience and then tested 
empirically with discriminant function analysis. The most 
affective items for homosexual males are questions 13 and 12 
which follow. 
013 Do you think your appearance is 
- very masculine (0) 
- masculine (0) 
- a little feminine (1) 
- very feminine (2) 
812 Since the age of 17, have you wished you had been born a 
girl instead of a boy 
- often (2) 
- occasionally (1) 
- never (0) 
The least affective items for males are questions 3 and 9. 
03 In childhood, were you very interested in the work of a 
garage mechanic? Was this 
- prior to age 6 (0) 
- aged between 6 and 12 (0) 
- probably in both periods (0) 
- do not remember that I was very interested in the work of a 
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garage mechanic (1) 
09 In childhood or at puberty, did you like mechanics magazines? 
Was this 
- between ages 6 and 12 (0) 
- between ages 12 and 14 (0) 
- probably in both periods (0) 
- do not remember that I liked mechanics magazines (1). 
The next two questionnaires are composed of items 
differentially endorsed by biological males and females. These 
scales measure a different construct to the FOI (and MGI). The 
construct being measured is the differential endorsement of sex 
related differences, that is, bio-sociality. 
The PIM or "Personality Description Questionnaire" (Antill et 
al., 1981) measures subjects' sex-role attributes and is 
specifically designed for Australian use. Form A of the PDO was 
used. The FT@ contains six subscales (total of 50 items): 
masculine positive (10 items) and negative (10 items), feminine 
positive (10 items) and negative (10 items), and social 
desirability positive (5 items) and negative (5 items). The 
masculine positive scale is composed of those items reported as 
significantly more typical of males than of females and reported 
as such by both males and females. The items are also seen as 
desirable by both males and females. The masculine negative 
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scale is similarly constructed except that the items are seen as 
significantly more undesirable by both males and females. The 
feminine positive and negative scales are similarly constructed 
excepting that the items are seen as feminine attributes. 
The lack of external validation of these scales has been 
criticized (chapter 2). Masculinity and femininity are the 
constructs implied by the labelling of masculinity and 
femininity scales but dominance and nurturance may be the more 
appropriate labels. 
Following a similar theoretical development with the PA O by 
Spence, Helmreich and Holahan (cited by Antill et al. 1981) the 
PDS! was developed with positively valued and with negatively 
valued scales for masculinity, femininity, and social 
desirability. The positive and negative attributes of, for 
example, the masculinity scale may be antonyms, in which case 
there is only one scale of masculinity which consists of a 
balance of the positive and negative desirability of the items. 
Antill et al. (1981) argue that presumed opposites, giving 
masculinity and femininity as an example, may not be negatively 
correlated. In this case there are two scales of masculinity, 
one positive and the other negative (and so on for femininity, 
and for social desirability). 
The distinction between positive and negative gives more 
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information than having a single scale of masculinity or 
femininity. Consider the following hypothetical circumstance: 
Subject Masculinity Masculinity Masculinity 
positive score negative score total score 
1 75 25 100 
2 50 50 100 
3 25 75 100 
While each subject has the same total masculinity score the 
quality of that masculinity is different in each of the three 
cases. Subject 1 is likely to be socially valued whereas subject 
3 is likely to be socially devalued. Subject 2 is intermediate. 
This is the case if positive and negative attributes are not 
antonyms. Antill et al. comment that there "is a need for ... a 
variety of validation studies to be conducted" (1981, p. 169) 
with the PD0. The meaning, and therefore the interpretation of 
results using these positive and negative qualifiers, remains 
somewhat obscure. 
The 10 items of the social desirability scale are "neutral" 
with males and females responding equally to the items: 5 are 
seen as positive and 5 as negative. These 10 items serve to 
distract the subject from the purpose of the scale. 
The PD0 was choosen because it is a social sex-role scale 
devised for Australian conditions. The PD0 measures masculinity 
and femininity as non-correlated variables with separate scores 
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for masculinity and for femininity. Current sex-role scales 
measure masculininity and femininity separately. This is in 
contrast to scales of masculinity - femininity (such as the Mf 
of the MMPI) which imply that persons lower on masculinity are 
therefore higher on femininity. 
In developing the PDe a total of 2,427 subjects rated 512 
adjectives. Subjects were recruited from a variety of 
socio-economic backgrounds: university and high school students 
and various community and other general sources. The age range 
of the subjects was 15-81 years with a mean of 23.0 years. 
The major source of adjectives were pre-existing American 
tests and/or their initial item pools: Bern's BSRI, Gough and 
Heilbrun's Adjective Check List, and the Rozenkrantz, Vogel, 
Bee, Broverman and Broverman Sex Role Stereotype Questionnaire 
(Antill et al., 1981). Some adjectives words were included that 
reflected Australian usage. 
Subjects are given a list of personality characteristics and 
asked to use these characteristics to describe themselves 
indicating on a scale from 1 to 7 how true of themselves these 
characteristics are. Form A characteristics are 
103 
MASCULINE: 
Positive Negative 
firm skilled in business bossy mischievous 
confident strong noisy feels superior 
competitive carefree show-off boastful 
casual outspoken aggressive rude 
forceful pleasure-seeking sarcastic sees self 
running show. 
FEMININE: 
Positive Negative 
loves children responsible dependent weak 
patient emotional needs approval bashful 
appreciative loyal nervous shy 
grateful gentle timid anxious 
devotes self to others self-critical worrying 
sensitive to needs of others 
SOCIAL DESIRABILITY: 
Positive 	Negative  
interesting tense 
self-sufficient rash 
logical childlike 
clear-thinking absent-minded 
resourceful silly 
The third questionnaire used is one devised by Eysenck and 
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reported in "Sex and Personality" (1976). Eysenck surveyed 
sexual attitudes using 427 males and 436 females aged 18 to 60 
years with a mean age of about 30 years. Eysenck sought to 
establish the "major factors in people's attitudes to sex" with 
an analysis of responses to 135 questions. The same questions 
are given to males and females, however, different wording is 
necessary with some questions to make them applicable to the sex 
of the subject. 'Yes', 'no', or 'don't know' answers are 
required. 
Kinsey started the "proper investigation of human sexuality" 
according to Eysenck (1976). Eysenck is, however, critical of 
the approach that collects interesting but not scientifically 
important 'facts' such as the average number of times a couple 
have sexual intercourse in a week. The purpose of "Sex and 
personality" is, according to Eysenck, to bring a scientific 
focus to the "very marked differences in human sexual 
behaviour". The results of the investigation are not used to 
produce demographic information: the concern is with the degree 
to which the questions in the questionnaire are correlated, the 
factors pertaining to sexual attitudes that they give rise to, 
and the correlations of these factors with personality factors. 
Eysenck's questionnaire is included as it provides an 
opportunity in discriminant analysis to show that homosexuality 
is strongly related to 'deviancy' of sexual attitudes and if 
this is so then discriminant analysis would reveal this 
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'deviancy' of the homosexual identity rather than the predicted 
relationship of homosexuality and gender identity. Homosexual 
male deviancy (compared to heterosexual male and to heterosexual 
female attitudes) would strongly argue against the experimental 
hypothesis and the theory from which it is derived. 
Fourteen factors have been identified by Eysenck's 
questionnaire. The number of items in each of the eleven primary 
factors is shown in brackets: permissiveness (14), satisfaction 
(12), neurotic sex (13), impersonal sex (14), pornography (8), 
sexual shyness (6), prudishness (9), sexual disgust (6), sexual 
excitement (9), physical sex (10), and aggressive sex (6). There 
are two second order factors: sexual satisfaction (16) and 
sexual libido (36), and also a masculinity - femininity scale 
(50). The results of Eysenck's survey shows that male-sex means 
are higher than female-sex means on permissiveness, neurotic 
sex, impersonal sex, pornography, sexual shyness, sexual 
excitement, physical sex, libido (second order factor) and 
masculinity - femininity. Female-sex means are higher than 
male-sex means on satisfaction, prudishness, sexual disgust, 
aggressive sex and the second order factor sexual satisfaction. 
As expected, the female-sex mean is lower than the male-sex mean 
on masculinity - femininity. Some of these differences are 
observed to be quite small and probably not significant. Eysenck 
says: 
the means of the various scales show interesting 
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sex-differences. Males clearly have higher scores 
on permissiveness, impersonal sex, pornography, 
excitement and physical sex; this is very much 
what popular wisdom (and previous studies) would 
have led one to expect. Women have higher scores 
on satisfaction, disgust, and prudishness; these 
too accord with previous work ... (1976, p. 104). 
Table 5. 
Alpha coefficient reliabililies of the Eysenck scales for males 
and females. 
RELIABILITY 
Males Females 
SCALE 
1 Permissiveness 0.84 0.83 
2 Satisfaction 0.82 0.83 
3 Neurotic sex 0.74 0.72 
4 Impersonal sex 0.85 0.81 
5 Pornography 0.78 0.78 
6 Sexual shyness 0.72 0.66 
7 Prudishness 0.58 0.61 
8 Sexual disgust 0.54 0.65 
9 Sexual excitement 0.66 0.77 
10 Physical sex 0.65 0.61 
11 Aggressive sex 0.47 0.51 
12 Masculinity - femininity 0.80 0.80 
13 Libido 0.90 0.89 
14 Sexual satisfaction 0.82 0.81 
Scales 1 to 6 and 12 to 14 have reliabilities in excess of 0.70 
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and are satisfactory. Scales 7 to 11 have low reliabilities and 
Eysenck does not recommend their use except for group 
comparisons (such as the studies of this dissertation). 
The validity of these scales is not well documented in "Sex 
and personality". The factors and their means do however accord, 
as Eysenck says, with 'popular wisdom' and 'previous studies'. 
He also has used four personality scales (psychoticism, 
extraversion, neuroticism, and the Lie scale) and the 
correlations of the sexual attitudes factors amongst themselves 
and to these personality scales have consistency. Thus the 
question of psychological significance is of central importance 
in this study should one or more of these 'sexual attitudes' 
scales be important in the subsequent analysis. There does not 
appear to be published any report using these scales in a 
homosexual population, nor is Eysenck aware of any such studies 
(private correspondence). 
Two questions of Eysenck's questionnaire could not be readily 
rewritten to be appropriate to homosexual subjects and so 133 
questions were used. Of these, 50 questions are used in the 
masculinity - femininity scale. On this scale low scoring male 
or female subjects are 'feminine' and high scoring male or 
female subjects are 'masculine'. Since masculinity and 
femininity are not scored independently in this scale, subjects 
scoring high on this scale are regarded as masculine and not 
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feminine, and vice versa for low scorers. Subjects must 
therefore be masculine or feminine (or intermediate) as compared 
to the PDO where the subject may be both masculine and feminine 
(or one, or neither). 
Procedure  
Subjects were asked to take part in a research project to 
compare the three groups on sexual attitudes and behaviour. The 
questionnaire was described briefly and the subjects assured of 
anonymity. Subjects were given a survey booklet and arrangements 
were made to collect it. Of the subjects approached for this 
study over 95% completed the questionnaire. 
Design  
Since sexual attitudes probably vary with age and years of 
education the groups were matched on these two variables. The 
results were analysed using discriminant analysis and a 
posteriori comparisons. 
In discriminant analysis a set of variables is measured in 
two or more identifiable groups to produce linear combinations 
of those variables that maximally discriminate amongst the 
groups. As part of the discriminant analysis an ordering of the 
variables is obtained to the extent to which they best 
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discriminant amongst the groups. In this study with 22 
attributional variables it is appreciated that with this number 
of dependent variables and an average cell size of 38 the 
analysis will lack statistical power as it could capitalize on 
chance. The integrity of the procedure is protected by the use 
of the Bonferroni correction which requires that alpha be set at 
0.05 divided by the number of attributional variables. Variables 
were not entered into the stepwise discriminant analysis unless 
they survived this criterion. Because of the possibility of 
spurious results due to capitalization on chance, Study 2 will 
replicate the same results. 
This discriminant analysis allows for the simultaneous 
discrimination of the three groups. A stepwise method was used 
to find the two discriminating functions: the maximum allowed 
with three groups. Discriminant analysis then uses these 
discriminating functions to predict the classification of each 
subject and gives a percentage measure of correct 
predictability. This predictability is a measure of the utility 
of the discriminant functions. 
A posteriori comparisons are used to statistically 
distinguish the homosexual group from the two heterosexual 
groups. The homosexual group is compared separately to both of 
the heterosexual groups. Only those variables significant and 
therefore entered into the discriminant analysis are subject to 
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a posteriori comparisons. 
It is hypothesized that there will be two attributional 
variables that will be explanatory in predicting the active 
variables of sexual preference and biological sex. The two 
attributional variables should be 'crossed-sex' gender identity 
and bio-sociality. Thus one discriminant function should be 
'crossed-sex' gender identity and this should discriminate the 
homosexual group from the heterosexual groups. The other 
discriminant function should be bio-sociality and variables such 
as social sex-role and sex-difference traits should discriminate 
the biological males from the biological females (i.e., the 
sexes). 
While this statistical analysis may be considered to lack 
power it is here appropriate. In this design, which tests 
alternative hypotheses of the origin of homo- and 
hetero-sexuality in the personality, gender identity (with a 
psychological frame of reference) has to compete with many other 
bio-social variables (with a sociological frame of reference) to 
be seen as statistically related to, and therefore explanatory 
of sexual preference. Gender identity is the one variable 
theoretically predicted to discriminate the homo- and 
hetero-sexual groups: capitalization on chance with only the one 
predicted variable amongst 21 other variables (which in 
conventional theories are supposed to explain homosexuality) is 
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remote. 
Furthermore, bio-sociality (and the thinking of the 
'third-person' relationship that his implies) has often been 
used in an attempt to explain homosexuality. In this design it 
can be shown that bio-sociality is not related to sexual 
preference even when a large number of variables which show sex 
differences (such as social sex-role scales) are included, and 
this should also capitalize on chance to the detriment of the 
experimental hypothesis. The ability of the bio-social scale 
measures to discriminate the sexes and not sexual preference 
groups would be strong evidence that bio-sociality is not 
related to homosexuality and that the 'male' and 'female' of 
sexual identity is not related to the 'male' and 'female' of 
gender identity. 
In summary, in Study 1 there are two active variables: sexual 
preference and biological sex. It is hypothesized that gender 
identity will be the main discriminator of the sexual preference 
groups and that bio-sociality will be the discriminator of 
biological sex groups. It is hypothesized that bio-social 
variables (social sex-role and other sex-difference scales) will 
not be discriminators of sexual preference groups. The 
hypothesized prediction for each variable is shown individually 
in Appendix 1. 
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STUDY 2 
Study 2 uses the Cass (1984) scale of 'Homosexual identity 
formation' and the subject's sex to classify subjects into three 
groups: homosexual male, heterosexual male and heterosexual 
female. The measure of the active variable of sexual preference 
is changed from Study 1. The Kinsey Heterosexual - Homosexual 
scale is well known and used and divides subjects into seven 
groups. In the first study only the extremes of this scale were 
used and intermediate subjects (3, 4, and 5) were not included. 
Since developmentally homosexuals are typically socialized as 
heterosexual it seemed likely that the intermediate subjects on 
the Kinsey scale would also identify with some stage on the Cass 
scale. This was in fact found to be so. The intermediate 
subjects on the Kinsey scale are likely to be 'new homosexuals' 
making a change in their sexual preference enactment. In 
'measures' (which follows) the Cass scale is discussed as a 
better device than the Kinsey scale to dichotomize homosexuals 
and heterosexuals. 
This study attempts to repeat the results of study 1 and 
thereby confirm that gender identity is the major discriminator 
of sexual preference groups and that bio-sociality discriminates 
the sexes. This would again show no relationship between sexual 
preference and bio-sociality, or between sexual preference and 
sexual identity (biological sex). This would support the 
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theoretical relationship between sexual preference and the 
gender of the self as subject. This study also aims to test the 
prediction from social frame theory that homosexual males are 
(pathologically) deviant compared to heterosexual comparisons 
and, therefore, the conclusion that homosexual males (like 
heterosexual females) are gender-female. 
Sexual preference and biological sex are again the active 
variables and these should be related to gender identity and to 
bio-sociality respectively. There are 28 attributional 
variables. Of these, 7 are repeated from Study 1 (Eysenck's 
masculinity - femininity scale, and the 6 scales of the PIM). 
The positive and negative scores of the PM are totalled for 
masculinity and for femininity and used as variables. There are 
18 other variables used which could be expected to relate to 
sexual preference if sexual preference is related to 
bio-sociality (with its referent in sexual identity) as commonly 
proposed. 
Besides repeating the test to the same results of Study 1, an 
ancillary test of Study 2 is the predicted classification of 
subjects in Study 2 from the discriminant functions of Study 1. 
The discriminant analysis procedure compares this predicted 
classification to the observed classification and reports this 
as a measure of percentage correct predictability. The degree to 
which the predicted and observed classifications correspond is 
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thus an indication of the interrelatedness of sexual preference 
and gender identity. 
Subjects 
Heterosexual males (n=34), heterosexual females (n=33), and 
homosexual males (n=124) were recruited mainly through 
friendship networks though some homosexual males (n=7) and one 
heterosexual male were recruited by advertisements. Some of the 
subjects from Study 1 were retested in Study 2 - 27 (21.8%) of 
the homosexual males, 16 (47.1%) of the heterosexual males, and 
17 (51.5%) of the heterosexual females. The time interval 
between study 1 and 2 was 10 months. As in Study 1 the three 
groups were matched for age distribution and years of education. 
The homosexual group was classified by a non-zero score on the 
Cass scale: the heterosexual subjects were classified by sex and 
a zero score on the Cass scale. 
Measures  
The active variable sexual preference was measured by both 
the modified Kinsey scale (as in Study 1) and the Cass scale. 
The modified Kinsey scale has been previously described in Study 
1. The Kinsey scale was used in study 1 to classify subjects as 
heterosexuals or homosexuals. Intermediate subjects were not 
used and this eliminated one subject. Since no information was 
available in the literature to compare the Kinsey and Cass 
classifications, both were used in Study 2. 
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Kinsey et al. (1948) give little theoretical reasoning for 
the construction of the heterosexual - homosexual scale apart 
from pointing to a (supposedly) continuous masculine - feminine 
scale. Factually, Kinsey et al. (1948) found that the 
overwhelming majority of adult men are exclusively heterosexual, 
about 5% are exclusively homosexual, and a small percentage are 
intermediate. The huge percentage of exclusive adult 
heterosexuals speaks more of a discontinuity than a continuity 
with homosexuality (Barnhouse, 1977, p105). 
The assumptions of the Kinsey scale requires some 
clarification. Psychometrically the scale is like the older 
masculinity - femininity scales, such as Eysenck's (1976), which 
were used before femininity and masculinity were shown to be 
independent. The subject who is both highly masculine and 
feminine is forced to make an either/or choice despite the 
scale's appearance of being continuous. Thus it seems that 
heterosexuals use the 0 of the Kinsey scale and the homosexuals 
use 1 to 6 (or equivalents on modified scales). This bears a 
strong similarity to the Cass scale where (intentionally) 
heterosexuals score 0 and homosexuals use stages 1 to 6. In 
other words, for the heterosexual there is no 'continuity' on 
either scale (only zero), while for the homosexual there is some 
dimension which can be meaningfully divided into a scale. 
116 
The Kinsey scale compares a man's sexual behaviour with 
others. This will be recognized as the same methodology of 
same-sex comparison as Freund et al. (1974, 1977) used to 
measure 'gender' as FGI. In practice however the heterosexual 
response is attentuated and the homosexuals (or bi-sexuals 
perhaps) use the remaining 6 points: remarkably like the Cass 
scale which is designed that way. The effect is twofold: to 
dichotomize the heterosexuals from the homosexuals and to allow 
within-group comparisons of the homosexuals as measured by 
points 1 to 6 of the scale. Again this is similar to the Cass 
scale. 
The Kinsey scale, when used as in Study 1, dichotomizes 
homosexual and heterosexual males. When the full Kinsey scale is 
used two things appear to happen: there is dichotomization and 
assortment. There is a dichotomy between the heterosexuals and 
the homosexuals. Nearly all heterosexuals use the 'exclusively 
heterosexual' category. The homosexuals appear to assort over 
the remaining categories. These categories compare the 
homosexuals with each other (while retaining the dichotomy 
between heterosexuals). The Kinsey scale confounds two frames of 
reference: the homosexual - heterosexual comparison with its 
psychological frame of reference in gender identity, and the 
homosexual - homosexual comparison with its psychological frame 
of reference in the different 'second-' and 'third-person' 
relationships of the homosexual to that subjective gender 
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identity. The Cass scale, repeating the same dichotomy between 
homosexual and heterosexual and the assortment of homosexuals, 
contains the same psychological referents. 
The Kinsey or Cass scale, when used with males only, is a 
between and a within design. It is a between design in that it 
separates the homosexual male group from the heterosexual male 
group. It is a within design in that it assorts the homosexual 
males on a continuum and therefore into groups which are all 
characterized by homosexuality. The Cass scale intentionally 
creates a dichotomy and an assortment whereas these are 
confounded in the Kinsey scale. The Cass scale assumes a 
dichotomy between homosexual and heterosexual whereas the Kinsey 
scale assumes a continuum. 
When the full range of the Kinsey scale is intended to be 
used the results are confounded by the lack of a clear 
distinction between the two implicit measures in the one scale 
(that is, type of sexual preference and identification with that 
sexual preference). Kinsey et al. (1948) erroneously assume that 
homosexuality and heterosexuality are continuous whereas the 
model of homosexuality proposed indicates a subjective dichotomy 
between homosexual males and heterosexual males (male or female 
gender identity). 
The Cass scale intends to dichotomize heterosexuals 
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(pre-stage 0) from homosexuals (stages 1-6), which the Kinsey 
scale does by default of attenuation, and intentionally assorts 
the homosexuals through 6 stages. Unlike the Kinsey scale, the 
results of the Cass scale are not intended to be used to compare 
heterosexuals and homosexuals. The Cass scale can be so used to 
dichotomize heterosexuals and homosexuals and this is done in 
this study. Used like this it implicitly dichotomizes the two 
male groups (homosexuals and heterosexuals) by their different 
gender identities. 
By presenting two separate scales of masculinity and 
femininity the problem of attenuation in sex-role scales that 
used the masculinity - femininity continuum was resolved. 
Masculinity and femininity are shown to be independent. 
Similarly it appears that the (so-called) heterosexual - 
homosexual continuum can be similarly un-confounded. One of the 
implicit measures is that which identifies homosexual and 
heterosexual. Sexual preference is theoretically related to 
gender identity: the FGI scale should therefore measure this 
variable implicit in the Kinsey scale. The other implicit 
measure in the Kinsey scale is that which measures the degree of 
identification with that gender identity (and, therefore, with 
homo- or hetero-sexuality): the Cass scale should therefore 
measure this variable implicit in the Kinsey scale. (There is 
however no heterosexual equivalent of the Cass scale). 
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"Homosexual identity formation" (Cass, 1984) is a six-stage 
measure of homosexual development which also includes a 
pre-stage 1 category (herein labelled 'stage 0') that defines 
heterosexual preference. Using two measures of the independent 
variable (sexual preference) allowed a comparison of both 
scales. Study 1 showed that few subjects self-rated themselves 
as 3, 4, or 5 on the modified Kinsey scale. In comparing the 
results of these different scales it was apparent that subjects 
who scored 3 to 7 on the Kinsey scale, and some 2's (four 
subjects), also self-described as homosexual (non-zero score on 
the Cass scale). There is some antipathy to identifying as 
homosexual and so it appears likely that those subjects who do 
so on the Cass scale are genuinely homosexual whereas those 
subjects who describe themselves as heterosexual on the Kinsey 
scale (and possibly stage 0 on the Cass scale) may include some 
subjects who are psychologically homosexual but who do not make, 
or don't want to make, a homosexual identification. 
The Cass scale is probably a better discriminator of 
homosexuals from heterosexuals because those subjects who 
identify as homosexual are positively identified by the Cass 
scale but not by the Kinsey scale. (It is plausible for some 
homosexuals to self-report as heterosexuals but it is most 
unlikely that heterosexuals would self-report as homosexual). 
Though the difference of four subjects between the two 
classificatory devices is perhaps small, the unambiguous 
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dichotomy and the separation of the two implicit but confounded 
constructs (of gender identity, and of identification) in the 
Kinsey scale appears to make the Cass scale a more valid 
classificatory device. 
The Cass scale is used in Study 2 to distinguish homosexual 
and heterosexual subjects. Study 3 uses the Cass scale to 
distinguish the low, middle, and high homosexual identity groups 
as the independent variable. The stages of the Cass scale are 
differentiated by the cognitive, behavioural, and affective 
dimensions typical of those stages. A 210-item questionnaire was 
developed by Cass to measure the affective, cognitive and 
behavioural dimensions of the process of identity development. 
The model of development was used to predict how ideal 
individuals at each stage should respond. Each stage was 
therefore characterised by expected response patterns (profiles) 
on the questionnaire. The validity of the scale was established 
in three ways using 166 male and female homosexual subjects: by 
testing two hypotheses derived from this model and a 
discriminant analysis. 
Firstly, according to an 'across-profiles' hypothesis the 
"actual response patterns of subjects nominated a priori to a 
particular stage would show greatest similarity (highest score) 
with the predicted profile of that stage, compared with the 
predicted profiles of all other stages" and that their scores 
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should diminish across the profiles (Cass, 1984, p. 153). Thus 
stage 1 subjects should score most highly on those items 
predicted from the questionnaire to be most typical of the stage 
1 profile and their scores should diminish across the profiles 
from stage 2 to 6. Strong empirical support was given for stages 
1, 5, and 6, while stages 2 and 4 were close to significance. 
Secondly, according to an 'across-groups' hypothesis the 
"actual response patterns of the subjects nominated a priori to 
that stage would show greatest similarity (highest score) with 
the predicted profile when compared with those subjects at other 
stages" (Cass, 1984, p. 154) so that for the Stage 1 profile, 
Stage 1 subjects should obtain the highest score on this 
profile, with Stage 2 to 6 subjects showing progressively lesser 
scores. And similarly for each of the profiles. This hypothesis 
was well supported for all of the profiles though there was a 
reversal for subjects between Stages 2 and 3. 
Thirdly, a discriminant analysis supported the allocation of 
subjects into six groups. The analysis correctly classifies 
97.0% of the subjects. 
Unlike the Kinsey scale the Cass scale is theory-based and is 
well described psychometrically. Cass observes that subjects 
seldom identify solely with one stage but often with two 
adjacent stages. This is not unexpected in a scale that measures 
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a developmental continuum. Thus while six stages can be 
recognized, for pragmatic reasons of subject numbers, collapsing 
these into three stages (low, middle, high) herein should not be 
theoretically problematic. 
Some measures described and used in Study 1 are repeated in 
Study 2. Those measures repeated are: part A of the 
'cross-gender' identity scale (FGI in males, Freund et al., 
1977; MOI in females, Blanchard & Fruend, 1983); the 
'masculinity - femininity' scale composed of 50 items taken from 
Eysenck's (1976) questionnaire on sexual attitudes and 
behaviours in adult populations; and the 'Personality 
Description Questionnaire' or PIM, form A (Antill et al., 1981). 
Of particular interest is the 'feminine positive' scale of the 
PIM shown to be significant in study 1. 
The Reynold's (1982) Form C of the 'Social Desirability 
Scale' describes behaviours which are culturally approved but 
which are improbable - it uses the same rationale as the MMPI 
Lie Scale. This is a short (13-item) version of the original 
Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale. Form C was developed 
on the basis of 608 undergraduate student responses to the 
33-item Marlowe-Crowne scale. Sex-differences on Form C were not 
found and nor were they expected based on previous findings. 
Internal consistency of the Form C measured by the 
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Kuder-Richardson formula 20 is 0.76 (compared to 0.82 for the 
Marlowe-Crowne). The range of items-to-total-score correlations 
for Form C is 0.32 - 0.47 with a mean of 0.38 (compared to 0.13 
- 0.49, and a mean of 0.32, for the Marlowe-Crowne). Both 
measures show satisfactory reliability. 
The concurrent validity is shown by the product-moment 
correlations between Form C and the Marlowe-Crowne Cr' = 0.93, p 
< 0.001), and with the Edwards Social Desirability Scale Cr = 
0.41, p < 0.001). The lower but significant correlation of the 
Edwards-SDS and Form C are consistent with similar correlations 
of the Marlowe-Crowne and Edwards-SDS reported by Reynolds 
(1982); 
The PDQ (fully described in Study 1) contains two five-item 
scales called 'social desirability positive' and 'social 
desirability negative'. These scale are composed of items which 
are equally and frequently endorsed by males and females. The 
Form C utilizes behaviours which while culturally approved are, 
however, infrequent. High scores on Form C therefore suggest a 
distortion or response bias ('lying'). Since 'response bias' is 
a potentially important determinant of subject responses it is 
included as a measure in Study 2 to preclude response bias 
accounting for results. Were this variable to reach significance 
it would cast doubt on the validity of the results of these 
studies. 
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Measures of anxiety: 
The hypothesis of anxiety existing in the absence of 
spontaneity predicted by the persons-grammar theory does not 
specify any particular form of anxiety. The 'SCL-90-R' 
(Derogatis, 1983) is a 90-item self-report symptom inventory 
designed to assess psychological symptoms during the past week. 
It is a clinical and research instrument that gives both a 
global measure of psychological distress over the past week and 
indices of specific pathologies, including two measures of 
anxiety. The SCL-90-R is scored on 9 aspects of pathology 
(number of items shown in brackets): somatization (12), 
obsessive-compulsive (10), interpersonal sensitivity (9), 
depression (13), anxiety (10), hostility (6), phobic anxiety 
(7), paranoid ideation (6), and psychoticism (10). As well the 
GSI (Global Severity Index) is the summed total of all scores 
and "represents the best single indicator of the current level 
or depth of the disorder, and should be utilized in most 
instances where a single summary measure is required" 
(Derogatis, 1983, p. 11). The 90 items are rated by the subject 
on a 5 point scale from 0 ('not at all') to 4 ('extremely'). 
The inclusion of this instrument, which takes about 12 
minutes to complete, allows for an identification of the type of 
anxiety but also, by including the non-anxiety scales, allows 
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also for the exclusion of variables such as depression which are 
not hypothesized (except as a null-hypothesis). The inclusion of 
anxiety and non-anxiety variables is intended to demonstrate 
both aspects of a test: if non-anxiety measures are not included 
they cannot be shown to be significant or explanatory. The 
inclusion of non-anxiety variables allows for the conclusion, 
for example, that depression is not related to spontaneity. 
Reliability estimates for the SCL-90-R are of two types: 
internal consistency and test-retest. Coefficient alpha for the 
9 dimensions varies between 0.77 and 0.90. Test-retest estimates 
vary between 0.78 and 0.86. Factorial invariance refers to 
constancy of the construct across subject parameters such as sex 
and class. The greater the invariance the more the construct is 
generalizable. The '90' shows high levels of invariance between 
males and females for 8 of the dimensions and a moderate level 
for the ninth (paranoid ideation). 
Since its introduction in 1975 the '90' has been used 
extensively as a self report symptom inventory in a "very broad 
spectrum of clinical research" (Derogatis, 1983, p. 17). The 
'90' was contrasted with the MMPI to determine equivalence of 
the constructs. Results of this study reported by Derogatis 
(1983) show a high degree of convergence. A similar study 
correlated the symptom dimensions of the '90' and the Middlesex 
Hospital Questionnaire. The lowest correlation is phobic anxiety 
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Cr = 0.361 and for anxiety r = 0.74). A partial review of the 
uses of the '90' show it to be used clinically in sexual 
disorders, psychopharmacological research, stress syndromes and 
meditation, drug abuse, many medical contexts including anorexia 
nervosa, psychological sequelae of ileal bypass, oncology, 
chronic pain, sleep disturbances, and in psychiatric research. 
It has been used both as a screening device and as an outcomes 
measure. 
Construct validation of the '90' was demonstrated by using 
the 83 items of the 9 symptom dimensions in a hypothesis matrix 
(9 dimensions by 83 items). The matrix was binary with each item 
loading '1' onto its postulated dimension and '0' on the 
remaining 8 dimensions. Data from 1002 psychiatric patients on 
the '90' were then intercorrelated resulting in an 83 by 83 
correlation matrix. This was factor analyzed with principal 
components method. The factors were rotated and compared to the 
hypothesized structure of the '90'. (This data is summarized in 
Derogatis, 1983, p. 26). The empirical - theoretical match is 
excellent. There is however some overlap between Anxiety and 
Phobic Anxiety. This study demonstrates, together with the many 
convergent studies referred to above, that "the hypothetical 
symptom constructs of the SCL-90-R may be recovered from real 
clinical data, and further, that these empirical measures 
correlate well with established and accepted external criterion 
measures" (Derogatis, 1983, p. 27). 
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Derogatis notes that there is a "significant relationship 
between sex and levels of pathology" (1983, p. 13). 
Unfortunately, Derogatis does not specify which scales show 
sex-differences. Since sex-differences are being investigated in 
this study raw scores are used which do not mask this potential 
difference. 
The 'Index of Homophobia' (IHP) measures the "response of 
fear, disgust, anger, discomfort, and aversion that individuals 
experience in dealing with gay people" (Hudson & Ricketts, 1980, 
p. 358). This definition of homophobia addresses a sense of 
dread of being in close proximity to homosexuals rather than the 
domain of general anti-gay sentiments called homonegativism. 
This scale measures "affective response to homosexual men and 
women" rather than the more general measures, such as, attitudes 
towards homosexuality (1980, p. 359). Hudson and Ricketts (1980) 
distinguish this measure from 'personal anxiety' seen as a more 
global measure which includes anxiety arising in situations not 
involving gay people. This scale measures a type of anxiety 
which arises as the result of proximity to, or interaction with, 
homosexual people. That 'homophobia' is fear or anxiety is a 
moot point. While this difference is perhaps debatable the use 
of the IHP scale itself is clearly relevant as a variable which 
may have explanatory power in male homosexuality and homosexual 
identity development. 
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The IHP scale is designed for use with heterosexual subjects. 
Since homosexuals are usually considered to have been taught 
heterosexuality - the Cass scale measures the change in 
identification from heterosexual conditioning to homosexuality - 
there is no reason why it cannot also be used with homosexuals. 
The interpretation of homosexual scores is not so clear however 
since homosexuals scoring high on this scale may be indicating a 
fear of homosexual others - the IHP's 'face validity' - but also 
perhaps a fear of one's homosexual self. 
300 persons, with a mean age of 24.4 years, and with a 
variety of ethnic and socio-economic backgrounds were tested 
with the IHP to establish its reliability and validity. The 
coefficient alpha was 0.90. This high reliability gives this 
scale good measurement characteristics. 
Construct validity was established in two ways. It was argued 
that homophobic persons are also more likely to be more 
conservative and a positive correlation was therefore predicted 
between the IHP and the Sexual Attitudes Scale (SAS: r = 0.53). 
Another method was to measure the IHP's relationship to 
'clinically relevant dysfunctions' - a psychosocial screening 
questionnaire designed to specify the severity of 20 of an 
individual's problems. A measure of 'personal distress' from 
this screening device correlated with the IHP Cr = 0.16). A 
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measure of 'interpersonal relationship disorder' (IRD) from the 
screen correlated with the IHP Cr = - 0.14). The negative 
correlation was unexpected. An examination of the IRD items 
showed that only one of its eight items was significantly 
correlated with IHP scores: it was both significantly and 
negatively correlated. Given that the 'homophobia' construct has 
not had a clear definition nor measuring instrument, there are 
few established criteria for examining its construct validity. 
The findings presented so far argue that the IHP has good 
construct validity. The authors' suggestion to modify questions 
12, 18, 19, 20 and 21 to improve the scale was herein followed. 
The SAS and the IHP were further used in an investigation of 
the validity of the IHP: each item of the IHP should correlate 
more with the IHP-total than with SAS-total. All but one item of 
the IHP did so and most were statistically significant. All IHP 
items, except 21, correlated with IHP-total at 0.40 or better. 
No significant sex-differences were found in this scale which 
appears to be a unidimensional measure of homophobia. The scale 
has 25 items, both positive and negative, and subjects self-rate 
on a five point scale. 
Levenson's (1981) 'locus of control' has been included as a 
well documented and widely used construct with all three of its 
subscales related to anxiety. The subscales, each with 8 items 
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are: the Internal Scale (I), measuring a belief in an internal 
locus of control; the Powerful Others Scale (P), measuring a 
belief in control by others who are more powerful than self; 
and, the Chance Scale (C), measuring a belief that events are 
not controlled but are random. The subject responds using a 
six-point scale. 
The I Scale is "consistently positively related to measures 
of sociability, while the C Scale is negatively related to the 
sense of well being and responsibility. ... the P Scale is 
related positively to suspiciousness" (Levenson, 1981). Both 
belief in 'powerful others' and in 'chance' are positively 
correlated with anxiety, while 'internality' is negatively 
correlated with depression and anxiety (Levenson, 1981). In the 
initial validating study male adults were found to have 
significantly higher P scale scores than adult females. No 
differences were found on the I or C scales. This finding has 
been replicated once. In three other same culture studies no 
differences were found. 
The I, P, and C Scales originated in Levenson's 
reconceptualization of Rotter's I-E Scale. They are composed of 
items adapted from Rotter's scale and statements written for 
these three specific dimensions. The original 36 items were 
pretested with item analyses and correlations with the 
Marlowe-Crowne Desirability Scale. The scores on these scales 
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can be used as dependent variables (as in this study) though 
they can also be used as independent variables. 
Internal consistency estimates are moderate. Kuder-Richardson 
reliabilities for a student sample (N = 152) were 0.64 for the I 
scale, 0.77 for the P scale, and 0.78 for the C scale. Using an 
adult sample (N = 115) showed similar results (0.51, 0.72, and 
0.73 respectively). A psychiatric sample also showed similar 
results (0.67, 0.82, and 0.79). 
Spearman-Brown split-half reliabilities are 0.62, 0.66, and 
0.64 for the same scales. Test-retest reliabilities for a 
one-week period vary from 0.60 to 0.79 while a 7-week interval 
found comparable correlations of 0.66, 0.62, and 0.73). 
329 undergraduates were tested with the three scales and the 
24 items were principle components factor analysed. Seven 
factors accounted for 52% of the variance. The first factor was 
composed entirely of P scale items, the second entirely of I 
scale items, and the third entirely of C scale items. 17 of the 
24 items loaded onto these first three factors. This empirical 
study supports the theoretical basis of this Locus of Control 
scale. Furthermore, using a psychiatric sample the same three 
factors were found in a factor analysis. Other studies have 
examined the relationships amongst the three scales of the Locus 
of Control, their relationship to Rotter's scale, to other 
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psychometric tests (CPI and 16PF), and demographic and 
cross-cultural effects. These studies have shown a pattern of 
"theoretically expected positive and negative relationships with 
other variables" (Levenson, 1981, p. 23). 
Fenigstein, Scheier and Buss (1975) argue that when attention 
is 'turned inward' a reason for anxiety may be found: that 
anxiety is a by-product of self-consciousness. The 
'Self-Consciousness Scale' (Fenigstein et al., 1975) is a 
23-item scale with three subscales: private self-consciousness, 
public self-consciousness, and social anxiety, the latter two 
being correlated. The trait 'self-consciousness' is defined as 
the "consistent tendency of persons to direct attention inward 
or outward" (1975, p. 522). It has two components - one private 
and one public. Both public and private self-consciousness 
"refer to a process of self-focussed attention" (1975, p. 523). 
Private self-consciousness is concerned with attending to one's 
own thoughts and feelings and is regarded by these authors as 
similar to Jung's introversion concept. Public 
self-consciousness is concerned with oneself as a social object 
having an effect on others and is regarded by these authors as 
similar to Mead's (1934) 'role of other' as reactions of others 
to self. 
Prior to final completion of the scale it was given to nine 
samples with a total n=1821. The same three factors emerged 
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consistently. The final scale was given to 179 male and 253 
female college students. The factor loadings and norms for males 
and females were similar and so combined. Factor analysis showed 
the expected three factors. To check the stability of the three 
factors and the norm's reliability the scale was then given to 
another 152 college undergraduates with similar results. 84 
subjects also completed the scale twice with a test-retest 
interval of 2 weeks. Test-retest correlations for the total 
score were 0.80: private self-consciousness, 0.79; public 
self-consciousness, 0.84; and social anxiety, 0.73. No 
sex-differences were found. 
The public self-consciousness subscale correlates moderately 
with social anxiety: in two samples r=0.23 and 0.26, with n=452 
and 152 respectively (p(0.01). Fenigstein (1979) gives an 
extreme example of public self-consciousness as the recently 
stigmatized person who is suddenly aware of other's reactions. 
This factor appears crucial in how others' evaluations affect 
ourselves (1979). It is significantly and positively correlated 
with general measures of anxiety (Schlenker & Leary, 1982). The 
'Self-Consciousness Scale' is included since public 
self-consciousness is conceptualized as similar to Mead's 
concept of seeing oneself as a social object and can therefore 
be seen as a measure of detached objectivity ('third-person' 
relationship to self). 
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Private self-consciousness does not correlate with social 
anxiety and weakly to moderately with public self-consciousness 
(Fenigstein, Scheir & Buss, 1975; Fenigstein, 1979). Subjects 
high in this factor are expected to be more responsive to their 
changing affective states. Since subjects who are 'high' on the 
Cass scale can be construed as being responsive to themselves 
rather than to social expectations (re homosexuality), involved 
objectivity (high group) should be positively associated with 
private self-consciousness. 
Both of the self-consciousness scales have been shown to be 
effective in social behaviour in laboratory contexts (Fenigstein 
et al., 1975). Women high in public self-consciousness were 
found to be more sensitive to rejection by peers, and in another 
experiment, subjects high in private self-consciousness were 
more responsive to their 'transient affective state' than were 
subjects low in private self-consciousness. This provides 
evidence of discriminant validity of the two measures. 
The social anxiety subscale specifically measures anxiety 
arising in social contexts (Turner, Scheir, Carver & Ickes, 
1978). Individuals experience social anxiety in that they intend 
to create a preferred impression but doubt that they will 
(Schenker & Leary, 1982). Since a 'new' homosexual is 
potentially alienated from friend and family, this should be 
measured as social anxiety since social anxiety is associated 
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with disaffiliation (Schlenker Be Leary, 1982). 
Procedure  
Subjects were asked to take part in a research project to 
compare the three groups. Assurance was given that names would 
not be identified with individual protocols. Some subjects (n=7) 
were recruited via newspaper advertisements. The advertisements 
were designed to recruit subjects who were likely to identify as 
types 1 or 2 on the Cass scale. The homosexual's questionnaire 
return rate was 83.0%. The heterosexual's questionnaire return 
rate was 100%. The overall return rate was 90.1%. 
Design  
As in Study 1 the three groups were matched for age and years 
of education. The results are analysed using discriminant 
analysis and a posteriori comparisons. In discriminant analysis 
a set of dependent variables are measured in two or more 
identified groups and produce linear combinations of those 
dependent variables that maximally discriminate amongst the 
groups. As part of the discriminant analysis an ordering of the 
dependent variables is obtained to the extent to which they best 
discriminate amongst the groups. In this study with 28 dependent 
variables and with the smallest cell size of 33, it is 
appreciated that the analysis could lack statistical power. 
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There are reasons for using this design: some have been 
discussed in Design of Study 1. These other reasons are now 
discussed. 
(i) In the discriminant analysis only those variables which 
survive the initial manova test and Bonferroni correction are 
entered into the stepwise discriminant analysis. Having a large 
number of variables from which the initial analysis is made to 
select entered variables may capitalize on chance. The integrity 
of the analysis is, however, protected by the Bonferroni 
correction which increases alpha to 0.05 divided by the number 
of dependent variables. Also a large number of dependent 
variables does not affect the discriminant analysis by producing 
spuriously high discriminant functions as would an equal number 
of variables as numbers of subjects in a multiple regression 
produce a perfect correlation. The argument of capitalizing on 
chance in this study is now further discussed. 
(ii) An analogy is used to demonstrate the argument. The 
English system of justice requires that the defendent be proven 
guilty rather than it be incumbent on him to prove innocence. 
Also, the method to establish guilt is by reasoned arguments 
between prosecutor and defendent following the laws of evidence. 
Altman's (1972) "Homosexual: oppression and liberation", the 
restrictive homo-sexual practices acts in some Australian 
states, and the American experience reported by Teal (1971) in 
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"The gay militants" would lead one to believe, if one was to 
genuinely believe in the English justice system, that 
homosexuality is proven to be deviant, nay, even criminal. 
One would expect, then, the evidence against homosexuality to 
be overwhelming to justify the oppression, including legal 
oppression, reported by Altman (1972) and Teal (1971) and which 
appears to have changed little in the fifteen years following 
those publications. Why? As anyone who has worked towards 
homosexual law reform or changing attitudes towards 
homosexuality in general will readily report, the task is not to 
prove guilt as English justice requires but to prove innocence. 
Proving innocence is problematic: how does anyone show that 
something is not something. In science this is the problem of 
the null hypothesis: it is not possible to prove the null 
hypothesis, a hypothesis can only be shown to be wrong. 
The motivation for using so many dependent variables is, in 
essence, to show as in the analogy, 'lack of guilt'. Thus I have 
followed a 'law of evidence' - that the 'particulars' of the 
'indictment' be specified. Study 1 uses many sex related 
variables to explore the possibility that one or some of these 
many variables may indict the 'deviancy' of homosexual 
subjectivity. Study 2 uses many variables of psychological 
pathology or correlates thereof to explore the possibility that 
one or some of these many variables may indict the 'deviancy' of 
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homosexuality. It is appropriate when testing null hypotheses to 
'throw the book' to use a legal metaphor. This does not of 
course negate the argument that 'some mud sticks' - that some 
variables will show significance because of the increased 
chances of hitting the target with so much ammunition. 'Hits' 
can be tested to see if they are 'false hits' by repeating the 
test: this changes the status of the researcher (who is after 
all both the prosecutor and defendent) from having to prove 
'innocence' to proving 'guilt'. Having changed the research 
design status, from testing a null hypothesis to testing a 
hypothesis, the social scientist can then proceed. 
Replication is science's ultimate 'law of evidence'. Study 2 
thus repeats the significant variables from Study 1. In 
homosexual research using the homosexual versus the heterosexual 
comparison the problem to this time has been to isolate an 
effect: despite research little is known psychologically (which 
is also empirically supported) about homosexuality. This 
argument uses a legal analogy to demonstrate a scientific 
principle: admissability of scientific evidence rests on the 
ability to repeat the same procedure to the same effect. The use 
of many dependent variables encourages 'deviancy' in the 
results, it can capitalize on chance and so doing this is 
antithetical to a null hypothesis. Using a large number of 
dependent variables to show no-effect strongly supports (but 
cannot prove) a null hypothesis. Chance is 'stacked against' the 
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null-hypothesis to support a finding of deviancy. If no 
statistical deviancy is found in the data this is evidence of no 
deviancy between the homosexuals and the heterosexuals. 
(iii) Explorations by their very nature cast a wide net: the 
findings are then refined. The theory of persons-grammar which 
conceptually distinguishes sex and gender and which identifies a 
semantic confusion of male-sex and male-gender (and so on for 
'female-') is new. The thinking, for example, that the 
heterosexual male is gender-female (and so on) is at least 
unconventional and probably radical. No new scales are devised 
and used herein and the method is traditional. What is radical 
is the testing of two different frames of reference that use the 
self as an object (biological sex) and as a subject (gender 
identity), and the explicit use of two different ways of 
thinking (integrated and dissociated) defined by these 
relationships of subject and object within the personality. The 
result is a radically different model of homosexuality to that 
historically proposed. Refinement is contra-indicated at the 
beginning of such an exploration: a data gathering approach 
driven by theory is appropriate. This design with a large number 
of dependent variables is consistent with a systems methodology 
(e.g., von Bertalanffy, 1968, p. 55) that simultaneously seeks 
to prove a null-hypothesis of no relationship between dependent 
and independent variables (bio-sociality and sexual preference) 
and to show the hypothesized relationship of one dependent 
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variable (gender identity) and the independent variable (sexual 
preference). 
With an overwhelming lack of knowledge (but many opinions) 
about homosexuality (and heterosexuality) the net needs - at 
first - to be widely cast. The meaning of traditional science 
comes from its ability to replicate effect. The statistical test 
does not in itself do this. The statistical test has become a 
short-cut method of showing scientific significance when in fact 
It can only show statistical significance measured as a 
probability. A necessary argument that statistical significance 
shows scientific significance is replication. 
The results are analysed using a posteriori comparisons and 
discriminant analysis. Since the effects of the independent 
variable on the dependent variable may be affected by the size 
of the sample, Omega squared values are given as an estimate of 
the strength of effect of the independent variable (Keppel, 
1982). Omega squared values generally vary between 0 and 1: a 
'large' effect in the behavioural sciences is a value of 0.15 or 
greater, while a 'medium' effect is 0.06, and a 'small' effect 
is 0.01 (Keppel, 1982). 
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The analyses are:- 
(i) A stepwise discriminant analysis is used to find the two 
discriminant functions. The percentage of correct predictability 
is used to indicate the utility of the discriminant functions. 
(ii) A posteriori comparisons of those variables repeated 
from Study 1 and entered into the discriminant analysis. 
(iii) Discriminant analysis is used to predict the 
classification of subjects in Study 2 from the discriminant 
functions of Study 1. This procedure predicts the independent 
variable (the subjects' classification) from the dependent 
variables (the discriminating functions) and compares the 
prediction to the subjects' own classification. Some loss in 
predictive power is expected using this procedure. 
Hypotheses 
The substantive thesis is the theoretical relationship 
between gender identity and sexual preference and the 
identification of that gender as a male or a female. It is 
hypothesised that: 
(i) The results of Study 1 will be repeated in this study, that 
is, sexual preference is predictive of gender identity; this is 
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interpreted as showing that the homosexual male and heterosexual 
female have the same gender identity which is opposite to that 
of the heterosexual male. 
(ii) The results of Study 1 will be repeated in this study, that 
is, that bio-sociality is predictive of sexual identity; this is 
interpreted as showing that the homosexual and heterosexual male 
experience and learn the same enculturation, an enculturation 
that is (at least partially) different to that of the 
heterosexual female. 
(iii) While sexual preference is hypothesized as being 
predictive of gender identity, it is also hypothesized that 
gender identity is also predictive of sexual preference. The 
interpretation of this partial cross-validation is that gender 
identity and sexual preference in homosexual males are 
interrelated as different aspects of homosexuality (i.e., the 
psychological intra- and sociological inter-personal aspects). 
(iv) There are no significant differences in measures of 
pathology between the homosexual and heterosexual groups. 
Support for this hypothesis discredits the social frame theories 
of homosexuality which predict homosexual deviancy. 
A hypothesis for each variable is stated in appendix 2. 
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STUDY 3 
Sub ects 
The same homosexuals in Study 2 were classified into one of 
three groups based on their Cass scale score: low (scale scores 
1, 2, and 3), middle (4, 5), and high (6). This was done as 
there were insufficient subjects in some categories and this 
classification is not contra-indicated by the psychometric 
properties of the Cass scale (1984). The group sizes were then 
n=20, n=65, and n=39 respectively. In the discriminant analysis 
six subjects were eliminated due to incomplete scores: the group 
sizes being n=20, n=60, and n=38 respectively. 
Measures  
All the measures used in Study 3 have been previously 
described in Study 1 or Study 2. 
Procedure  
Since Studies 2 and 3 were concurrent the procedure has been 
described in Study 2. 
Design  
Age and years of education were regarded as dependent rather 
than control variables and therefore there was no matching of 
the three homosexual groups. The results were analysed using 
discriminant analysis and a posteriori comparisons. Omega 
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squared values are used to show the strength of the effect of 
the independent variable on the dependent variables without the 
effects of sample size. 
In this discriminant analysis with 30 dependent variables (28 
as in Study 2 plus age and years of education) and with a 
smallest cell size of 20 there is a lack of power. The reasons 
for tolerating a lack of power have already been discussed in 
Study 2. These same issues are also relevant in Study 3. (They 
are not discussed again here. Further reference is found in 
'implications for science' in Chapter 7). 
Of the 30 dependent variables, 18 can be said to be matching. 
There are not expected to be any differences between the three 
groups on these dependent variables: gender identity, PDS (8 
scales), Eysenck's masculinity - femininity, 7 scales of the 
SCL-90-R, and the Reynold's social desirability scale. 
Of the remaining 12 variables, age and years of education are 
expected to vary as functions of the Cass scale. The 3 subscales 
of Levenson's (1981) 'locus of control', the 2 
'self-consciousness' subscales, and the GSI (of the SCL-90-R) 
are not direct measures of anxiety but potentially provide a 
means of challenging the anxiety hypothesis by provoking the 
analysis with alternatives as measures known to be related to 
psychological pathology. Thus an analysis that showed homosexual 
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identity development to be strongly related to, for example, 
'powerful others' of the locus of control construct, would be a 
strong argument against an anxiety hypothesis, and therefore 
against the theory developed in this thesis and the hypothesis 
that the homosexual male (and heterosexual female) is 
gender-male. These scales have been included because, in 
encouraging deviancy in the data, they make the support of the 
hypothesis more difficult. 
The remaining four scales are measures of different 
constructs of anxiety: 'anxiety' and 'phobic anxiety' 
(agoraphobia) from the SCL-90-R, the 'social anxiety' subscale 
of 'self-consciousness', and 'homophobia' (IHP). The value of 
science is not restricted to showing positively what is. It is 
also valuable to show that something is not. In the social 
sciences this is probably so in the testing of commonly held but 
fallacious beliefs. This is analogous to establishing an alibi 
when the person is guilty at law until proven innocent. The 
design of this experiment has centred on the principle that 
provoking statistical deviancy would undermine the proposed 
model of homosexual identity. This is consistent with a 
principle of identity (in a system) that identity is not shown 
unless the entity is free to be different, deviant, free-willed, 
or spontaneous. In this design (e.g., that proposed by von 
Bertalanffy, 1968) variables that could be expected to be 
related to the null hypotheses and to the experimental 
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hypothesis are tested. 
The Study 3 analyses are:- 
(i) A stepwise discriminant analysis is used to find the two 
discriminant functions. The percent correct predictability is 
used to indicate the utility of the discriminant functions. 
(ii) A posteriori comparisons of those variables entered into 
the stepwise discriminant analysis. 
Hypotheses  
There are two hypotheses: 
(i) Homosexuality (gender identity of the subject) is not 
expected to vary with the independent variable of identification 
with self as subject (homosexual identity formation). Support 
for this hypothesis will be interpreted as showing the validity 
of a subjective psychological homosexuality ('being homosexual' 
related to gender identity) that is separate to the objective 
relationship (involved or detached) to this identity within the 
self. This would support the theory of persons-grammar which 
predicts the separateness of subjective function (role creating) 
and objective function (identification: taking own role and 
taking role of other) within the personality. 
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(ii) 	The 	independent 	variable of homosexual identity 
formation is expected to be predictive of anxiety. The 
relationship is predicted to be inverse: the more homosexual 
identity formation (taking own role or embodying the self) the 
less there is anxiety. This will be interpreted as support for 
the psychological theory of persons-grammar and for the proposed 
theory of sexual preferences. It would follow that pathology is 
strongly related to a 'third-person' relationship to oneself and 
not to homosexuality. Empirical support for this anxiety 
hypothesis is support for the theory of sexual preferences which 
theorizes the homosexual male being subjectively male (i.e., 
gender-male). 
Hypotheses for each variable are stated in appendix 3. 
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CHAPTER 5 
RESULTS: Statistical and substantive. 
The results are presented statistically and substantively. 
The results of each of the three studies are presented 
separately. 
STUDY 1 
These results are presented in the following order: (a) 
descriptive statistics, (b) discriminant analysis, and lastly, 
(c) a posteriori comparisons. In Study 1 the subject numbers 
are: n=41, n=37, and n=35 for heterosexual male, female, and 
homosexual male respectively. 
(a) Descriptive statistics. 
This section (a) is purely descriptive (tests of significance 
are below in section c). Higher scores on 'gender identity' (see 
Table 6, with a potential range from 0 to 19) indicate more 
'crossed-sex' gender identity. Lower scores on 'crossed-sex' 
gender identity indicates an absence of this non-typical gender 
identity and (presumably) a typical gender identity. 
Heterosexual males and females are expected to have low scores 
on this variable: they are assumed (by the labelling of this 
variable in the literature) to have a gender identity congruent 
with their sex. The homosexuals are seen to score more highly on 
this variable than do either of the heterosexual groups: the 
homosexual group shows a higher level of 'crossed-sex' gender 
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identity, that is, a gender identity that is typical 
heterosexual females. 
Table 6. 
of 
Descriptive statistics for the heterosexual male (1) 
heterosexual female (2). and homosexual male (3). 
MEAN STANDARD DEVIATION 
SCALE 1 2 3 1 2 3 
CROSSED-SEX GENDER IDENTITY: 
gender identity 7.07 8.14 13.26 3.77 3.87 4.64 
PDG: 
femimine positive 50.32 56.14 55.08 6.08 5.49 6.96 
feminine negative 34.00 35.05 36.72 7.61 8.97 10.28 
masculine positive 46.15 43.68 44.83 6.99 6.70 7.77 
masculine negative 33.49 30.03 30.39 
soc. desirability: 
7.85 7.66 8.59 
positive 26.29 26.05 26.83 3.23 3.21 3.46 
negative 16.46 16.38 16.11 4.30 3.62 5.03 
SEXUAL ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOUR: 
permissiveness 36.76 37.11 38.61 4.22 2.74 3.69 
satisfaction 27.49 28.08 28.33 5.35 5.56 5.77 
neurotic sex 18.12 18.22 18.67 5.31 3.82 4.30 
impersonal sex 24.27 20.08 27.78 5.93 3.95 6.16 
pornography 21.61 18.57 22.94 3.10 4.07 2.46 
continued over: 
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Table 6 continued. 
MEAN STANDARD DEVIATION 
SCALE 1 2 3 1 2 3 
sexual shyness 7.27 7.05 7.64 1.86 2.09 2.34 
prudishness 9.59 10.51 9.64 1.47 2.04 1.51 
sexual disgust 9.68 10.38 10.56 2.05 2.70 2.32 
sex. excitement 18.68 16.05 18.28 2.92 4.38 2.85 
physical sex 14.78 14.57 15.50 2.63 2.75 2.67 
aggressive sex 10.27 9.97 9.53 2.60 2.07 2.59 
age at first 18.29 18.68 17.69 3.02 2.84 5.32 
intercourse 
2nd order factors:- 
sex. satisfaction 34.80 34.76 35.75 5.61 5.24 5.13 
libido 84.51 76.86 90.83 12.08 8.72 7.58 
masc. - fem. 111.66 98.27 116.50 9.10 9.70 9.40 
The heterosexual male and female scores on the PD61 scales 
show the expected sex-differences: heterosexual males score more 
highly on masculine positive and negative, and heterosexual 
females score more highly on feminine positive and negative. The 
homosexual male scores are intermediate in feminine positive and 
both masculinity scales, while in feminine negative they score 
more highly than heterosexual females. In both PD Q measures of 
social desirability all three groups are similar. 
Eysenck (1976) identified in adults 14 factors related to 
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sexual attitudes and behaviours, 	some 	of 	which 	showed 
sex-differences. The results show that four of these factors 
appear to fail to show the expected sex-difference. These are:- 
permissiveness, neurotic sex, aggressive sex and sexual 
satisfaction (2nd order factor). 
Compared to the heterosexual comparisons, the means of the 
Eysenck factors show the homosexual male is less sexually 
aggressive. Those factors for which homosexual males are higher 
than both control groups are:- permissiveness, neurotic sex, 
satisfaction, sexual satisfaction, sexual disgust, impersonal 
sex, pornography, sexual shyness, physical sex, libido, and 
masculinity - femininity. Additionally, homosexual males were 
younger at first sexual intercourse. The homosexual male at 
first sexual intercourse has an average age of 17.69 years, the 
heterosexual male an average age of 18.29 years, and the 
heterosexual female 18.68 years. The homosexual male means are 
intermediate between those of the heterosexual males and females 
for prudishness and sexual excitement. Some of these differences 
are small. Also, while the factorial labels are descriptive of 
the identified factors it would probably be misleading to 
consider, for example, what was pornographic in 1976 as still 
SO . 
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(b) Discriminant Analysis. 
With 22 variables vis-a-vis the sample size there is a 
reduction in power. To ensure that chance results are kept to a 
minimum, the Bonferroni correction was applied and resulted in a 
criterion level of 0.0022. In discriminant analysis there is 
first a manova of the 22 variables. The variables entered into 
the discriminant analysis are selected according to criterion 
(Bonferroni correction = 0.05 / 22). Only those variables which 
survived alpha < 0.0022 are included in the stepwise 
discriminant analysis. Some variables may be correlated with 
each other and so the stepwise procedure may eliminate those 
correlated variables which do not further contribute to 
discrimination. Six variables are entered into this stepwise 
discriminant analysis. These are:- 'feminine positive', 
'impersonal sex', 'pornography', 'libido', 'masculinity - 
femininity', and 'gender identity'. 'Impersonal sex' Was 
eliminated in the discriminant analysis. The inter-correlation 
matrix of these six variables is shown in Table 7. 
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Table 7. 
Pooled within-groups correlation matrix of variables  
entered into the discriminant analysis.  
FEM. IMPER. PORN. LIB. MASCL. GENDER 
POS. SEX - FEM. IDENT. 
Fem. Positive 
Impersonal Sex 
Pornography 
Libido 
Masc. - Fem. 
Gender Ident. 
1.00 
-0.23 
0.03 
-0.16 
-0.13 
-0.01 
1.00 
0.29 
0.75 
0.76 
0.04 
1.00 
0.65 
0.54 
-0.11 
1.00 
0.81 
-0.07 
1.00 
0.00 1.00 
The inter-correlation matrix of variables entered into the 
discriminant analysis shows that the variables impersonal sex, 
pornography, libido, and masculinity femininity show 
considerable inter-correlations. Thus these Eysenck scales which 
measure predominantly masculine sex traits correlate amongst 
themselves but not with feminine positive or gender identity. 
The negative correlations of feminine positive with the 
masculine sex traits of impersonal sex, libido, and masculinity 
- femininity is therefore consistent. Neither feminine positive 
nor gender identity correlate highly with other variables. These 
variables are entered into the discriminant analysis and the 
results of this discriminant analysis are shown in Table 8. 
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Table EL 
'The standardized canonical discriminant functions: coefficients  
and percent of variance.  
FUNCTION 1 FUNCTION 2 
STANDARDIZED COEFFICIENTS: 
Feminine Positive -0.05 0.63 
Pornography 0.41 -0.27 
Libido -0.37 0.96 
Masculinity - Femininity 0.89 -0.83 
Gender Identity 0.51 0.65 
PERCENT OF VARIANCE 65.55% 34.45% 
Table 9. 
Pooled within-groups correlations between the discriminating 
variables and the canonical discriminant functions. 
FUNCTION 1 FUNCTION 2 
Masculinity - Femininity 0.81 -0.27 
Libido 0.59 -0.03 
Pornography 0.58 -0.14 
Gender Identity 0.49 0.62 
Feminine Positive -0.09 0.57 
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Table 10. 
Canonical discriminant functions evaluated at group means.  
GROUP FUNCTION 1 	FUNCTION 2 
1 Heterosexual Males 0.05 -0.94 
2 Heterosexual Females -1.22 0.50 
3 Homosexual Males 1.23 0.57 
1 
Heterosexual Females 	 Homosexual Males 
0 - 
Heterosexual Males 
0 
	
1 
Figure 6. 	 Function I 
Canonical discriminant functions of Table 10 plotted as the  
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group means. 
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The discriminant analysis produces two discriminant 
functions. The size and sign of the coefficients of function 1 
show that masculinity - femininity, pornography and gender 
identity account for most of the predictability. Of the six 
variables entered into the analysis only feminine positive does 
not correlate positively with this function. Function 1 is the 
main discriminant function accounting for 65.55% of the 
variance: it discriminates the heterosexual females from the 
homosexual males with the heterosexual males intermediate. 
Overall, the main components of function 1 are ('crossed-sex') 
gender identity and masculinity. 
The main variables contributing to function 2 are feminine 
positive, libido, gender identity, while masculinity - feminity 
contributes negatively. The main correlates with this function 
are gender identity and feminine positive and the negative (and 
therefore feminine) contribution of masculinity - femininity. 
Function 2 accounts for 34.45% of the variance: it discriminates 
the heterosexual males from the other two groups. Overall, the 
main components of function 2 are ('crossed-sex') gender 
identity and femininity. 
Gender identity enters into both functions: the homosexual 
males are different from both heterosexual groups in having a 
'crossed-sex' gender identity. They are also different to 
heterosexual males in having some 'feminine' qualities that are 
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also characteristic of heterosexual females. They are also 
different to heterosexual females in having some characteristic 
'masculine' qualities that are also characteristic of 
heterosexual males. The heterosexual males are intermediate on 
function 1 - the homosexual males are more 'masculine' than the 
heterosexual males. In summary, function 1 discriminates the 
sexes and is the main discriminant function. Function 2 
separates the heterosexual males from the homosexual males and 
heterosexual females. 
Table 11. 
Classification of subjects (using priors) into predicted group  
membership.  
ACTUAL 	No. of 	PRIOR PREDICTED GROUP MEMBERSHIP 
GROUP 	SUBJECTS PROB'S 	1 	2 	3 
1 
	 41 	0.36 	27 	8 	6 
Het. Males 65.9% 	19.5% 	14.6% 
2 	38 	0.33 	7 	27 	4 
Het. Fem. 18.4% 	71.1% 	10.5% 
3 	35 	0.31 	6 	2 	27 
Horn. Males 17.1% 	5.7% 	77.1% 
Discriminant 	analysis 	is 	also used to predict group 
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membership and 77.1% of the homosexual males are correctly 
classified (with priors) using these discriminant functions. 
Overall, the analysis predicts the three groups with 71.05% 
accuracy compared to chance at approximately 33%. 
(c) A Posteriori Comparisons. 
A posteriori comparisons of those variables entered into the 
discriminant analysis were anticipated. Six variables were 
entered. Homosexual and heterosexual males are compared, as are 
homosexual males and heterosexual females. There are therefore 
12 tests (alpha=0.0042, df=1,112). 
Table 12. 
Comparisons of those variables entered into the discriminant  
analysis. 
(A - comparison of homosexual males and heterosexual males, 
B - comparison of homosexual males and heterosexual females. 
* - significant differences). 
PLANNED 
A 
COMPARISON 
Gender Identity 43.44 0.000 * 28.21 0.000 * 
Feminine Positive 11.35 0.001 * 0.70 0.409 
Impersonal Sex 7.93 0.006 38.34 0.000 * 
Pornography 3.13 0.076 34.64 0.000 * 
Libido 7.73 0.007 39.61 0.000 * 
Masculinity - Femininity 4.99 0.026 71.65 0.000 * 
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The six variables entered into the discriminant analysis were 
tested in statistical comparisons. The homosexual males are 
significantly different to both the heterosexual groups in 
'crossed-sex' gender identity: the homosexual male has a higher 
level of 'crossed-sex' gender identity. The homosexual male is 
also different to the heterosexual male on the feminine positive 
variable. Compared to the heterosexual male, the homosexual male 
has significantly higher scores on two 'feminine' variables 
(gender identity, feminine positive). The homosexual male is 
also different to the heterosexual female on impersonal sex, 
pornography, libido, and masculinity - femininity. Homosexual 
males score more highly on these variables that are masculine 
sex traits and which reliably differentiate males and females. 
The homosexual male is discriminated from heterosexual females 
by higher levels of 'crossed-sex' gender identity, and also by 
masculine sex characteristics. 
In summary, homosexual males are shown to be different to 
heterosexual males in 'crossed-sex' gender identity and in a 
measure of female bio-sociality ('feminine positive') but they 
are not different in masculine bio-sociality. The homosexual 
males are also shown to be different to heterosexual females in 
'crossed-sex' gender identity and in masculine bio-social 
differences. Bio-socially the homosexual male, compared to the 
heterosexual female, is masculine and in some ways feminine, 
and, compared to the heterosexual male the homosexual male is 
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also bio-socially masculine and feminine. Compared to both 
heterosexual males and females the homosexual male is 
characterized by a higher 'crossed-sex' gender identity. 
161 
STUDY 2 
These results are presented in the following order: (a) 
descriptive statistics, (b) discriminant analysis, (c) a 
posteriori comparisons, and last, (d) partial cross-validation. 
The subject numbers are: n=34 and n=33 for heterosexual males 
and females respectively and n=124 for homosexual males. 
(a) Descriptive Statistics. 
Table 13. 
Descriptive statistics for the heterosexual 	males (1) 
heterosexual females (2) and homosexual males (3). 
SCALE 
MEAN 
1 2 3 
STANDARD DEVIATION 
1 2 3 
Gender Identity 6.94 7.73 11.98 2.58 4.32 4.18 
Masc. - Fem. 111.91 100.52 113.27 9.86 9.54 9.58 
Feminine Positive 50.79 55.64 53.45 5.67 4.97 6.74 
Feminine Negative 35.26 35.24 36.86 6.45 6.68 8.87 
Feminine Total 86.06 90.79 90.31 8.36 9.26 10.95 
Masculine Positive 44.00 43.76 43.35 5.98 5.87 7.84 
Masculine Negative 31.85 30.27 29.52 7.09 6.82 7.95 
Masculine Total 75.26 74.03 72.90 11.60 10.81 13.56 
continued over: 
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Table 13 continued. 
MEAN STANDARD DEVIATION 
SCALE 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Social Desirability: 
Positive 25.50 25.82 25.47 3.85 3.15 4.31 
Negative 16.79 16.82 16.26 3.02 3.08 4.52 
Social Desirability: 
Reynold's Form C 9.41 11.09 11.50 5.75 5.98 5.44 
Somatization 40.18 29.06 44.85 33.74 31.42 35.67 
Obsessive-Comp. 75.29 56.73 74.94 55.66 35.67 61.07 
Interper. Sens. 62.65 64.55 73.73 49.42 54.05 71.33 
Depression 61.71 64.85 73.88 49.58 52.97 65.76 
Anxiety 36.18 38.00 49.02 45.53 50.37 55.87 
Hostility 47.56 39.45 39.31 •48.42 37.14 44.18 
Phobic Anxiety 7.94 6.06 19.55 16.52 11.37 42.92 
Paranoid Ideation 57.29 44.51 63.40 52.99 50.98 64.78 
Psychoticism 22.65 22.27 40.82 26.21 30.11 51.59 
GSI 47.00 44.06 55.93 34.31 32.28 48.75 
Homophobia 65.97 60.03 46.40 14.93 11.69 13.42 
Internality 35.41 34.76 35.39 4.48 4.32 6.22 
Powerful Others 16.09 17.18 19.95 7.35 8.02 8.16 
Chance 15.91 16.58 19.05 7.33 7.77 7.65 
Priv. Self-consc. 22.74 23.79 22.23 6.52 7.00 5.89 
Pub. Self-consc. 14.71 16.21 16.85 4.36 5.53 5.06 
Social Anxiety 10.18 11.82 11.94 3.46 4.05 5.31 
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Some variables of Study 1 are repeated in Study 2. 
Statistically significant differences are presented in 'a 
posteriori comparisons' below. As in Study 1, homosexual males 
show a higher level of 'crossed-sex' gender identity and of 
masculinity - femininity (Table 13 above). As previously found, 
the homosexual males are higher than heterosexual males on 
feminine positive and negative. Different from Study 1 is the 
finding that homosexual males score lower than heterosexual 
females on masculine positive and negative. As previously found 
the scores on social desirability, both positive and negative 
are similar. Some of these observed differences are quite 
small. 
Compared to the heterosexual comparisons, the homosexual 
males score lower on hostility, homophobia, and private 
self-consciousness and intermediate on internality and 
obsessive-compulsive. The homosexual males score higher on 
Reynold's Form C of social desirability, somatization, 
interpersonal sensitivity, depression, anxiety, phobic anxiety, 
paranoid ideation, psychoticism, 691, powerful others, chance, 
public self-consciousness and social anxiety. 
(b) Discriminant Analysis. 
The variables entered into the discriminant analysis are 
selected after an initial manova (Bonferroni criterion = 0.05 
divided by 28). Only those three variables which survived alpha 
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< 0.0018 are entered into the stepwise discriminant analysis. 
These are:- 'gender identity', 'masculinity - femininity', and 
'homophobia'. Feminine positive with alpha = 0.008 failed to 
reach criterion and was therefore excluded. The 
inter-correlation matrix of these variables is shown in the 
following Table. 
Table 14. 
Pooled within-groups correlation matrix of variables  
entered into the discriminant analysis.  
Gend. Masc. Homoph. 
Ident. -Fern. 
gender identity 1.00 
masculinity . - femininity -0.01 1.00 
homophobia -0.07 -0.26 1.00 
The inter-correlation matrix of variables entered into the 
discriminant analysis shows only one small and negative 
correlation (r=-0.26) between homophobia and masculinity - 
femininity. As in Study 1 there is little correlation between 
gender identity and other variables. (An absence of correlation 
between gender identity and other variables is also evident with 
other variables not included in the Table: the highest 
correlations are gender identity and feminine negative where 
r=0.18, and with masculine positive where r=-0.19). These three 
variables were entered into the discriminant analysis and the 
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results of this analysis are presented in the following tables. 
Table 15. 
The standardized canonical discriminant functions: coefficients  
and percent of variance. 
 
FUNCTION 1 FUNCTION 2 
STANDARDIZED COEFFICIENTS 
Gender identity 0.61 -0.05 
Masculinity - Femininity 0.28 0.99 
Homophobia -0.64 0.53 
PERCENT OF VARIANCE 79.04% 20.96% 
Table 16. 
Pooled within-groups correlations between the discriminating  
variables and the canonical discriminant functions. 
FUNCTION 1 FUNCTION 2 
Gender Identity 0.65 -0.10 
Masculinity - Femininity 0.44 0.86 
Homophobia -0.76 0.27 
1 
El 
Heterosexual Males 
0 - 
Homosexual Males 
Heterosexual Females 
El 
-1 
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Table 17. 
Canonical discriminant functions evaluated at group means.  
GROUP 	 FUNCTION 1 	FUNCTION 2 
1 Heterosexual Males -1.16 0.70 
2 Heterosexual Females -1.09 -0.75 
3 Homosexual Males 0.64 0.01 
Figure 7. 
-2 
Function 1 
0 
Canonical discriminant functions amt. Table 12 platted As. lb& 
group means. 
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The discriminant analysis produces two discriminant 
functions. The size and sign of the coefficients of function 1 
show that homophobia (negatively), gender identity and 
masculinity - femininity variables all contribute to this 
function which appears to measure predominantly homosexual male 
characteristics. All three variables correlate with function 1 
with the expected sign. Function 1 is the main discriminant 
function accounting for 79.04% of the variance: it discriminates 
the homosexual from the heterosexual with the heterosexual 
female intermediate. Overall, the main components of function 1 
are those which characterize male homosexuals: 'female' gender 
identity, lower homophobia, and 'masculinity' (masculinity - 
femininity). 
The main variables contributing to function 2 are masculinity 
- femininity and homophobia. The main correlate with this 
function is masculinity - femininity. Homophobia is moderately 
(r=0.27) correlated with function 2 and gender identity has a 
low and negative (r=-0.10) correlation. Function 2 accounts for 
20.96% of the variance: it discriminates between the sexes with 
the homosexual group intermediate. The main variable in function 
2 is masculinity - femininity which distinguishes the sexes. 
(The homosexual males are in fact the most 'masculine' on this 
measure). This masculine - feminine function also has a 
contribution from homophobia which serves to separate the 
homosexual and heterosexual males such that the homosexual males 
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are intermediate. Overall, the homosexual males are 
discriminated from the heterosexual females largely by 
'masculinity' (masculinity - femininity) and the heterosexual 
males from heterosexual females by both 'masculinity' and by 
homophobia. 
Table 18. 
Classification of subjects (using priors) into predicted group, 
membership.  
ACTUAL No. PRIOR PREDICTED GROUP MEMBERSHIP 
GROUP SUBJECTS PROB'S 1 	 2 3 
1 
	
34 0.18 20 4 10 
Het. Males 58.8% 11.8% 29.4% 
2 33 0.18 6 17 10 
Het. Females 18.2% 51.5% 30.3% 
3 124 0.64 8 4 112 
Hom. Males 6.5% 3.2% 90.3% 
Discriminant analysis with priors predicts 90.3% (77.1% in 
Study 1) of the homosexual males, and without priors is 71.0%, 
which compares favourably to chance at 33%. Overall, the 
analysis predicts group membership with priors at 78.01% (71.05% 
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in Study 1) and without priors at 69.63% which also compares 
favourably to chance at 33%. In Study 1 the main discriminant 
variables were gender identity, masculinity - femininity, 
feminine positive, and to some extent libido. Discriminant 
predictability is improved in Study 2 with the inclusion of 
homophobia and the exclusion of feminine positive. The effect of 
libido was marginal in Study 1 and has not been included in 
Study 2. 
This Study tests the thesis that sexual preference is related 
to gender identity and sexual identity to bio-sexuality, and 
therefore, that sexual identity and sexual preference are not 
related. If the homosexual is sexually deviant as conventional 
theories of sexual preferences postulate, then the homosexual 
group should in this discriminant function be predicted by 
variables related to an inverted bio-sociality and to 
psychopathology. Despite the inclusion of many variables which 
potentially should show the bio-social and psychological 
deviancy of the homosexual male, none of these results show such 
a deviancy. Those variables which should enter into the 
discriminant functions were this hypothesis correct do not do 
so. The discriminant functions of this Study are not related to 
sexual inversion and pathology. 
Overall the homosexual male is shown to be characterized by a 
'masculinity' (masculinity - femininity variable) and by a 
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'crossed-sex' gender identity. The masculine - feminine variable 
and the gender identity variable account for much of the 
predictive power of the discriminant analysis. The homophobia 
variable also contributes and serves to discriminate homosexual 
and heterosexual. With three groups there are theoretically 
three discriminating functions though discriminant analysis with 
three groups allows for only two. Three functions that should 
discriminate the groups are identified in Table 19. 
Table 19. 
Three functions that discriminate the three groups. 
DISTINGUISHES FROM FUNCTION 
Het. males Het. females (i) 'Male' (so-called) 
Hom. males gender identity 
Het. females Het. male (ii) 'feminine' (so-called) 
Horn. males bio-sociality 
Horn. males Het. males (iii) 'Crossed-sex' gender identity 
Het. females and variables specific to 
homosexual enculturation, 
e.g., homophobia. 
There is no measure of 'male gender identity' in Males 
included in this Study (none have been published). Function (ii) 
shows that the homosexual and heterosexual male are alike 
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bio-socially and different in this respect from heterosexual 
females. Function (iii) shows homosexual males are different 
from the other two groups. Both 'crossed-sex' gender identity 
(FGI) and homophobia are main components of this discriminating 
function. 
(c) A Posteriori Comparisons. 
Statistical comparisons of those variables entered into the 
discriminant analysis were anticipated. Three variables were 
entered. Homosexual and heterosexual males are compared as are 
homosexual males and heterosexual females. 6 tests are therefore 
planned (alpha=0.0083, df=1,189). 
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Table 20. 
A posteriori comparisons of those variables entered into the 
discriminant analysis.  
(A - comparison of homosexual males and heterosexual males. 
B - comparison of homosexual males and heterosexual females. 
* - significant difference) 
A POSTERIORI COMPARISONS 
A B OMEGA 
SQUARED 
Gender Identity 42.92 0.000 * 29.84 0.000 * 0.23 
Masc. - Fem. 0.53 0.465 45.82 0.000 * 0.19 
Homophobia 56.69 0.000 * 26.85 0.000 * 0.26 
Those variables entered into the discriminant analysis were 
subject to statistical comparisons. The homosexual males are 
different from both heterosexual males and heterosexual females 
in homophobia and 'crossed-sex' gender identity. The homosexual 
male is less homophobic compared to the heterosexual. The 
finding of higher levels of 'crossed-sex' gender identity 
repeats the findings of Study 1: homosexual males have higher 
levels of 'female' (so-called) gender identity. Homosexual males 
are not different from the heterosexual males in 'masculinity' 
(masculinity - femininity). Compared to heterosexual females 
both the male groups are more 'masculine'. 
Omega squared gives a relative measure of the strength of the 
independent variable and an effect in the behavioural and social 
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sciences equal to, or larger than, 0.15 is a 'large' effect 
(Keppel, 1982). Masculinity - femininity, gender identity and 
homophobia all have omega squared values of 0.19 or more 
indicating that the effect size is substantial and relatively 
independent of the sample size. 
Both Studies 1 and 2 show that homosexual males are found to 
be different from heterosexual males in 'feminine' (so-called) 
gender identity but not different in 'masculinity' 
(bio-sociality). Study 1 also found that homosexual and 
heterosexual males are alike on the characteristically masculine 
sex attributes of impersonal sex, pornography and libido. 
Homosexual males are shown to be different from heterosexual . 
females in masculinity - femininity and also in having high 
levels of 'crossed-sex' gender identity. As in Study 1 the 
homosexual male, compared to the heterosexual male and female, 
is characterized by a 'crossed-sex' gender identity. Feminine 
positive is statistically excluded in Study 2: this variable has 
a marginal significance in these two studies. Study 2 has also 
found that homosexual males are dissimilar to both heterosexual 
groups in having lower levels of homophobia. 
In these two studies adult homosexual males have been 
contrasted with matched heterosexual male and female controls. 
These three groups have been contrasted on a large number and 
wide variety of variables. In all 42 different dependent 
174 
variables have been used. These variables are measures of gender 
identity, sex-differences, sexual attitudes and behaviours, 
social desirability or response biasing, psychological 
pathology, and of constructs related to psychological pathology. 
In both Studies male homosexuality is associated with a 
crossed-sex ('female') gender identity and with masculine 
bio-sociality. The results of Study 1 - the statistical 
association of sexual preference and gender identity and of 
biological sex and bio-sociality - are repeated in Study 2. 
The overall classification of subjects using priors varies 
from 71.05% in Study 1 to 78.01% in Study 2. Classification of 
homosexual males with priors varies from 77.1% in Study 1 to 
90.3% in Study 2. In Study 2 the overall predictability without 
priors is 69.63% while for homosexual males it is 71.0% compared 
to chance at 33%. This large percentage difference between 
chance and actual prediction is shown in both studies. 
The reason for using a large number and variety of variables 
has been previously discussed. Despite the inclusion of a main 
and contradictory hypothesis provided by a large number of 
dependent variables related to sexual deviancy and pathology, 
only those variables related to gender identity and masculine 
attributes were successful in characterizing the homosexual 
male. It is clear from these results that homosexuality, per se, 
is not systematically related to psychological pathology nor to 
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indicators of pathology. The null hypothesis is however not 
supported since the heterosexual subjects report higher levels 
of homophobia and this is contrary to the null hypothesis of 
no-difference. These findings of predicted equivalences and no 
pathology in the homosexual male group is supportive ' of an 
origin for sexual preferences in the gender of the self as 
subject and not in bio-sociality where the self is object. 
(d) Partial Cross-validation. 
The discriminant functions of Study 1 are used to predict 
group category of the subjects in Study 2 and then this 
prediction is compared to the subject's self report of group 
category. Since all the variables of the discriminant functions 
from Study 1 have not been included in Study 2 this procedure is 
a partial cross-validation. The aim of this procedure is to 
measure the predictability of the discriminant functions in a 
similar group of subjects. To the extent that the discriminant 
functions are valid they should be predictive of the same 
categories in the independent group of subjects. Some loss of 
predictability is expected in this procedure when compared to 
the overall predictability of 69.63% reported in Table 18 above. 
The discriminant functions used to predict Study 2 subject 
classification is shown in Table 21. 
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Table 21. 
Standardized canonical discriminant function coefficients.  
FUNCTION 1 FUNCTION 2 
Feminine Positive 0.11 0.67 
Feminine Negative 0.28 0.15 
Masculinity - Femininity 0.91 -0.32 
Gender Identity 0.46 0.62 
PERCENT OF VARIANCE 70.09% 29.91% 
Study 1 discriminant functions, when used to predict subject 
classification of Study 2 subjects, predict without priors 59.0% 
of the homosexual males correctly, and overall, 63.07% (see 
Table 22 below). A drop in predictive power from 69.63% to 
63.07% is not unusual. This procedure predicts Study 2 subjects 
at about 25% better than chance. The discriminant functions have 
good predictability across different studies in this 
cross-validational study. 
177 
Table 22. 
Classification of study 2 subjects from Study 1 discriminant  
functions without priors. 
ACTUAL PREDICTED PREDICTED GROUP MEMBERSHIP 
GROUP CASES 1 2 3 
 
38 28 4 
73.7% 10.5% 
33 9 21 
27.3% 63.6% 
105 24 19 
22.9% 18.1% 
15 1 4 
6.7% 26.7% 
1 
Het. Males 
2 
Het. Females 
3 
Horn. Males 
Ungrouped 
6 
15.8% 
3 
9.1% 
62 
59.0% 
10 
66.7% 
In summary, the homosexual males are shown to be different 
from heterosexual males in 'crossed-sex' gender identity and 
they are not different in 'masculine' bio-sociality. The 
homosexual males are also different from the heterosexual 
females in 'crossed-sex' gender identity and in 'masculinity'. 
Both the heterosexual males and females are more homophobic than 
the homosexual male. The results of Study 2 repeat the findings 
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of Study 1 that the homosexual male is characterized by a 'male' 
bio-sociality and he is also characterized, compared to 
heterosexual males and females, by a crossed-sex 'female' 
(so-called) gender identity. 
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STUDY 3 
These results are presented in the following order: (a) 
descriptive statistics, (b) discriminant analysis, and (c), a 
posteriori comparisons. The subject numbers are: n=20, n=65, and 
n=39, for the low, middle, and high groups respectively. 
(a) Descriptive Statistics. 
Table 23. 
Descriptive statistics for the low (1). middle (2) and high (3) 
Cass groups.  
MEAN STANDARD DEVIATION 
SCALE 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Age 30.25 35.78 38.68 9.20 9.89 8.96 
Years of education 14.25 15.18 15.45 2.90 3.01 3.40 
Gender Identity 10;65 12.03 12.56 4.93 3.91 4.15 
Masc - Fem. 118.80 113.12 114.28 10.80 9.01 9.98 
Feminine Positive 52.95 53.29 53.97 6.78 7.02 6.37 
Feminine Negative 37.70 38.37 33.92 10.42 8.45 8.18 
Feminine Total 90.65 91.66 87.89 11.20 10.68 11.14 
Masculine Positive 40.55 42.31 46.54 7.74 7.82 7.05 
Masculine Negative 28.05 27.65 33.38 7.72 6.27 9.29 
Masculine Total 68.70 69.95 79.97 12.12 11.48 14.96 
continued over: 
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Table 23 continued: 
MEAN STANDARD DEVIATION 
SCALE 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Social Desirability: 
Positive 23.55 25.74 26.00 5.38 4.10 3.85 
Negative 17.30 15.42 17.13 5.99 3.92 4.43 
Social Desirability: 
Reynold's Form C 13.10 11.08 11.41 6.24 5.65 4.58 
Somatization 65.00 43.00 37.59 68.91 42.05 45.07 
Obsessive - Comp. 85.00 81.57 58.72 79.31 61.14 47.25 
Interpers. Sens. 106.15 76.03 53.26 94.29 74.22 41.86 
Depression 108.50 72.88 57.79 91.59 65.22 41.71 
Anxiety 83.00 50.12 29.77 93.81 48.57 27.17 
Hostility 52.60 41.08 29.56 70.60 40.81 28.72 
Phobic Anxiety 51.50 17.29 6.92 76.85 34.76 16.30 
Paranoid Ideation 79.60 66.18 50.46 83.40 65.22 51.17 
Psychoticism 78.00 41.11 21.28 84.70 44.54 23.86 
GSI 82.95 56.86 40.51 76.61 44.47 28.23 
Homophobia 59.15 45.35 41.62 9.05 12.53 12.92 
Internality 35.55 35.15 35.69 5.51 6.68 5.89 
Powerful Others 20.35 21.03 17.95 7.76 8.20 8.12 
Chance 21.35 19.06 17.85 10.49 7.99 8.67 
Priv. Self-consc. 23.80 21,.98 21.82 6.89 5.57 5.90 
Pub. Self-consc. 18.60 17.31 15.18 6.13 4.76 4.59 
Social Anxiety 13.40 12.72 9.90 5.12 5.34 4.85 
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- Observation of Table 23 (above) shows that some of the means 
(i) increase, (ii) stay the same, and (iii) decrease, across the 
low, middle and high categories on the Cass scale. (Tests of 
signficance follow below in Section C). Some of these 
differences between means are 'small'. 
(i) The variables whose means increase with the Cass scale 
are: age, years of education, gender identity, masculine 
positive, masculine negative, masculine total, and social 
desirability positive (PDQ). 
(ii) The variables whose means show little variation across 
the Cass groups are: feminine positive, feminine negative, 
feminine total, social desirability negative (PM and Reynold's 
Form C of social desirability. 
(iii) Those variables which show higher means in the low Cass 
group and lower means in the high Cass groups are: masculinity - 
femininity, somatization, obsessive-compulsive, interpersonal 
sensitivity, depression, anxiety, hostility, phobic anxiety, 
paranoid ideation, psychoticism, GSI, homophobia, powerful 
others, chance, public self-consciousness and social anxiety. 
Some of the means across these groups show 'large' differences. 
Comparing the score profiles of the high and low Cass scale 
categories shows an association of psychological pathology with 
the low Cass scale category. 
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(b) Discriminant Analysis. 
Five variables which survived alpha < 0.0018 were entered 
into the stepwise discriminant analysis. These are: 'masculine 
negative', 'masculine total', 'homophobia', 'psychoticism', and 
'phobic anxiety'. 
Table 24. 
Pooled within-qrouos correlation matrix of variables entered  
into the analysis. 
 
MAS. MAS. HOMOPH. PSYCHOT. PHOBIC 
NEG. TOTAL ANXIETY 
Masculine Negative 1.00 
Masculine Total 0.85 1.00 
Homophobia 0.12 0.00 1.00 
Psychoticism -0.03 -0.17 0.18 1.00 
Phobic Anxiety 0.10 -0.02 0.20 0.64 1.00 
There are two large correlations: between the two masculinity 
variables and between psychoticism and phobic anxiety. The 
correlations of homophobia with psychoticism and phobic anxiety 
are small. Other variables show negligible correlations. 
Two variables, masculine total and psychoticism (which are 
correlated with masculine negative and phobic anxiety 
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respectively), were eliminated in the stepwise analysis. The 
three variables masculine negative, homophobia, and phobic 
anxiety remain in the discriminant functions. The discriminant 
analysis with three Cass scale groups produces two discriminant 
functions. 
Table 25. 
The standardized canonical discriminant functions: coefficients  
and percent of variance.  
FUNCTION 1 FUNCTION 2 
STANDARDIZED COEFFICIENTS 
Homophobia 0.76 0.23 
Phobic Anxiety 0.45 0.19 
Masculine Negative -0.46 0.90 
PERCENT OF VARIANCE 84.11% 15.89% 
Table 26. 
Pooled within-groups correlations between the discriminating  
variables and the canonical discriminant functions.  
FUNCTION 1 FUNCTION 2 
Homophobia 0.79 0.38 
Phobic Anxiety 0.56 0.32 
Masculine Negative -0.32 0.95 
The size and sign of the coefficients of function 1 show that 
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homophobia especially, but also phobic anxiety and a negative 
contribution of masculine negative, contribute to this function. 
Homophobia and phobic anxiety correlate positively with this 
function. Masculine negative is negatively correlated with 
function 1. Masculinity in sex-role scales is generally 
associated with agency or instrumentality and so the negative 
contribution of masculine negative (coefficient = -0.46) 
indicates less competence associated with higher levels of 
homophobia and phobic anxiety. Masculine negative is composed of 
items which are seen as masculine sex traits but which are 
negatively valued, for example, 'bossy', 'noisy', 'aggressive', 
'sees self running show' and so masculine negative is probably a 
competence for 'standing on one's own'. It seems therefore to be 
a measure of 'independence' that includes some reactionary 
components. Function 1 indicates an absence of this 
'independence' (competence) in the low Cass group associated 
also with homophobia and phobic anxiety. 
Table 27.. 
Canonical discriminant functions evaluated at group means.  
CASS GROUPS FUNCTION 1 FUNCTION 2 
1 - Low 1.36 0.27 
2 - Middle -0.03 -0.29 
3 - High -0.67 0.31 
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Figure 8, Function 1 
Canonical discriminant functions of. Table 27 plotted as the 
srauo means.. 
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Function 1 is the main discriminant function accounting for 
84.11% of the variance: it orders the three Cass groups as high, 
middle, and low, with increasing levels of homophobia and phobic 
anxiety, and less 'masculine' competence in that order. Overall, 
the main components of function 1 are those which characterize a 
less developed identification (detached objectivity) with the 
self 'being homosexual'. This disembodied self is characterized 
by homophobia, phobic anxiety, and less masculine competence. 
The main variable contributing to function 2 is masculine 
negative but there is also some positive contribution from 
homophobia and phobic anxiety. Masculine negative correlates 
strongly and homophobia and phobic anxiety have moderate 
correlations with function 2. Function 2 accounts for 15.89% of 
the variance: it discriminates the middle group from the low and 
high groups (the low group is intermediate). The main variable 
in function 2 is masculine negative (coefficient=0.90). An 
examination of the means of masculine negative shows that the 
middle group is lowest in masculine negative. Overall, function 
2 distinguishes the three groups mainly on the masculine 
negative variable which seems to be some 'reactionary 
independent' characteristic. This function separates the less 
'reactionary' and less 'independent' middle group from the other 
two (high and low) groups. 
Variables that are highly correlated are eliminated in 
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discriminant analysis. Psychoticism and masculine total have 
been eliminated by this stepwise discriminant procedure. 
Psychoticism and phobic anxiety are correlated (r=0.64), and 
psychoticism correlates (r=0.44) with function 1. Masculine 
negative and masculine total are correlated (r=0.85), and 
masculine total correlates (r=0.76) with function 2. These two 
variables (and others) were tested and the results are described 
in (c) A Posteriori Comparisons (below). 
Table 28. 
Classification of subjects (with priors) into predicted group  
membership.  
ACTUAL No. of PRIOR PREDICTED GROUP MEMBERSHIP 
GROUP SUBJECTS PROB'S 1 2 3 
1 - Low 20 0.17 8 10 2 
 
40.0% 50.0% 10.0% 
2 - Middle 65 0.51 7 48 10 
10.8% 73.8% 15.4% 
3 - High 39 0.32 0 23 16 
0.0% 59.0% 41.0% 
The discriminant analysis predicts group classification with 
priors at 58.06%. This predictability is satisfactory: 90.0% of 
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low subjects are predicted within the low-middle range, 73.8% of 
middle subjects are predicted as middle subjects, and 100.0% of 
high subjects are predicted within the middle-high range. In 
other words, predictability is poorest at the extremes of • the 
Cass scale. Overall, however, with function 1 composed mainly of 
homophobia and phobic anxiety, its ordering of the low, middle, 
and high Cass groups, and in it accounting for 84.11% of the 
variance, the meaning of this discriminant function as phobic 
anxiety (i.e., both 'homo-phobia' and 'phobic anxiety') is 
clear. 
(c) A Posteriori Comparisons. 
Statistical comparisons of those variables entered into the 
discriminant analysis were anticipated. Five variables were 
entered. Low and middle homosexual groups are compared as are 
the low and high homosexual groups. 
The subjects of the three groups are psychologically 
homosexual. This sexual preference is hypothesized (and 
empirically confirmed in Studies 1 and 2) to be theoretically 
related to a 'crossed-sex' gender identity which is separate to 
a person's identification with their being homosexual. Since 
they are all psychologically homosexual, hypothetically 
differing only in degree of identification, the three groups 
should have equivalence in degree of 'feminine' (so-called) 
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gender identity. A test of significance is therefore 
hypothesized to show no significant difference in gender 
identity between the three groups. Overall, there are 12 
comparisons (apha=0.004) 
Table 29. 
A posteriori comparisons of Study 3. 
(A - comparison of low and middle homosexuals, 
B - comparison of low and high homosexuals. 
* - significant variable). 
A POSTERIORI COMPARISONS 
A B OMEGA 
 
F P F P SQUARED 
Masculine Negative 0.04 0.835 6.57 0.012 0.09 
Masculine Total 0.15 0.702 10.30 0.002 * 0.11 
Homophobia 19.63 0.000 * 27.42 0.000 * 0.17 
Phobic Anxiety 10.85 0.001 * 15.93 0.000 * 0.10 
Psychoticism 8.84 0.004 * 18.06 0.000 * 0.11 
Gender Identity 1.68 0.197 2.67 0.097 0.01 
Masculine negative, a contributing variable in the 
discriminant analysis, fails to reach significance. With the 
observed slight reversal, the maximum difference in means 
between groups is not between low and high Cass groups but a 
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contrast between the middle and high Cass groups. With ;3(0.0001 
the difference between the low and high groups is close to 
significance, as p=0.012 suggests. 
Masculine negative and masculine positive sum to masculine 
total and so there is a correlation (r=0.85) between masculine 
negative and masculine total and it is not surprising that one 
is eliminated by the discriminant analysis. The difference in 
masculine total scores between the low and high Cass groups is 
significant, the high Cass group being the more 'masculine'. The 
comparison of low and middle Cass groups is not significant. 
Compared to the group with low homosexual identity formation, 
the group with high homosexual identity formation is more 
'masculine' in those characteristics measured by the masculine 
positive and negative scales of the PDC/. These two scales 
measure masculine sex characteristics that are socially valued 
(positive) and de-valued (negative). This shows that homosexual 
males with a developed homo-sexual identity are more 'masculine' 
(which probably is best understood as being more competent or 
instrumental) than those who are homosexual and whose social 
role or embodiment of their homosexual self is less developed. 
Both masculine negative and masculine total have Omega squared 
values in the medium to large range for behavioral and social 
sciences. 
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A priori interpretations were made based on possible 
outcomes, both for the sign (positive and negative) and for 
masculinity/femininity. (See Appendix 3: hypotheses H99 to 
H110). The positive and negative sign of these scales shows the 
valuing of those traits. Generally the development of homosexual 
identity (HIP) is here associated with increased positive and 
negative valuing of masculine traits. (This corresponds to H101 
in Appendix 3). The a priori interpretation of this finding is 
that in the process of homosexual identity formation homosexual 
males socialize in ways that converge with generally accepted 
social values for male-sexed persons. Compared to the homosexual 
of the low (HIP) group, the homosexual who is more identified 
with his homosexual self is more likely to experience both 
social valuing (masculine positive) and social de-valuing 
(masculine negative). The objectively involved homosexual male 
asserts both the positive and negative aspects of the 'male' sex 
role. 
The results of Study 2 reported above show no differences 
between heterosexual and homosexual males on these masculinity 
scales of the PDG: this measure with its referent in sexual 
identity is not associated with sexual preference. In Study 3 
'masculinity' is shown to be statistically associated with the 
development of the homosexual's identification with himself, 
that is, 'masculinity' (i.e., competence) is associated with 
'more' homosexuality (identification) which contradicts 
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conventional assumptions of sexual inversion in homosexual 
males. 
Homophobia, 	phobic 	anxiety, and psychoticism all show 
significant differences between the low and middle Cass groups, 
and between the low and high Cass groups. Two other variables, 
'anxiety' and 'social anxiety', did not survive the criterion 
for entry into the discriminant analysis. Though excluded by the 
criterion these two variables show the same pattern of decreased 
anxiety with increased homosexual identity formation. This 
result shows a markedly consistent pattern with homophobia, 
phobic anxiety, and psychoticism diminishing with increasing 
levels of involved objectivity or spontaneity, that is, more 
integrated thinking and more freedom. Psychoticism and phobic 
anxiety have Omega squared values in the medium to large range, 
while that for homophobia is large. 
The results of Study 2 reported above show no differences 
between heterosexual males, heterosexual females, and homosexual 
males on the phobic anxiety and psychoticism variables. Both 
heterosexual groups are more homophobic than the homosexual male 
group. Phobic anxiety and psychoticism varies inversely with an 
involved objectivity or spontaneity and not with psychological 
homosexuality. Homophobia is shown to be related to both the 
development of homosexual identity - the lower Cass groups being 
more homophobic, and to differences in sexual preferences - 
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heterosexuals are higher than homosexuals in homophobia. All 
three of these measures indicate that more anxiety is associated 
with the dissociated thinking and the dis-embodiment (mind-body 
split) of the 'third-person' relationship to self. 
Overall, the results support the hypotheses postulated in 
this Study. On the Cass scale all subjects who have a non-zero 
score 'are homosexual'. What this scale measures is not 'degree 
of homosexualness' but degree of identification, an objective 
involvement or spontaneity with being psychologically 
homosexual. It has herein been argued that (psychological) 
homosexuality is related to the subjective experience of gender 
identity (self as subject) rather than to the objective 
experience of bio-sociality with its referent in sexual identity 
(self as object). It follows that all subjects in all groups of 
the Cass scale 'are homosexual' and that what makes them 
(psychologically) homosexual should be present in all three 
groups as 'feminine' (so-called) gender identity. This is 
supported by the a posteriori comparisons which show no 
differences in 'crossed-sex' gender identity between the groups. 
(Though there is no statistical comparison of the middle and 
high groups it is clear from the means that such a comparison 
would fail). 
The Omega squared value of 'crossed-sex' gender identity is 
small: the independent variable of Homosexual Identity Formation 
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has little effect on this dependent variable. This finding is 
consistent with the results of Studies 1 and 2 which support a 
model of homosexuality that is both subjective and objective and 
oriented in a theory of objective relations that has the subject 
as the scientific frame of reference. The objective expression 
of self (thinking) in the 'I-you' relationship of the 
spontaneous self (integrated thinking) is shown to be strongly 
and inversely related to anxiety and psychoticism (and 
dissociated thinking). 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS 
This study identifies and then applies the different frames 
of reference implicit in gender and sex research to an 
understanding of psychological homosexuality in males. An 
analysis of the literature shows that gender and sex have 
different frames of reference and these psychological and 
sociological frameworks have been confounded in psychological 
and community thinking. Confounding is a source of conceptual 
and semantic confusion in the gender and sex literature and a 
probable source of perplexity in attempting to understand the 
applications of this research, for example, to homosexuality. 
Gender and sex are constructs with implicitly different 
theories of subject-object relations and are applied in this 
research of male homosexuality. The model of the homosexual male 
in this thesis proposes a person with a male sexual identity and 
bio-sociality (self as object) and whose hypothesized 
psychological self (self as subject) is also male (though 
incorrectly labelled 'female' in the literature). Hypotheses 
were derived from this model: principally, that homosexuality is 
related to the self as subject (i.e., gender of self), and not 
to the self as object (i.e., sex of body). This hypothesis is at 
variance with a commonly held community opinion that 
homosexuality is a (deviant) variant of sexuality 
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homo-sexuality). If homosexuality is an aspect of sexual 
identity, then homosexual and heterosexual males should be 
bio-socially different. In this thesis there is no theoretical 
reason to suppose that they differ bio-socially. If, as proposed 
in this thesis, homosexuality is an aspect of gender identity - 
of being psychologically male or female - then the homosexual 
and heterosexual male should be different in this respect. 
Discriminant analysis has allowed (in Studies 1 and 2) the 
testing of both the conflicting gender and sexual identity 
theories, and (in Study 3) the two conflicting theories of 
sexual preference. Discriminant analysis should show a 
statistical association between gender identity and sexual 
preference and between biological sex and bio-sociality. It was 
hypothesized that 'crossed-sex' gender identity is the main 
discriminating variable between heterosexuals and homosexuals 
(and hence the homosexual male and heterosexual female have the 
same gender identity), and that bio-sociality is the main 
discriminating variable between biological males (home- and 
hetero-sexual) and females. It was the purpose of Study 1 to 
test this hypothesis and of Study 2 to repeat and confirm the 
finding. 
While Studies 1 and 2 are sufficient in themselves for the 
purposes of this thesis, the evidence for the proposed model of 
the homosexual male is strengthened if the spontaneity 
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relationship between the 'second-' and 'third-persons' predicted 
by the persons-grammar theory is also tested. This has the added 
advantage of identifying the homosexual male as gender-male or 
gender-female by testing the different theories of sexual 
preference. It was the purpose of Study 3 to identify the 
identity of the homosexual male (and heterosexual female) as 
gender-male. 
The Cass scale (HIF) in Study 3 was used to measure 
differences in identification with the psychological self (self 
as subject) and these differences are shown to operationalize 
two psychological relationships (ways of thinking) identified in 
the theory of persons-grammar and defining the extremes of a 
continuum of spontaneity. It was hypothesized that Cass scale 
differences in identification (identity formation) should not be 
related to gender identity if homosexuality is a function of the 
psychological frame - as persons-grammar theory proposes - and 
not a function of the sociological frame as sex-oriented 
theories postulate. Since these differences in the active 
variable operationalize a theoretical scale of spontaneity 
related inversely to anxiety it was hypothesized that these 
differences in identification would relate, not to homosexuality 
as a deviant sexuality, but to anxiety. This hypothesized 
finding would show that an absence of identification with self 
('third-person' thinking and loss of spontaneity) and not 
homosexuality per se, is associated with pathology. This would 
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confirm the theory of persons-grammar as an appropriate 
psychological construct of reality and therefore the theory of 
sexual preferences used to define the homosexual male as 
psychologically (or gender-) male. 
The conclusions drawn from these studies are now described in 
detail. Each study is presented separately. 
STUDY 1 
The results of Study 1 show that the sociological framework 
represented as scales that measure the bio-social male-female 
dimension do differentiate males from females as expected. The 
heterosexual male group is typically 'masculine' and the 
heterosexual female group is typically 'feminine'. The 
homosexual male group is typically 'masculine' on these same 
measures and perhaps even more so than the heterosexual males. 
On these bio-social measures the homosexual male is typically 
'masculine' compared to the heterosexual males, and both male 
groups are typically 'masculine' compared to the feminine 
females. The homosexual male is also more 'feminine' than the 
heterosexual male suggesting that the homosexual male is more 
androgynous (as previous research suggests). There is however no 
relationship between bio-sociality of the sociological frame of 
reference and homosexuality. 
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The 	study also shows that the psychological framework 
represented as the scale that measures the male-male (and 
parallel female-female) dimension does differentiate the 
homosexual males from both of the heterosexual groups. This 
finding shows that the homosexual male does have a high level of 
'crossed-sex' gender identity and that it is in this respect 
that the homosexual male is not typical compared to the two 
heterosexual control groups. The homosexual male (with his 
characteristic 'crossed-sex' gender identity) and the 
heterosexual female have the same gender identity that is 
different to the gender identity of the heterosexual male. There 
is a relationship between gender identity of the psychological 
frame of reference and homosexuality. 
Homo-sexual 	preference 	has usually been postulated as 
deviant: homosexuality is supposed to be a departure from a 
'normal' biologically based heterosexual preference and is 
therefore in some way abnormal. If this were so then in 
discriminant analysis it could be expected that the homosexuals 
would be differentiated from the male or female heterosexuals, 
or both, by scores showing abnormality. In Study 1 the found 
differences are those expected to predict (psychological) 
homosexuality and those 'masculine' and 'feminine' bio-social 
traits expected to predict sociometric homosexuality, that is, a 
cultural tendency for biological males and females to form 
separate social groups characterized by different norms (e.g., 
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social sex-roles). The term 'sociometric homosexuality' is 
derived from Moreno's concept of 'sociometric cleavage' defined 
as 
two groups of individuals in which self preference 
- that is preference for members of own group - 
rules out other-preference, that is, preference 
for members of out-group. It is the dynamic reason 
for the tendency of a group to breakup into 
subgroups (1978, p. 721). 
Male- and female-sexed subgroups are formed when the criterion 
for forming subgroups is biological sex. Moreno (1978) 
identifies this process in children's groups as 'homosexual 
cleavage'. Sociometric homosexuality refers to the end-product 
of this process of enculturation which differentially socializes 
children according to their biological sex (i.e., sexism). 
Using a large number of dependent variables to provoke a 
deviancy has not been successful in showing that the homosexuals 
are deviant except on two 'feminine' variables (one 
theoretically predictive of homosexuality and the other 
indicative of more 'communion' and 'inter-personal warmth'). The 
absence of deviancy supports the null hypothesis that 
psychological homosexuality is not per se abnormal. There is no 
support in Study 1 to suggest that 'crossed-sex' gender identity 
is in itself deviant. (Since about 1 in 20 male persons are 
exclusively homosexual, 'crossed-sex' gender identity is less 
common and so it is deviant in this statistical sense). Deviant 
in this context is in the sense of being abnormal, for which 
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there is no support. 
These findings are consistent with the model of the 
homosexual male as a person who is psychologically the same as 
the heterosexual female in gender identity and who is the same 
as the heterosexual male in bio-social masculinity. All three 
groups show a bio-sociality predictable from a sociometric 
cleavage into male- and female-sexed (literally homo-sexual) 
groups though the psychologically homosexual males are also more 
feminine ('feminine positive') than the heterosexual males. This 
model has been tested by predicting no statistical association 
between sexual preference and bio-sociality and predicting an 
association between sexual preference and gender identity. 
Sexual preference is shown to be the objective expression of a 
subjectively experienced gender. Overall, the findings 
substantially support the predictions suggesting that these 
statistically significant findings are also psychologically 
significant. There is substantial support for the conclusion 
that psychological homosexuality in the male has its origins in 
the psychological identity of the self and not in a socially 
defined bio-sociality with its referent in sexual identity. 
An unpredicted finding is that homosexual males are more 
'feminine' than heterosexual males in the Pna measure of 
'feminine positive'. There is some support in the literature for 
homosexual males being more androgynous (and therefore more 
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'feminine') than heterosexual males and so this finding of more 
'femininity', while perhaps unexpected, is not surprising. This 
'femininity' is named after a statistical and sociological 
association between biological sex and 'communion' (whatever) 
and is not related to a psychological sense of being female. 
'Femininity' in this context of the homosexual male is an 
ability to take the role of other (female social sex-role) and 
is indicative of less sociometric homosexuality (less sexism) 
than in heterosexual males, that is, more androgyny. 
Overall, these results support the proposed theory of 
persons-grammar and the hypothesis that sexual preference has 
its origins in the gender identity of the subject. There is no 
support for a hypothesis that psychological homosexuality is 
associated with deviancy. There is no support for the antagonist 
hypothesis that psychological homosexuality in the male has its 
origin in a deviant bio-sociality with its referent in sexual 
identity. 
STUDY 2 
As in Study 1 the model proposes that the homosexual and 
heterosexual male are alike bio-socially ('male' social 
sex-role) and different to the heterosexual female bio-socially 
('female' social sex-role), and that the homosexual male is 
characterized and differentiated from heterosexual males and 
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females by a psychological 'crossed-sex' gender identity. The 
purpose of Study 2 is to replicate the findings of Study 1 and 
thereby to nullify objections that the results of Study 1 are 
spurious. Study 2 also tests the implicit and proposed social 
frame theories of sexual preference which propose that the 
homosexual male should be pathologically deviant compared to 
heterosexual comparisons. It is hypothesized in this thesis that 
there is no difference in pathology and that this finding would 
confirm the inappropriateness of social frame theories of sexual 
preference. 
Two of the three discriminating variables in Study I are 
shown to be discriminating variables in Study 2: the two main 
variables that demonstrate the homosexual male to be both 
psychologically 'feminine' (so-called FGI scale) and 
bio-socially 'masculine' (masculinity - femininity scale). The 
PDQ variable of feminine positive failed to reach significance 
in this Study: this is of no consequence since it is not a 
measure of 'femininity' as such despite its label to the 
contrary. (It is a measure of 'nurturance', 'inter-personal 
warmth', whatever a socio-cultural conditioning of female 
sexed persons). The repetition of Study 1 findings in Study 2 
strongly supports the proposed model of male homosexuality. 
Study 2 included some new dependent variables. One of these, 
homophobia, also is an important discriminating variable 
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contributing markedly to the differentiation of homosexual and 
heterosexual. Moreno (1978) found evidence of a sociometric 
cleavage in children (homosexual cleavage) which can account for 
the differentiation of the male and female roles measured as 
social sex-roles and conceptualized in the reviewed literature 
as expressions of different sexual identities. Moreno does not 
record a sociometric cleavage between heterosexual and 
homosexual groups. The significantly higher homophobic scores of 
the heterosexual groups show that there is such a cleavage and 
that it is a 'heterosexist cleavage': the homosexual is the 
feared 'other' by the heterosexual. There is no equivalent 
'heterophobia' scale to show that there is or is not also a 
'homosexist cleavage'. 
The democracy of groups that exclude the 'other' is dubious 
if entry to such groups and to its cooperative action is 
conditional on meeting the restricted entry criteria of that 
group. Historically, to take part in the cooperative action of 
the society in which he lives, the homosexual has been accepted 
conditionally - he has often only been accepted as long as he 
passes as being heterosexual. The evidence that heterosexuals 
exclude homosexuals is obvious in the long history of social, 
medical, and legal constraints which have discriminated against 
homosexuals and which continue to do so. 
To provoke deviancy in the data, and to show that the 
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homosexual is deviant compared to the heterosexual groups, a 
large number of dependent variables were used. In both Studies 1 
and 2, 42 different dependent variables were used: these are 
measures of gender identity, sex-differences, sexual attitudes 
and behaviours, social desirability, response biasing (lying), 
psychological pathology, and measures of constructs related to 
psychological pathology. As in the first study, sexual 
preference is associated with psychological gender and sexual 
identity with bio-sociality: these relationships seem robust and 
there is no support for a hypothesis that suggests that 
homosexuality is associated with pathology. 
Contrary to this absence of pathological association in the 
homosexual male is the strong association of heterosexuality and 
homophobia. This heterosexual level of homophobia is not high 
("low grade homophobic" by American norms; Hudson & Ricketts, 
1980) compared to the homosexual males ("low grade 
non-homophobic"). The conclusion appears to be that the 
heterosexual has some resistance to taking the role of other 
when the other is homosexual. (This resistance in the homosexual 
male is the subject of Study 3 and is there shown to be related 
to anxiety). 
Deviancy, in the sense of the abnormal, is not a 
characteristic of psychological homosexuality: 'crossed-sex' 
gender identity (so-called FGI) is itself not pathological since 
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it shows no association with these established measures of 
pathology. The view that 'crossed-sex' gender identity is a 
clinical syndrome indicative of psycho- or socio-pathology is 
not validated here by external criteria. The validity of 
'feminine' gender identity in males as a diagnostic category by 
itself, or as an imputed disorder of the abnormal and 
dysfunctional (transsexuality), as in DSM-111 (American 
Psychiatric Association, 1980), is seriously questioned by these 
results. 
The discriminant functions of Study 1 were used to predict 
the self-classification of subjects in Study 2 in a partial 
cross-validational study. Not only is 'female' (so-called) 
gender identity predicted from adult male homosexuality, 
'female' (so-called) gender identity is also predictive of adult 
male homosexuality. This finding shows that sexual preference 
and gender identity are interrelated and supports the 
persons-grammar theory of object relations which has the subject 
as the frame of reference. 
Freund et al. (1974) distinguished sexual preference from 
gender identity for research purposes. Homosexuality in the 
sexual identity literature has usually been equated with sexual 
preference rather than with both gender identity and sexual 
preference. Since sexual preference becomes apparent at 
adolescence, homosexuality is. often seen to begin at 
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adolescence. These results show that homosexuality is not 
something that arises from nowhere at adolescence as a different 
sexual preference (and different sexual identity), but that 
gender identity and sexual preference are contiguous aspects of 
development. Bell et al. (1981) have also shown that 
homosexuality has a continuous developmental history and does 
not suddenly develop at adolescence. There is strong support for 
understanding psychological homosexuality and heterosexuality as 
having their origins in the subjective experience of the gender 
of the self. Since gender identity is usually considered to be 
established by 3 years of age, and probably much earlier, 
homosexual and heterosexual preference are theoretically likely 
to be the central and enduring aspects of the personality which 
they have been found to be. 
This finding is contrary to the two main psychological 
theories of homosexuality. The psychoanalytic view construes 
homosexuality as a deviant reaction against an anxiety provoking 
heterosexuality since sex is symbolically associated with 
confusions, guilts and fears in the heterosexual parent - 
homosexual child relationship (West, 1977). Talbot (1985) cites 
studies from the 1950's and 1960's which contradict this 
formulation. The psychoanalytic view of homosexuality is 
predicated by sex. Studies 1 and 2 have shown the 
non-relationship between sex and homosexuality and the strong 
relationship between gender and homosexuality. That the 
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homosexual is an invert - having a reversed sex role or instinct 
- is not supported since homosexual males and heterosexual males 
have equivalence in their 'male' bio-sociality. (The 
'instinctual' nature of sexual preference is not addressed. An 
alternative view to instinct is the proposed theory of sexual 
preferences in Chapter 3 which is supported by these results). 
The psychoanalytic view suggests disturbed personality since 
homosexuality is purported to arise as a psychological 
disturbance in disturbing circumstances. That this is not so is 
attested to by many studies of homosexuals with null findings 
(West, 1977). This finding is repeated here in Studies 1 and 2. 
The evidence here is that heterosexuality is associated with 
homophobia, but there is no evidence of homosexual personality 
disturbance compared to the heterosexual comparisons. The 
findings of Studies 1 and 2 do accord with the psychoanalytic 
position that homosexual and heterosexual development occurs 
early in life. 
Social learning theory construes heterosexuality as the 
result of direct processes of reward and punishment conditioning 
children into sexual conformity: emphasis is given to 
adolescence as a time when influences other than the parent may 
either reinforce or counteract previous learning (West, 1977). 
As with the psychoanalytic theory sex is the key developmental 
issue, however, gender and not sex is shown by Studies 1 and 2 
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to be important in the development of sexual preferences. If 
homosexuals do not conform, as social learning theory proposes," 
then the homosexual males and heterosexual males should be 
sexually different. This thesis proposes that the homosexual and 
heterosexual male have the same bio-social 'masculinity' with 
its referent in sex: they both exhibit a sociometric 
homosexuality (masculinity) that is different to the sociometric 
homosexuality (femininity) of the females. The homosexual male 
is not sexually deviant (compared to heterosexuals). 
Because social learning theorists propose a latter 
acquisition of sexual preference when personality factors have 
already been largely determined, no personality disturbance in 
homosexuals is proposed. Gender identity is however established 
at least by 3 years of age and the demonstrated relationship 
between gender identity and homosexuality is contrary to the 
social learning theory of latter acquisition. The proposition 
from social learning theory that personality disturbance does 
not accompany homosexuality is however supported by these 
Studies. 
Social learning theory proposes a developmental period, a 
period of 'sexual conformity', when homosexuality is supposed to 
develop. Moreno (1978) described this same sexual conformity 
period in 1934 as 'homosexual cleavage'. Social learning 
theorists appear to be describing the origins of sociometric 
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homosexuality and attributing this causally to the development 
of psychological homosexuality. Social learning theory 
apparently equates sociometric homo-sexual preference with 
psychological homosexuality, ignoring the earlier developmental 
history of homosexuality in gender identity by 3 years of age. 
Social learning theory confuses two different psychological and 
sociological homosexualities with their different referents in 
gender identity and sexual identity. Furthermore the higher 
levels of homophobia in the heterosexual comparisons is contrary 
to the social learning postulate of no personality disturbance. 
Summarizing so far, Study 2 repeats Study 1 to similar 
results: that these consistent results arise due to a spurious 
capitalization on chance is highly improbable. These results 
support the hypothesized relationship between sexual preference 
and gender of the subjective self. Furthermore, there is no 
relationship between bio-sociality (with its referent in 
biological sex) and homosexuality as the main theories of 
homosexuality have predicted. There is no evidence of 
personality disturbance associated with psychological 
homosexuality. There were differences between Study 1 and 2. 
Study 2 did not show the homosexual males as more 'feminine' 
(nurturant) than the heterosexual males and Study 2 did show 
that heterosexuality is associated with homophobia. 
Overall, the two studies support the systems theory of 
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persons-grammar with its unified theory of the self as the 
theoretical frame of reference. The persons-grammar theory of 
object relations (the 'second-person' and 'third-person' 
relations of integrated and dissociated thinking) which uses the 
subject as the frame of reference has utility in understanding 
the subject - object relationship that sexual behaviour 
implies. 
Sexual identity has been defined herein as biological sex. 
Sexual identity in the literature is poorly defined - • • • a 
clear delineation of the meaning of sexual identity has been 
lacking, and this has been a major factor in the confusion that 
presently exists in this area of psychology" (LaTorre, 1979, p. 
6). It is clear that there has been a lack of delineation in the 
literature and that sexual identity has a conceptual 
pre-eminence it does not deserve. This lack of delineation is 
probably not the origin of confusion. LaTorre (1979) procedes to 
define sexual identity as: gender identity, gender role 
adoption, gender role preference, and gender role ability. The 
• definition of sex and gender in terms of each other (as LaTorre 
does) is common in the psychological literature. Since these are 
conceptually different the confounding of these concepts by 
using gender and sex synonymously, would seem a more probable 
source of a confusion that is conceptual and not just semantic. 
The term bio-sexuality is useful to refer to the observed 
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socially induced differences between males and females, 
differences that in the literature appear to be described by the 
grab-bag term 'sexual identity'. The origin of bio-sociality in 
Moreno's 'sociometric homosexuality' is more meaningful than 
'sexual identity' which is essentially a biological, and not a 
psychological, term. 
The persons-grammar establishes a frame of reference which 
distinguishes two ways of thinking: the 'second-person' 
relationship of involved objectivity where the self is the 
subject, and the 'third-person' relationship of detached 
objectivity where the self is an object. These frames of 
reference are integrated in the trinity of the persons-grammar 
as a unified theory of reality. The self as subject and self as 
object each has a gender which have been identified as gender 
identity and sexual identity respectively. Studies 1 and 2 show 
the hypothesized relationship between psychological 
homosexuality and gender identity, and the null relationship 
between psychological homosexuality and sociometric 
homosexuality (i.e., bio-sociality). 
The second purpose of Study 2 is to test the social frame 
theories of sexual preferences that predict homosexuality is 
deviant compared to heterosexuality. This hypothesis is not 
supported and these results are consistent with a literature 
which has not found much to distinguish the homosexual from the 
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heterosexual apart from 'crossed-sex' gender identity. These 
results do not support the implicit or the proposed social frame 
theories of sexual preferences both of which predict homosexual 
deviancy (discussed in Chapter 3). Social frame theories having 
their referent in biological sex are not supported by these 
Studies as appropriate theories of homo- and hetero-sexual 
origins. 
STUDY 3 
There are two theories of object relations implicit in the 
psychological literature and explicit in the persons-grammar as 
a unified theory. These theories are tested in Studies 1, 2 and 
3. Homosexuality and heterosexuality have been discussed as 
different subject - object relations expressing different 
genders of the subject. Sexual preference has conventionally 
been understood as an expression of 'sexual identity' with its 
implicit sociological theory of inter-personal relations that 
uses biological sex as the referent. Studies 1 and 2 have shown 
that sexual preference is better understood as an expression of 
gender identity, that is, an expression of the self as subject. 
Studies 1 and 2 compare homosexuals and heterosexuals. In Study 
3 homosexual males who enact these different theories of object 
relations ('second-' and 'third-person' relations) in their 
lives are compared. There is empirical support for that way of 
thinking ('second-person' relation) which uses the subjective 
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gender of the self as the frame of reference, and also for the 
proposed theory of sexual preferences which asserts that the 
homosexual male is psychologically male. 
In this thesis psychological homosexuality is related to the 
gender of the subject; the 'second-person' relationship 
(involved objectivity) and the 'third-person' relationship 
(detached objectivity) are different attitudes to the self and 
identify a way of thinking (identification). Involved 
objectivity is related to more spontaneity compared to detached 
objectivity. In Study 3 it is hypothesized that degree of 
objective involvement or detachment ('Homosexual Identity 
Formation') should not predict differences in the subjective 
experience of being homosexual (FGI). Involvement 
(identification) should however predict anxiety with detached 
objectivity (dissociated thinking and less spontaneity) 
associated with more anxiety. This finding supports spontaneity 
as a theoretical dimension related to pathology and it supports 
the persons-grammar theory in which this dimension of 
spontaneity is situated. This finding also supports the proposed 
theory of sexual preferences which asserts the homosexual male 
and heterosexual female are psychologically male (gender-male) 
and that the heterosexual male is psychologically female 
(gender-female). 
The same dependent variables used in the discriminant 
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analysis of Study 2 were used in Study 3: the active variable is 
spontaneity operationalized by the Cass scale (HIF). Homosexual 
males who report themselves to be homosexual identified their 
stage of identification with themselves as being homosexual. 
Subjects were classified into one of three groups varying in 
degree of spontaneity: the low group is low in identification 
(detached objectivity) and spontaneity. The high group is high 
in identification (involved objectivity) and spontaneity. The 
middle group is intermediate in identification and is 
intermediate in spontaneity between the low and the high groups. 
Spontaneity and anxiety have an inverse relationship in the 
persons-grammar theory. Involved objectivity (high Cass group) 
should be associated with less anxiety than detached objectivity 
(low Cass group). 
Moreno attributes a "great deal of Man's psycho- and 
socio-pathology" to the underdevelopment of spontaneity (1978, 
p. 42). Operationalized as the Cass scale, spontaneity orders 
all of the groups scores on the SCL-90-R pathology scales, and 
that of 'social anxiety', in the expected direction such that 
dissociation of the homosexual from his psychologically 
homosexual self ('third-person' relationship) is associated with 
increased pathology. The spontaneity of the objectively involved 
group is least associated with pathology on all of the measures 
of pathology included as dependent variables. Loss of 
spontaneity is strongly related to a wide variety of measures of 
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pathology including four measures of anxiety. 
Davison and Neale (1982, p. 44) list "free-floating anxiety", 
"phobia", and "panic reaction" as forms •of "neurotic anxiety" in 
psychoanalytic theory. DSM-111 (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1980) classifies the "anxiety disorders" into 
"phobic disorders", "anxiety states" and "posttraumatic stress 
disorder". Phobia is a generally recognized form of anxiety. 
Phobia (homophobia and phobic anxiety) is the main form of 
anxiety that discriminates the homosexual groups. 
Study 3 has shown that the more spontaneity of involved 
objectivity is related to less anxiety and the lesser 
spontaneity of detached objectivity is related to more anxiety. 
Loss of spontaneity is characterized by dissociated thinking 
('third-person' relationship to self) and a phobic reaction. The 
results of Study 3 are quite conclusive: the distinction between 
the psychological and sociological frames of reference as 
different ways of thinking about reality has utility in 
identifying a theoretical dimension of pathology related to the 
absence of spontaneity. This result supports the proposed theory 
of sexual preference which uses the psychological frame of 
reference and which theorizes that the sexual partner takes the 
'second-person' meta-role in the thinking of the subject who is 
spontaneous. This theory of sexual preferences supported by the 
empirical test of Study 3 identifies the identity of the 
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homosexual male as gender-male, that is, the homosexual male is 
psychologically male. 
In Study 3 there are some findings which are perhaps 
subsidiary to the purpose of the thesis - but which nonetheless 
are relevant to the theory of this thesis - and which may have 
some significance in themselves. In discriminant analysis some 
correlated variables are likely to be eliminated. The variables 
that show significant differences between the three groups in a 
posteriori comparisons are now discussed. (Gender identity does 
not show any significant differences as predicted and has been 
discussed above. It will not be discussed further). These 
differences are summarized in Figure 9 which follows below. 
KEY: 	Gender identity 
Homophobia 
Phobic anxiety -- 
Competence 
218 
• 
Dependent 
variables 
St 
St 
St 
Low 	Middle 	High 
SPONTANEITY 
Figure 9. 
Generalized graphical depiction of the significant differences  
found between the three homosexual groups in a posteriori  
comparisons. 
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(i) Masculinity (so-called) of the Social Sex-role. 
The development of a homosexual identity (identification) is 
associated with increased 'masculinity'; differences in 
'femininity' are not significant. A strict interpretation (which 
assumes no differences in PDO femininity across the groups) 
leads to the conclusion that increased homosexual identification 
in males is associated with increasing 'masculinization' (i.e., 
competency), that is, with traits statistically associated with 
male sexed persons. Since these sex-role scales are not 
validated by 'external criteria' (Anastasi, 1982), but by their 
ability to differentiate the sexes, the meaning of 'masculinity' 
in social sex-roles remains (empirically) unknown. 'Masculinity' 
and 'femininity' are measures of sociometric homosexuality (the 
end-product of homo-sexual sociometric cleavage) and the 
development of homosexual male identification apparently affirms 
the social sex-role of 'male' (or vice versa) but not the social 
sex-role of 'female'. 'Masculinity' of the PIM appears to 
measure competence in self-assertion. 
Moreno defines spontaneity as "the adequate response to the 
present situation" (1978, p. 336). If masculinity in this 
context means competence , then the finding of an association 
between spontaneity (active variable) and masculinity (dependent 
variable) may not be very surprising since an adequate response 
and competence have some overlap in meaning. If the external 
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criterion is spontaneity, then masculinity as measured by the 
PDEZ in the homosexual male is related to it and femininity as 
measured by the PDQ is not. If PDQ femininity is sentimentality 
(emotionality, nurturance, inter-personal warmth, whatever), 
then sentimentality is not associated with spontaneity. 
(ii) Phobia. 
There are significant differences between the groups in both 
homophobia and in phobic anxiety with detached objectivity 
associated with increased phobia. Homophobia is a measure of 
anxiety that arises as the result of proximity to, or 
interaction with, homosexual people. Derogatis defines phobic 
anxiety as: 
a persistent fear response to a specific person, 
place, object, or situation, which is 
characterized as being irrational and 
disproportionate to the stimulus, and which leads 
to avoidance or escape behavior. The items of the 
present dimension focus on the more pathognomic 
and disruptive manifestations of phobic behavior. 
The actual structure of the dimension is in close 
agreement with the definition of "agoraphobia" 
(Marks, 1969), also termed "phobic anxiety 
depersonalization syndrome" by Roth (1959) (1983, 
p. 9). 
Phobias are generally regarded as forms of the more general 
category of anxiety. 
Goodwin (1986) in *Anxiety" associates a number of 
distressing external events which cause inner confusion, 
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alienation, uncertainty, and finally, °unattached " persons. The 
results found in Study 3 support the association of 
unattachedness and personal distress described here by Goodwin. 
Study 3 shows that anxiety is related to an inability to respond 
adequately to oneself by taking own role: an absence of 
spontaneity. These distressing external events may not therefore 
lead to anxiety but vice versa: an absence of spontaneity may be 
externalized as a distressing event. Since there is no 
involvement with the self the self cannot respond - the person 
is 'frozen' in omniscient inaction, a distressing event. 
The theoretical and statistical association between a 
detached personality and anxiety is strong. An analysis of the 
circumstances in which people gain and lose spontaneity - and 
the application of this analysis to increase spontaneity in 
personal and community living - may have more utility than an 
absorption in external 'causes' of anxiety. 
The pervasiveness and severity of anxiety is well-established 
(for example, Hallam, 1985). What it is and how it arises are 
less well understood. As to what anxiety is, Hallam (1985) says 
that it is a reification - a view which holds that anxiety is 
not a "phenomenon that expresses the natural workings of a 
universal and timeless human psychology or the derangement 
thereof by pathological processes" (1985, p. 1). Anxiety is not, 
according to Hallam (1985), an emotion, and nor is it the effect 
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of a pathological disorder. 
In Study 3 anxiety is associated with a 'third-person' 
detached objectivity. Theoretically if something is not 
'related' it is unknown. The 'third-person' meta-role is a 
dissociated, an 'as though', or non-existent, 'person' and is 
strongly associated with anxiety. Anxiety is a personal 
non-existence, a nothing. Moreno, correctly, does not define the 
reification but defines anxiety as the absence of spontaneity. 
As 'nothing' anxiety is something (supposedly as an emotion or 
pathological disorder). Anxiety has existence as a reification 
and is manifested in thought disorder that confuses existence 
and reality. (In the psychological construction of reality what 
exists may not be real). Anxiety as an absence of spontaneity, 
and therefore without a connotation of a real existence, is a 
more logical and real definition. The absence or loss of 
spontaneity has, however, real antecedents. 
Because anxiety is a reification, Hallam (1985) emphasizes 
the role of antecedents. Of antecedents he says: 
The antecedents are assumed to include events that 
can be defined at the biological, psychological, 
and sociological levels of analysis. All levels of 
analysis are necessary to develop an adequate 
model of the antecedents of reports of anxiety, 
but at the present time there are simply no 
scientific theories that can achieve this 
integration. This is not a failure of theorists of 
anxiety, but a feature of the current state of the 
biological and social sciences (1985, p. 2). 
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The persons-grammar is a unified theory of reality that 
includes the biological, sociological, and psychological levels 
of analysis. Study 3 shows that the co-ordinate of anxiety is an 
absence of spontaneity. A conclusion drawn is that the 
antecedent of anxiety is the loss of spontaneity. 
This conclusion is also supported by other evidence. Study 3 
has shown that the 'male' role (of the PIM is positively 
associated with spontaneity and that the 'female' role (of the 
PM) is not. The relative absence of the 'male' role 
(competence) in females is therefore likely to be associated 
with a relative absence of spontaneity in females who do not 
develop the 'male' role. By definition (in the differential 
scientific way of thinking) the 'male' role - and its form of 
spontaneity - is uncharacteristic of females. This situation of 
less spontaneity in females is predictive of higher levels of 
anxiety in females. The 'almost universal finding' (Hallam, 
1985) of a higher incidence of anxiety reported by women than by 
men is explicable by differences in spontaneity. Sexist thinking 
in the differential enculturation of boys and girls appears to 
have profound and long-term consequences. Sexist thinking - and 
the 'third-person' relationship to self in general - may be an 
important and universal antecedent of loss of spontaneity and, 
therefore, an antecedent of anxiety. 
The phobic individual does not respond with adequacy to the 
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new situation or with novelty to the old. Asch (1955) describes 
in "Opinions and social pressures" the power of the conserved 
role to conformity and of the improbability of the individual to 
change once he has conformed. Hallam (1985) has outlined the 
longevity of anxiety in the individual. Moreno says of conserves 
that "such adherence may gradually obliterate the ability of the 
organism and the talent of the actor to change" (1978, p. 722). 
Phobia is here a neurotic condition that describes anxiety as 
existing in the absence of spontaneity and whose psychological 
origin is in the 'third-person' meta-role of the personality. 
(iii) Psychoticism. 
Spontaneity is an adequate response to the novel situation 
and a new response to the old; it is also the ability to move 
,between fantasy and reality (Moreno, 1978). Study 3 shows that 
spontaneity is also related to psychoticism: the less 
spontaneity the more there is psychoticism. Psychoticism is 
defined by Derogatis: 
The psychoticism scale was developed in a fashion 
to represent the construct as a continuous 
dimension of human experience. Items indicative of 
a withdrawn, isolated, schizoid life style were 
included, as were first-rank symptoms of 
schizophrenia, such as hallucinations and 
thought-broadcasting. The psychoticism scale 
provides a graduated continuum from mild 
interpersonal alienation to dramatic evidence of 
psychosis. In this respect the present definition 
owes much to the work of Eysenck (1968) (1983, p. 
10). 
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Before discussing 'psychoticism', Moreno's developmental theory 
and model of psychosis is outlined. 
Moreno (1977, p. 61) hypothesizes in the infant a primary 
stage of "co-being, co-action, and co-experience" which he calls 
the "matrix of identity". It is, according to Moreno, that phase 
in which "playing the role of other" develops and several stages 
are outlined to this end (1977, p. 61). During this stage 
"identification is without meaning in this first world of the 
infant" as it implies, amongst other things, that the infant is 
able to experience himself in relation to another (1977, p. 63). 
This "matrix of identity" breaks up gradually as the infant 
develops more autonomy. This first universe ends when this 
infantile experience breaks up into fantasy and reality and the 
differentiation between real and imaginary things takes form. 
After this division between fantasy and reality is established 
the psychodramatic and social roles gradually differentiate. 
Moreno postulates that in the child, after the division of 
fantasy and reality, there is a clustering of roles to form 
intermediary or partial selves. Two of these partial selves are 
the psyche oriented in fantasy and the socius oriented in 
reality. It is from the unification of the partial selves 
(physiological, psychological and social) that the self emerges. 
The division between fantasy and reality is illustrated by 
Moreno's discussion of a case of paranoia. 
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An illustration: A case of paranoia. 
"The treatment of psychoses has been a challenge to the 
ingenuity of the psychiatrist ever since psychiatry became a 
special branch of medicine" wrote Moreno in 1944 (reprinted 
1975, p. 181), and added that "the lack of any rationale must be 
laid to the absence of a consistent scientific theory of the 
origin of the psychosis". Since 1944 the advent of the major 
tranquillizers and psychoactive drugs have seen major changes in 
the treatment of the psychoses. The psychoses remain a major and 
chronic problem. The main treatment mode via drug regimes is 
consistent with a biochemical deficiency hypothesis and there is 
now some evidence of a relationship between neuroendocrinal 
brain chemistry and psychosis. There is however no compelling 
evidence of a causal relationship. 
Moreno addressed the lack of a rationale in a paper called " A 
case of paranoia" where he outlined the psychodramatic concept 
of psychosis. He begins with his postulate: Man is 
divided from early childhood on by the dimensions 
of reality and fantasy. Once this division has 
emerged in him, he never succeeds in breaching it. 
But in his social behavior he acts as if a breach 
between fantasy and reality has never taken place, 
or as if the two were fully integrated. He tries 
to give the world around him the illusion, if not 
of perfection, at least of individual unity (1975, 
p. 181). 
The case involves Mary, a woman of 23. Three years before Mary 
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had very briefly meet a man called John. She has not mentioned 
this to anyone in the intervening three years and is now making 
a concerted effort to find John. She never meets John again 
since that initial and fleeting meeting except as an 
hallucination. John had returned to her mind during a bout of 
influenza. Mary's behaviour in searching for John had brought 
her to the attention of the police. 
Early in the treatment the conclusion is reached that Mary 
had a deep memory and clear vision of the 
products of her own imagination, such as John and 
kindred experiences, but a poor memory and a weak 
attachment to people she had actually met or lived 
with. ... She had always lived along two tracks of 
experience, but the world of imagination prevailed 
and pushed the world of actual events into the 
background (1975, p. 186). 
Mary acts out her drama, her 'John-production') she wants to 
bring John to realization wherever she is: even as an 
apparition. The division between Mary's fantasy world and her 
real world are now overt in her 'illness': she largely ignores 
the real world of actual people. 
From this account it can be seen that Moreno's concept of 
psychosis rests not only on the division of fantasy and reality, 
which he postulates is the human condition, but particularly on 
the loss of spontaneity to integrate fantasy and reality. This 
'breach' is not in itself predictive of psychosis. The division 
of fantasy and reality is common to all people but with the 
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absence of spontaneity to bridge the division - as found in the 
homosexuals with less homosexual identification - there is an 
inability to integrate fantasy (being psychologically 
homosexual) and reality (act the social role of homosexual). 
These results support Moreno's model of psychosis in general. 
The theory of persons-grammar allows an intra-psychic 
analysis of the personality and therefore enables some 
clarification of the specifics of psychosis. The integration of 
creativity (creating own role) and spontaneity (taking own role) 
bridges the division between role of self as subject (Moreno's 
'fantasy') and role of self as object (Moreno's 'reality'), an 
integration implicit in the 'second-person' relationship. (The 
meta-role of 'second-person' is largely absent from Moreno's 
theory in an explicit form). The results of Studies 1, 2 and 3 
show that the division of fantasy (the creativity of the 
'first-person') and reality (the spontaneity of the subject to 
enact and so make real that creativity) is meaningful and has 
utility in understanding male homosexuality. The results of 
Study 3 show that this division is related to psychosis as an 
inability to bridge this subject-object division within the 
individual psyche. This inability is theoretically and 
empirically related to the null 'third-person' relationship. 
Psychoticism is indicative of psychosis-like symptoms and it 
should not be interpreted that any subjects in this study are 
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psychotic: it is only evident that the incidence of psychotic 
symptoms is more commonly associated with less spontaneity. As 
far as is known, no person who was actively psychotic was 
included in the research studies and nor were any excluded for 
this reason. The following description is therefore a model of 
psychosis derived from this study of statistically relatively 
normal people. 
These results support a model of psychosis that shows the 
psychotic experience as a state wherein a person is conserved in 
the detached attitude, in whom is absent the interaction of the 
involved objective and subjective experience of self. In this 
model of psychosis there is an inability to integrate fantasy 
into reality: the psychotic is conserved in social functioning - 
the reified 'third-person' or persona is now the 
(depersonalized) 'self'. Instead of the self emerging 
consciously from the integration of the 'first-' and 
'second-persons' ('second-person' relationship), the 'self' 
emerges in an altered state of consciousness (a dissociation of 
self) as the 'third-person' ('third-person' relationship). Where 
self is consciously the integrated 'I am-ness' of the 
'second-person' relationship, in this psychosis the persona is 
now the 'self' and the real self has become the 'other' (as 
shown in Figure 5, Chapter 3). The psychotic self relates 
objectively (as the detached omniscient 'self') to his real self 
of 'first-person' fantasy and absent 'second-person' 
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objectivity - as though it is reality. The real self appears to 
be 'other': the dissociation from self is evident as the 
hallucinated and unreal persona. 
Moreno proposed five hypotheses for Mary's conception of 
John: the fourth posits that John is Mary and he asks "but how 
can Mary be a man?" (1975, p. 191). Moreno dismisses this 
hypothesis because of his inability to answer 'how?'. The 
question should however be taken seriously: there is no a priori 
reason for Moreno's, Freund et al's, transsexuals', and similar 
literal assumptions that the gender of biology should relate 
positively with the gender of the subjective entity. Moreno has 
here held to an expected belief rather than accept the evidence 
of his and Mary's investigation. Mary can be subjectively a 
'man' (male) if that is the basis of female heterosexuality as 
proposed and tested in this thesis. It is however the inability 
of Mary to realize herself - to bring her psyche into objective 
reality - that is the basis of her 'realization paranoia'. 
Mary's psychosis is her inability to realize herself as subject, 
literally to make-real 'her' creation of self. This does not 
mean that Mary need correctly label that entity (this would be a 
semantic confusion and would not represent the profound 
confusion that Mary experiences). Mary conceptually confounds 
flesh-and-blood John of her external inter-personal world with 
her 'my John' internal intra-personal world that is self. Mary's 
thinking is conserved in the sociological frame of reference. 
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Summary of Chapter 6 
The first substantive issue of this thesis that homosexuality 
is theoretically related to the gender of the self as subject is 
strongly supported. The second substantive issue of this thesis 
that the identity of the self as subject in the homosexual male 
is gender-male is also strongly supported. Homo- and 
hetero-sexual preferences are related to the gender identity of 
the self as subject and not to the sexual identity of the self 
as object. Homosexuality is not an expression of a 'different' 
or deviant sexual identity. Homosexuality and heterosexuality 
are shown to have an equivalence in subject object 
relationships whereby the subject's gender identity and the sex 
partner's biological sex have the same identity. Homosexual and 
heterosexual preferences both express the same 'second-person' 
relationship of the creative and spontaneous self. 
Homosexuality does not arise in adolescence as a sexual 
preference but has antecedents in childhood as 'crossed-sex' 
gender identity. The origins of homosexuality are therefore 
established in early childhood, probably by the age of 3 years. 
Psychopathology is not associated with subjective gender 
identity and is associated with differences in objective 
identification with that gender identity. That 'crossed-sex' 
gender identity is listed in DSM-111 as gender identity disorder 
of childhood and as transsexualism is questionable. Sexual and 
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gender identity congruency (homosexuality) or incongruency 
(heterosexuality) is not by itself shown to be associated with 
psychopathology. Pathology is related to an absence of 
spontaneity as a way of thinking (relating to self as subject or 
object) and not to homosexuality or gender identity per se. 
The thesis proposed and tested a theory of persons-grammar 
that explains homo- and hetero-sexuality. Subsidiary to this was 
the finding that provides empirical support for a model of 
anxiety and of psychosis. Both models (as does that of 
homosexual identification) use the interaction of creativity and 
spontaneity (embodied as the 'second-person') as the scientific 
frame of reference. While the intra-personal dimension is 
implicit in Moreno's work, the explicit absence of this 
psychological framework distinct from the sociological framework 
in his theoretical work has perhaps precluded the use of his 
theory as a unified and explicit theory of personality and model 
for the social sciences. 
 
Moreno identifies spontaneity with roleplaying and its 
absence with roletaking, and he defines these as the polar 
extremes of his 'axiological scale of spontaneity'. The 
persons-grammar with its unified whole (i.e., self or trinity) 
provides a theoretical framework for Moreno's scale of 
spontaneity. This framework also identifies the meta-role of the 
second-person and the function of this 'person' as the 
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integrator of fantasy and reality. Apart from 'roleplaying', 
this meta-role is conceptually underdeveloped or absent in 
Moreno's theory. This absent role in Moreno's theory is the 
'sociodramatic role' which is referred to as such only once 
(1977, p. 352). The sociodramatic role is an individuated social 
role. 
Moreno's theory of personality underlies the models of 
anxiety and psychosis and is supported by the results of this 
research. Spontaneity is axiomatic to his theory. His 
axiological scale of spontaneity has been shown to be related to 
different ways of thinking and strongly related to 
psychopathology as he predicted. In this research study the 
creativity of the subject is axiomatic. This study identifies a 
theoretical basis for spontaneity and provides support for 
Moreno's spontaneity theory of learning. 
Moreno devised a science with the spontaneity of the subject 
as its scientific frame of reference: spontaneity is axiomatic. 
What of creativity? Moreno notes this absence and its value. He 
says: 
The fate of a culture is decided by the creativity 
of its carriers. But creativity as a scientific 
frame of reference has never been established and 
so a basis for a critique of deviations has been 
missing. If a disease of the creative functions 
has afflicted the primary group, the creative men 
of the human race, then it is of supreme 
importance that the principle of creativity be 
redefined and that its perverted -forms be compared 
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with creativity in its original state (1978, p. 
40). 
In this thesis the scientific frame of reference has been the 
creativity of the subject. Creativity and spontaneity interact 
in the 'second-person' relationship: the self (trinity) emerges 
with the development of the 'first-' and 'second-person' 
meta-roles of persons-grammar. Homosexuality, compared to 
heterosexuality, is shown not to be a deviation of creativity. 
The 'disease of the creative functions' appears to be the loss 
of spontaneity to respond to the functioning of the rolecreating 
'first-person', that is, an incapacity to take own role as the 
integrated 'second-person' meta-role. 
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CHAPTER 7 
SUMMARY 
The term homo-sexuality connotes a sexuality that is 
different to hetero-sexuality. The psychoanalytic, social 
learning, and biological theories of homosexual aetiology, have 
tried to account for male homosexuality as a difference in 
sexuality. Historically, the framework and language used to 
describe homosexuality (and heterosexuality) has been that of 
sex. There has been, however, a remarkable lack of empirical 
support for the proposition that homo-sexuality is related in a 
literal sense to sexual identity. It has become increasingly 
evident that the homosexual male and heterosexual female have 
the same gender identity that is different to that of the 
heterosexual male and that it is this identity of the subject 
that is associated with homo- and hetero-sexuality. 
The theory of persons-grammar was developed to integrate both 
frames of reference implicit in the literature. This theory of 
personality with its two ways of thinking provided a unified 
theoretical framework for the psychological and sociological 
frames of reference that produce the different attitudes 
(meta-roles) of self, that is, thinking of the self as the 
subject and thinking of the self as the object. The first 
relationship ('I-I') of persons-grammar defined the identity of 
the 'first-person' (subject) in the personality as a subject who 
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has identity with the whelle system (self or trinity). The second 
relationship ('I-you') defined objects in relationship with the 
subject. The third relationship ('I-he') defined objects absent 
from the subject (and whose referent is not in the subject). 
The first substantive issue of this thesis addressed the 
origins of homosexuality in the personality. It was hypothesized 
that homosexuality was related to the gender of the self as 
subject and not to the gender of the self as object. It was 
predicted therefore that there should be a statistical 
association between homosexuality and gender identity and a null 
relationship between homosexuality and sexual identity. These 
two relationships, the 'second-person' ('I-you') and the 
'third-person' ('I-he'), were tested empirically by comparing 
homosexuals with heterosexual groups. It was predicted that the 
homosexual males and heterosexual females would have the same 
gender identity that was different to that of the heterosexual 
males and that this preference was separate to the gender of the 
self as an object, that is, separate to sexual identity. Thus it 
can be said that homosexual males and heterosexual females have 
the same sexual preference (for males) even though they have 
different sexual identities. 
The second substantive issue of this thesis addressed the 
gender identity of the subject in homosexual males. Studies 2 
and 3 were concerned with whether male homosexuality was deviant 
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or spontaneous. It was hypothesized that male homosexuality per 
se was not deviant (Study 2) and that the person's response to 
their self as homosexual could be spontaneous (Study 3). The 
fourth relationship of persons-grammar ('you-he') is a 
theoretical dimension of spontaneity which related deviancy to a 
way of thinking that was separate to homosexuality or to 
heterosexuality. Deviancy, measured as pathology, was found to 
be associated, not with homosexuality (Study 2), but with 
adopting the 'third-person' relationship, that is, thinking 
about self as though self is an object. The psychology of sexual 
preferences supported by this finding hypothesized the 
spontaneous sexual relationship as the sexual partner taking the 
meta-role of the second-person in relation to the subject, that 
is, a subject whose sexual preference enacts the 'second-person' 
relationship. This psychology predicted the deviancy of the 
'I-he' ('third-person') relationship and the absence of deviancy 
in the 'I-you' ('second-person') relationship. Deviancy is 
associated with a way of thinking about the self as an object. 
The psychology of sexual preferences which predicted that the 
identity of the subject of the homosexual male (and heterosexual 
female) is gender-male was supported. Thus it can be said that 
homosexual males and heterosexual females have the same 
psychological gender, a male gender mirrored in the male sexual 
identity of the preferred sex partner. 
There has been no satisfactory model of homosexuality that 
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integrates the known facts. Concurrent with this, and probably 
underlying the perplexity of homosexuality research, is the 
confusion in the sex and gender research. At least some of this 
perplexity is due to the confounding of different frames of 
reference and the consequent semantic confusion of 'male' (and 
'female') which has both a subjective and an objective referent. 
Homosexuality is understood to have both subjective (gender 
identity) and objective components (identification and thinking) 
and these components are theoretically related in the 
persons-grammar theory of object relations which has the subject 
as the frame of reference. 
The theory of persons-grammar provided a unified theoretical 
framework that integrated both the psychological and 
sociological frames of reference with their different referents 
in gender identity and sexual identity respectively. Gender 
identity is the gender of the self as subject and has some 
expression as the person's conviction of being male or female 
(even if semantically confused). Bio-sociality refers to those 
traits differentially attributed to biological males and females 
and whose origin appears to be located within the enculturation 
process of learning separate male and female norms. The 
psychological frame of reference of gender identity and the 
sociological frame of reference of bio-sociality have not been 
conceptually well separated in the literature. They have also 
been confounded, for example, in the Kinsey et al. (1948) 
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heterosexual - homosexual scale. 
The persons-grammar theory implies two different theories of 
constructing reality; an interactional and therefore open system 
characterized by the 'second-person' relationship (open mind) 
and oriented in the psychological frame of reference, and a 
non-interactional and therefore closed system characterized by 
the 'third-person' relationship (closed mind) and oriented in a 
sociological frame of reference (and specifically a 
socio-cultural way of thinking). Study 3 showed that the 
thinking of the closed mind is associated with psychological 
distress. 
The 'second-person' relationship of involved objectivity and 
the 'third-person' relationship of detached objectivity are 
extremes of a continuum of spontaneity. Spontaneity has herein 
been linked to thinking, with integrated thinking related to 
spontaneity and dissociated thinking related to loss of 
spontaneity. Loss of spontaneity in the absent or underdeveloped 
sociodramatic role ('second-person') is strongly associated with 
pathology, notably anxiety and psychoticism. The 'third-person' 
relationship, associated with anxiety and psychoticism, is 
theoretically related to dissociated thinking as an altered 
state of consciousness. Consciousness is related to the 
'second-person' relationship, a psychological frame of reference 
where the self is the subject. 
240 
The empirical results of this study support the 
persons-grammar theory that has creativity as its axiom and 
which identifies a continuum of spontaneity theoretically 
related to that creativity. These results also support Moreno's 
theory that has spontaneity as its axiom and the models of 
phobia and psychosis that are directly derived from his work. 
The findings of this study support Moreno's understanding that 
spontaneity provides a scientific frame of reference, 
particularly for the social sciences. Moreno did not investigate 
psychological homosexuality. 
LIMITS OF THE STUDY 
The homosexual and heterosexual subjects for the research 
study were mainly recruited via friendship networks. The 
homosexual sample is not representative as would be a random 
sample if it were possible. Neither is the homosexual sample 
drawn from institutions and homophile organizations. The sample 
of homosexual and heterosexual subjects in this research is 
probably fairly typical of mature-aged and well-educated 
persons. The sample sizes are usually adequate though in Study 3 
the smallest of the three groups is only 20 subjects. The 
pattern of results for this smaller group is however consistent 
with the pattern of results of the two other larger groups. 
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The testing of the model has depended particularly on the 
operationalization of the two frames of reference using 
well-established scales and questionnaires of related 
constructs. Some criticism can be made of the operationalization 
of the 'male' and 'female' roles as the social sex-roles. That 
these 'sex' roles are artefacts of sexism is of no consequence 
to the need to measure the effects of the divisive forces that 
create sexist (racial, and other) barriers within society. The 
method of measuring these sex-roles as 'different from' rather 
than as 'attributes of' makes these scales difficult to 
interpret excepting that they highlight the difference between 
males and females. The highlighting of these socio-cultural 
differences between males and females with their origin in 
homo-sexual group cleavage in childhood (i.e., sociometric 
homosexuality) has been useful for the purposes of this study. 
Only one measure of gender identity is available in 
questionnaire form and suitable for research of this type. 
Fortunately, the psychometric properties of this scale (FGI) are 
good even if the type of 'femininity' (i.e., being 
psychologically male) being measured by the scale, and its 
relations to other 'femininity', has not been well understood. 
In this thesis it has been argued that the 'femininity' of the 
social sex-roles is a misnomer for nurturance, emotionality or 
sentimentality and refers to social conditioning towards those 
(adjectival) 'feminine' norms and beliefs, and not to femaleness 
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(as a noun). 
The method of collecting data by questionnaires which can be 
lost to the researcher was satisfactory. The return rate is 
usually a measure of adequacy and in this study the return rates 
have been quite high. This is due, in part, to the researcher's 
sociometric proximity to the subjects. This proximity could 
perhaps encourage subjects to give socially desirable responses: 
the results do not support this assertion. The non-response of 
some subjects may introduce a bias with those subjects least 
comfortable in responding to a questionnaire on sex, sexual 
preference, and various attitudes, being less likely to comply. 
The return rate is high and this is largely due to the 
willingness and co-operativeness of the persons approached to 
take part in the Study. The non-response rate is low. 
A number of reasons have been given for the unusual inclusion 
of many dependent variables in the experimental design and 
discriminant analysis. Principally it has been argued that if 
the sociological frame of reference were important in 
homosexuality then by including many of these variables with 
their referent in biological sex, and only one variable (gender 
identity) representing the psychological frame of reference 
(with its referent in the subject), this should work against the 
acceptance of the proposed hypothesis. The repeating of the test 
of Study 1 to the same result in Study 2, and a different test 
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of the theory in Study 3, shows the improbability of the 
interpretation that these findings are spurious. Nevertheless, 
it could still perhaps be argued that this design has a lack of 
statistical power in the discriminant analysis. Furthermore, 
while the persons-grammar theory of homosexuality has been 
repeatedly tested in Studies 1, 2, and 3, the results of Study 3 
have not been replicated. The results that have been used to 
draw subsidiary conclusions regarding phobia and psychosis have 
not been replicated in this Study. 
Some of the limits are ethical rather than experimental. 
Moreno's Psychodrama theory - the unitary term to cover all of 
his theoretical work - has clearly been of major importance in 
helping to define the scientific frame of reference for this 
thesis. While this thesis provides a new and unified theory it 
nonetheless borrows heavily from Moreno's theoretical work. 
Probably most important is the distinction implicit in his 
theoretical work that the self is subject, and not object, and 
the profound implications for the development of thinking (as 
the 'second-person' of the trinity) that this implies. 
Despite these limits the hypotheses derived from the theory 
of persons-grammar (and the psychology of sexual preferences) 
have been substantially supported in all of the three studies. 
The main tests have been repeated to the same result and the 
partial cross-validation is supportive. The association between 
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gender identity and sexual preference is such that each is 
strongly predictive of the other. Contrary to the main theories 
of homosexuality, there is no association between sexual 
identity/bio-sociality and homosexuality. The strength of these 
findings is confirming of the model of the homosexual male as a 
person who is biologically, socio-culturally, and 
psychologically male. It is the psychological masculinity of the 
homosexual male that is expressed in homosexual act 
preferences. 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
(i) For Homosexuals. 
The self is endowed with degrees of consciousness that emerge 
with the psychological growth and integration of the 
subject-object attitudes of the personality. For the purposes of 
this thesis the gender of the self as subject was defined by 
gender identity and the gender of the self as object was defined 
by sexual identity. The prior assumption to this operation is 
the existence of a self and the theory for this has been the 
persons-grammar, that is, the Trinity of the Christian God. 
Moreno discusses the developmental, educational, and therapeutic 
goal, as the 'I-god' (Moreno, 1971). This examination of 
homosexuality has not found any reason to believe that 
homosexuality is a developmental departure from that human 
educative and therapeutic goal - the 'I-god' - that Moreno uses 
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as his scientific frame of reference. Homosexuality is 
consistent with the develomental and evolutionary existentialist 
religious goal of 'I am-ness'. Prohibitions and discriminations 
against homosexuality are not justified by any of the findings 
of this research. 
At its simplest, homosexuality and heterosexuality are self 
expressions of an absolute - the gender of the subject. This 
thesis (unlike Moreno's work) makes the 'second-person' of the 
trinity explicit as a 'person' spontaneously involved with the 
creativity of the 'first-person', that is, interactive with the 
subject. It is the self which emerges from this interaction 
(unlike the reified spectre or persona of the 'third-person') 
that has existence and is real. 
(ii) For Education and Therapy. 
This research supports Moreno's assertion that spontaneity 
and psycho- and socio-pathology are closely linked. He says 
that 
as the training of spontaneity states and not the 
learning of contents is the objective, the attempt 
is made to loosen the fixed associations between 
states and contents as they have become 
established in the course of education by 
traditional methods. Emphasis upon contents 
results in the split of the individual into an act 
personality and a content personality (1978, p. 
538). 
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The research model and results support Morenb's hypothesis of 
different personalities: a comparison was made (Study 3) between 
the personality of the spontaneous person and that of the less 
spontaneous person. The act personality (defined in this thesis 
as the 'second-person' relationship) of the high Cass scale 
subjects is different to the content personality (defined in 
this thesis as the 'third-person' relationship) of the low Cass 
scale subjects. The act personality is oriented in consciousness 
and the content personality is oriented in an altered state of 
consciousness. This difference is theoretically and empirically 
related to anxiety and to psychoticism. This implies that 
training for spontaneity - and the way of thinking that this 
implies - is a relevant educational and therapeutic goal. 
(iii) For Science. 
The formulation of objectivity as a continuum of spontaneity 
should help clarify the role of the social scientist as social 
investigator and social therapist (e.g., community 
psychologist). Moreno devised sociodrama as the model and method 
of investigation of the group, that is, the sociological 
dimension. This method explores inter-personal relationships 
within a group. 
Moreno devised Psychodrama as the theoretical model and 
method of investigation of the individual. This method explores 
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the inter- and intra-personal relationships of an individual: it 
is concerned with both the sociological and psychological worlds 
of the individual. Moreno says that psychodrama 'deals with 
inter-personal relations and private worlds' (1978, p. 81). The 
identification in this thesis of an 'intra-personal' framework 
in a theory of object relations clarifies psychodrama as a 
science which deals with both the inter- and intra-personal 
relations of the self. 
Moreno postulated creativity and spontaneity as interactional 
axioms of science and he developed a science (Psychodrama) that 
used spontaneity as the scientific frame of reference. In this 
research spontaneity (defined by the 'you-he' relationship of 
persons-grammar) was operationalized by the roleplaying and 
roletaking of involved and detached homosexual males (Study 3). 
In this research (in Studies 1 and 2) the presence of creativity 
(defined by the 'I-you' relationship of persons-grammar) was 
operationalized by the rolecreating - roleplaying relationship 
('second-person' relationship) and compared to the absence of 
creativity operationalized by the rolecreating - roletaking null 
relationship ('third-person' relationship). The scientific 
relationship of spontaneity and creativity has been shown, at 
least in part, by this research. The value of spontaneity as a 
scientific frame of reference is demonstrated by this study. The 
theory of persons-grammar is proposed as a unified theory of 
reality in which creativity is the frame of reference. 
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Religion in its original meaning is to 'bind' - the idea of 
relation. The idea of the unconscious can perhaps be understood 
as that with which the individual has no relation: something 
cannot be known unless it is in relation. Creativity may 
therefore be found in those religious systems where a method of 
personification or embodiment is enacted: where a freedom of 
attitude to new relations allows the creative expansion of 
consciousness in the wilful (spontaneous) development of new and 
more adequate roles. With spontaneity as the catalyst of 
creativity, the individual learns new roles and more adequate 
role enactment. Moreno had arrived at the conclusion that the 
integration of fantasy and reality was the next step. The 
enactment of the idea (fantasy) in psychodrama is an operational 
definition of creativity. He says: 
I arrived at the conclusion that the "next step" 
is the realization and concretization of the idea 
in the flesh rather than its further intellectual 
extension. Therefore I became a psychodramatist 
and roleplayer (1978, p. xvi). 
Moreno's formulation of science has not been well accepted. 
Study 3 uses a scale of spontaneity and compares two different 
rationales: two rationales apparent in scientific thinking but 
confused (as are the psychological and sociological in 
psychology). There are two rationales underlying the scientific 
formulation of reality: 
the model of the organism as an open system has 
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proved useful in the explanation and mathematical 
formulation of numerous life phenomena; it also 
leads, as is to be expected in a scientific 
working hypothesis, to further problems, partly of 
a fundamental nature. This implies that it is not 
only of scientific but also of 'meta-scientific' 
importance. The mechanistic concept of nature 
predominant so far emphasized the resolution of 
happenings into linear causal chains; . In 
contrast to this, in the theory of open systems 
... principles of multivariate interaction ... 
become apparent Therefore, these 
developments form part of a new formulation of the 
scientific world view (von Bertalanffy, 1968, p. 
161). 
The persons-grammar unified theory of reality identifies these 
two rationales of the 'world view': the open system thinking of 
the 'second-person' relationship (mind as an open system) and 
the closed system thinking of the 'third-person' relationship 
(mind as a closed system). Moreno's axiological scale of 
spontaneity describes a theoretical continuum that links these 
two different scientific rationales. 
There has been some resistance to the 'new' view. 
... the Cartesian dualism between matter and mind, 
object outside and ego inside, brain and 
consciousness, and so forth, is incorrect both in 
the light of direct phenomenological experience 
and of modern research in various fields; it is a 
conceptualization stemming from seventeenth- 
century physics which, even though still 
prevailing in modern debates, is obsolete (von 
Bertalanffy, 1968, p. 233). 
The traditional scientific viewpoint is that of the third-person 
- the scientist observer outside the field (Figure 1, Chapter 
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3). This is the world of Newtonian physics. The new scientific 
viewpoint is that of the integrated first- and second-persons 
the scientist inside the field (Figure 2, Chapter 3). This is 
the world of the 'new physics' of Einstein and quantum 
mechanics. Modern physics has not been able to integrate these 
two world views - the 'time - space' continuum of old and new 
physics - into one scientific formulation of reality. 
Study 3 has compared the outcomes of these rationales and 
found that the 'time' oriented thinking of the closed system 
rationale is empirically associated with deviancy whereas the 
'space' oriented thinking of the open system rationale is 
empirically associated with spontaneity. This supports the 
theoretical viewpoint that it is the type of thinking that is 
itself deviant (that is, dissociated from creativity and 
spontaneity). 
This finding also supports the argument that the design of 
this Study has been appropriate in a systems (open systems) way 
of thinking. The rationale argued for in this design has been 
that while using many variables may seem to produce a lack of 
statistical power and capitalization on chance, the use of many 
conventionally valid but theoretically unacceptable variables 
has worked against the spurious acceptance of chance findings. 
In this design and using discriminant analysis, not only does 
there have to be a statistical association between the active 
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and hypothesized dependent variable (main effect in a closed 
mathematical system: 'third-person' thinking), but this variable 
must also be a better predictor than other combinations of 
dependent variables (interactions of an open mathematical 
system: 'second-person' thinking). 
(iv) For Further Research. 
First, the implications discussed in (ii) and (iii) assume 
that the findings of Study 3 can be replicated. Given the 
apparent scientific, educational, and therapeutic implication of 
Moreno's axiological scale of spontaneity, replication is 
required. 
Second, the defining and operationalization of an axiological 
scale of creativity may have scientific utility. The axiological 
scale of spontaneity has been implicated in a model of psychosis 
where the fantasy of the subject is not able to be integrated 
with the reality of the objective world: what Moreno describes 
as a "realization paranoia". The central feature of this 
psychosis is anxiety with the active psychotic symptoms of 
delusions (Mary thinks that she is not 'John') and 
hallucinations (detachment from self, i.e., 'John'). Whereas the 
axiological scale of spontaneity is linked with anxiety, a 
continuum of creativity is probably associated with depression: 
that is, depression could be defined as an absence of 
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creativity. 
Clinically, depression seems to be associated with the lack 
of embodiment of creativity: the absence of experienced 
creativity (e.g., loss of ideas, thoughts, words). The absence 
of embodied creativity may also be associated with psychosis. 
This form of psychosis would be where the reality of the 
objective world is not able to be integrated with the fantasy of 
the subjective world: in essence the person lives in their own 
inner world and cannot create themselves in the outer world of 
objective existence (such as in thought). The central feature of 
this psychosis is depression, and since the person is living the 
fantasy there is no dissociation of the fantasy world into 
hallucination. Absorbed in fantasy there is the outward 
appearance of autism. The language of the objective world is 
relatively absent or directed to the fantasy world. 
Haracz (1982) provides some evidence for two generalized 
types of psychosis. Crow (cited by Haracz, 1982) in 1980 had 
distinguished two schizophrenic syndromes - type I and type II - 
amongst schizophrenia patients based on clinical phenomena. This 
typology was extended by Haracz (1982) to include more than 
clinical symptoms. Haracz concluded: 
The data reviewed ... suggest that schizophrenics 
with predominantly positive (type I) or negative 
(type II) symptoms also tend to differ in their: 
(1) clinical responses to DA agonists and 
antagonist, (2) regional cerebral blood flow 
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patterns, and (3) cerebral ventricular size. Thus 
Crow's type I/type II distinction could be a 
useful theoretical framework in the search for 
biologically homogeneous subgroups (1982, p. 
444). 
The positive symptoms of type I are hallucinations, delusions, 
and thought disorder. The negative symptoms of type II are 
affective flattening, social withdrawal, and poverty of speech. 
This typology is consistent with two different psychological 
models of psychosis postulated from two axioms of human 
progress: spontaneity and creativity. 
Both types of psychoses are associated with an absence of the 
'second-person' - involved objectivity - the person who acts 
spontaneously to take own role. Type I models a personality 
conserved in the 'third-person': the subjective self appears as 
hallucinations. The absence of involvement in the true self 
('second-person' relationship) is apparent in delusion. This is 
the 'content' personality: an absorption in the contents of the 
outer world, a person whose referent is the object. 
Type II models a personality conserved in the 'first-person': 
the person is absorbed in the subjective or inner world of 
fantasy. There is an absence of involved objectivity appearing 
as an autism. This is also a 'content' personality: an 
absorption in the contents of the inner world. Type II models 
the person who lacks creativity to bridge the division between 
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fantasy and reality: who cannot create himself by acting in the 
real world and integrating reality into fantasy. Type I models 
the person who lacks spontaneity to bridge the division between 
fantasy and reality: who cannot act their fantasy in the real 
world and bring fantasy to reality. Both models of psychosis 
have as their central feature the absence of the involved actor: 
the 'second-person' ('I-you') relationship. 
Third, creativity cannot be defined by its absence. Moreno 
proposed two scales. One is the 'role playing - role taking' 
continuum that as the intra-personal relation between 'you' and 
'he' is the axiological scale of spontaneity. The other is the 
'role playing - role creating' scale (subject object 
dichotomy) that describes the intra-personal relation between 
'I' and 'you'. The 'second-person' relationship is the 
objectively observable expression of this relationship, and 
therefore, of creativity. (This necessarily implies the presence 
of spontaneity since the 'you' of the second-person is the 
spontaneous extreme of the spontaneity continuum. Creativity and 
spontaneity are interactive). 
Moreno hypothesized the emergence of the self from the role, 
not the roles from the self. The trinity is a system of 
meta-roles: the self is the trinity as a whole and not its 
interdependent parts. In this system there cannot be a whole 
unless there are all the parts. The absence of an attitude (a 
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'person') implies the incompleteness of the self: an absence of 
creation. The sociodramatic role of the 2nd person - the 
involved other - is crucial to the creation and development of 
the self. Since there is apparently only the one reference to 
'sociodramatic role' in Moreno's works, this construct is an 
inconsistency in his work, the construct is much underdeveloped, 
or there is an error of understanding involved. The development 
of social roles from sociodramatic roles with the subsequent 
loss of spontaneity is consistent with his spontaneity theory of 
learning that before roletaking there is roleplaying. 
That the construct of involved objectivity (thinking) of the 
individuated sociodramatic role is underdeveloped in Moreno's 
work has some support. A tenet of Psychodrama is the changing of 
the research status of the person from researched (self as 
object) to researcher (self as subject). Moreno introduced the 
'first-person' but not the 'second-person' into this theory. His 
psychodramatic method in changing the status of the person 
introduces the 'subject'. The subject, however, is not defined 
by Moreno's 'subjectivity' and 'inter-personal relations': these 
remain oriented in a 'third-person' observer role. It is the 
changing from the detached relationship of the social role to 
the involved relationship of the sociodramatic role that is the 
change in research status within the individual's personality 
and identified variously as the axiological scale of spontaneity 
and as different ways of thinking. It is the development of the 
256 
sociodramatic role in educational systems and the re-discovery 
of the sociodramatic role in therapeutic systems - the objective 
'I am' - that is implied, but seldom stated, in Moreno's works. 
In summary, the homosexual male has been examined in the 
context of a systems theory of personality. The hypothesized and 
empirically supported subsystems of the self are the 'persons' 
of the trinity. The 'second-' and 'third-persons' relationships 
are different ways of thinking about reality and are themselves 
integrated in this psychological theory of persons-grammar. This 
thesis proposes that the homosexual male is biologically, 
sociologically, and psychologically male. He is sociologically 
like the heterosexual male in having a way of thinking that 
distorts the human personality in sexist ways. He is 
psychologically like the heterosexual female in having a male 
gender identity and preferring male-sexed sexual partners. This 
model of the homosexual male is situated and tested within two 
theories of object relations - a theory of the self as object 
which uses a sociological frame of reference, and a theory of 
the self as subject which uses the unified psychological frame 
of reference. The theory of the self as subject is a psychology 
of health; it provides, in the theoretical interaction of 
creativity - spontaneity, an integrated scientific rationale 
oriented in health. 
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APPENDIX I 
HYPOTHESES OF STUDY 1 
HI. The FOI mean of homosexual males is significantly higher 
than that of heterosexual males. 
H2. The FGI mean of homosexual males is significantly higher 
than the MGI of heterosexual females. 
Hypotheses H3 to H14 are tabulated. The mean of homosexual 
males (Horn) is compared to the mean of heterosexual males (Hem) 
and to heterosexual females (Fern) . The expected results are as 
follows: 
MEAN OF HOMOSEXUAL MALES COMPARED 
TO MEANS OF: 
PD0 SCALES: 
HETEROSEXUAL 
MALES 
HETEROSEXUAL 
FEMALES 
Masculine positive Horn = Hem (H3) Nom > Fern (H4) 
Masculine negative Horn = Hem (H5) Ham > Fern (H6) 
Feminine positive Horn = Hem (H7) Horn < Fern (HG) 
Feminine negative Horn = Hem (H9) Horn < Fern (H10) 
Social 	desirability: 
positive Ham = Hem (HII) Horn = Fern (H12) 
negative Horn = Hem (H13) Horn = Fern (H14) 
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Hypotheses H15 to H42 are tabulated. The mean of homosexual 
males (Horn) is compared to the mean of heterosexual males (Hem) 
and to heterosexual females (Fern). The expected results are as 
follows: 
EYSENCK'S 
primary scales: 
MEAN OF HOMOSEXUAL MALES COMPARED 
TO MEANS OF 
HETEROSEXUAL 	HETEROSEXUAL 
MALES 	FEMALES 
Permissiveness Horn = Hem (H15) Horn > Fern (H16) 
Impersonal sex Horn = Hem (Hi?) Horn > Fern (H18) 
Pornography Horn = Hem (H19) Horn > Fern (H20) 
Sexual excitement Horn = Hem (H21) Horn > Fern (H22) 
Physical sex Horn = Hem (H23) Horn > Fern (H24) 
Sex. 	satisfaction Horn = Hem (H25) Horn < Fern (H26) 
Sexual disgust Horn = Hem (H27) Horn < Fern (H28) 
Prudishness Ham = Hem (H29) Horn < Fern (H30) 
Neurotic sex Horn = Hem (H31) Horn = Fern (H32) 
Sexual shyness Horn = Hem (H33) Horn = Fern (H34) 
Aggressive sex 
superfactors: 
Horn = Hem (H35) Horn = Fern (H36) 
Libido Horn = Hem (H37) Horn > Fern (H38) 
Satisfaction Horn = Hem (H39) Horn = Fern (H40) 
Mas. 	- Fem. Horn = Hem (H41) Horn > Fern (H42) 
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APPENDIX 2 
HYPOTHESES OF STUDY 2 
H43. (Repeats HI). The FGI mean of homosexual males is 
significantly higher than that of heterosexual males. 
H44. (Repeats H2). The FGI mean of homosexual males is 
significantly higher than the MGI of heterosexual females. 
Hypotheses H45 to H56 are tabulated. (Repeats H3 to H6, and 
H9 to H14). The PDO mean of homosexual males (Ham) is compared 
to the mean of heterosexual males (Hem) and to heterosexual 
females (Fem). The following table states the expected results. 
(H49 and HSO do not repeat hypotheses from Study 1 where 
'feminine positive' was found to be significant). 
MEAN OF HOMOSEXUAL MALES COMPARED 
TO MEANS OF: 
PDO SCALES HETEROSEXUAL 
MALES 
HETEROSEXUAL 
FEMALES 
Masculine positive Horn = Hem (H45) Horn > Fern (H46) 
Masculine negative Horn = Hem (H47) Horn > Fern (H48) 
Feminine positive Horn > Hem (H49) Nom = Fern (HSO) 
Feminine negative Horn = Hem (H51) Horn < Fern (H52) 
Social 	desirability: 
positive Horn = Hem (H53) Horn = Fern (H54) 
negative Horn = Hem (H55) Horn = Fern (H56) 
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H57. (Repeats H41). The masculinity - femininity mean of 
homosexual males is expected to be the same as that for 
heterosexual males. 
H58. (Repeats H42). The masculinity - feminity mean of 
homosexual males is expected to be significantly higher than for 
heterosexual females. 
H59, H60. The social desirability (Reynold's Form C) mean of 
homosexual males is expected to be the same as that of 
heterosexual males (H59) and also as that of heterosexual 
females (H60). 
Hypotheses H61 to H80 are tabulated. The following table is 
incomplete as Derogatis (1983) does not indicate which scales 
show sex-differences. Inspection of the tables of norm indicates 
that females typically score higher on all scales and on GSI, 
except perhaps paranoid ideation where male and female means are 
similar. The means for homosexual males and heterosexual males 
are expected to be the same. Should differences between 
heterosexual males and heterosexual females occur the same 
differences in magnitude and direction should occur between 
homosexual males and heterosexual females. 
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Internality (H86), Powerful Others (H87), and Chance (H88) - for 
homosexual males and heterosexual females are not expected to 
differ significantly. 
Hypotheses H89 to H94 are tabulated. 
MEAN OF HOMOSEXUAL MALES COMPARED 
TO MEANS OF:- 
SELF- 	HETEROSEXUAL 	HETEROSEXUAL 
CONSCIOUSNESS MALES 	FEMALES 
Private 	Horn = Hem (H89) 	Horn = Fern (H90) 
Public Horn = Hem (H91) 	Horn = Fern (H92) 
Social anxiety 	Horn = Hem (H93) 	Horn = Fern (H94) 
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APPENDIX 3 
HYPOTHESES OF STUDY 3 
Hypotheses are stated only as they are predicted to apply to 
the low and high homosexual groups. The 'middle' Cass scale 
group is predicted to be intermediary between the 'low' and 
'high' groups. 
H95. The mean age of the low group is expected to be lower 
than the mean age of the high group. 
H96. The mean years of education of the low group is expected 
to be lower than the mean years of education of the high group. 
H97. The mean of gender identity of the low group is not 
expected to differ significantly from the same mean of the high 
group. 
H98. The mean of masculinity - femininity of the low group is 
not expected to differ significantly from the same mean of the 
high group. 
There is no previously reported research that investigates 
the relationship of the Cass scale and the PDG. This 
relationship, if one exists, is probably complex rather than 
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simple and so to retain simplicity some of the possible 
relationships are proposed as models. From these predicted 
models an a priori interpretation is given. Models are proposed 
from both the 'sign' (i.e., negative or positive) and from the 
gender of sex (i.e., masculinity or femininity) of the PD11/ 
scales. 
There are five predicted models (plus unspecified composites) 
which predict the relationship of the Cass scale to the 
direction of valuing or 'sign' (i.e., positive or negative) of 
the FM! scales. These five predictions are: 
(i) H99. The means of 'positive' and 'negative' for both the 
low and high groups do not show any significant differences. (No 
relationship). 
(ii) H100. The means of 'positive' and 'negative' are both 
higher for the low group than the high group. (Inverse 
relationship). 
(iii) H101. The means of 'positive' and 'negative' are both 
lower for the low group than the high group. (Positive 
relationship). 
The means of 'positive' and 'negative' scales show a cross-over 
effect: 
(iv) H102. The means of 'positive' are significantly higher 
for the high group than the low group, and the means of 
265 
'negative' are significantly higher for the low group than the 
high group. 
(v) H103. The means of 'positive' are significantly higher 
for the low group than the high group, and the means of 
'negative' are significantly higher for the high group than the 
low group. 
An a priori interpretation of the five models: 
(i) Model H99 suggests no relationship between the Cass and 
PDe scales: this would raise doubts about the validity and 
theoretical bases of one or both scales. 
(ii) Model H100 suggests that homosexual identity formation 
socializes homosexuals in ways that diverge from generally 
accepted values (as shown by the PDe). 
(iii) Model H101 suggests that homosexual identity formation 
socializes homosexuals in ways that converge to generally 
accepted values (as shown by the PDe). 
(iv) Model H102 suggests that homosexual identity formation 
develops socially approved traits and diminishes socially 
disapproved traits. 
(v) Model H103 suggests that homosexual identity formation 
develops socially disapproved traits and diminishes socially 
approved traits. 
There are five models (plus unspecified composites) which 
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predict the relationship of the Cass scale and the masculinity 
and femininity of the PIND scales. These five predictions are: 
(i) H104. The means of 'masculine' and 'feminine' for both 
the low and high groups do not show any significant differences. 
(No relationship). 
(ii) H105. The means of 'masculine' and 'feminine' are both 
higher for the low group than the high group. (Inverse 
relationship). 
(iii) H106. The means of 'masculine' and 'feminine' are both 
lower for the low group than the high group. (Positive 
relationship). 
The means of 'masculine' and 'feminine' show a cross-over 
effect. 
(iv) H107. The means of 'masculine' are significantly higher 
for the high group than the low group, and the means of 
'feminine' are significantly higher for the low group than the 
high group. 
(v) HI08. The means of 'masculine' are significantly higher 
for the low group than the high group, and the means of 
'feminine' are significantly higher for the high group than the 
low group. 
An a priori interpretation of the five models: 
(i) Model H104 suggests no relationship between the Cass and 
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PDO scales: this would raise doubts about the validity and 
theoretical bases of one or both scales, or, that the constructs 
measured are different. Since measures of gender identity should 
not vary over the three homosexual groups this is the model of 
choice for 'feminine positive' since Study 1 shows that this 
scale is associated with gender identity, even though 'feminine 
positive' is a sexual identity measure. An alternative 
interpretation is that this 'femininine' scale may confound sex 
and gender. 
This finding from Study 1 is expressed as a specific 
hypothesis: 
H104.1 The mean of 'feminine positive' for the low and high 
groups are not expected to show significant differences. 
(ii) Model H105 suggests that homosexual identity formation 
is antithetical to development: it shows homosexuals become 
'more undifferentiated' during homosexual development. An 
alternative would be that the PDO is measuring stereotypy and 
that it is this that is decreasing with homosexual development. 
(iii) Model H106 suggests that homosexual identity formation 
moves from undifferentiated to androgynous as the sex-role 
literature proposes. If the Cass scale does measure a 
developmental process this is the predicted model. 
(iv) Model H107 suggests that homosexual development 
masculinizes and de-femininizes, that is, encourages sex role 
stereotypy. This would suggest that the female subjective self 
model of male homosexuality is not correct or that the PIM fails 
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to capture and measure it. Since the PDG! is a measure of sexual 
identity or socialization, it is unlikely that it strongly 
captures the female gender identity of male bodied subjects. 
(The 'femininine' PDQ and FGI scales are different constructs of 
femininity and the scales are constructed in methodologically 
different ways. The FGI is the theoretical measure of feminine 
gender and the feminine scales of the PM are theoretically 
measures of socialized or sexual 'femininity'). 
(iv) Model H108 suggests that homosexual development 
femininizes and de-masculinizes. This says that homosexual 
identity formation develops crossed-sex sex role stereotypy. 
This would seem antithetical to the Cass developmental stages. 
Alternatively, the PDQ could be of questionable use. A finding 
that supports this model would probably support community 
'myths' about male homosexuality. 
H109. The mean of social desirability positive (PDQ) of the 
low and high groups are not expected to differ significantly. 
HI10. The mean of social desirability negative (PM) of the 
low and high groups are not expected to differ significantly. 
H111. The mean of social desirability (Reynold's Form C, 
1982) of the low and high groups are not expected to differ 
significantly. 
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HI12 to HI21 are tabulated. 
MEANS OF: 
SCL-90-R SCALES 	LOW GROUP HIGH GROUP 
H112. Somatization Low 	= 	High 
H113. Obsessive-compulsive 	Low 	= 	High 
HI14. Interpersonal sensitivity 	Low 	= 	High 
H115. Depression 	 Low 	= 	High 
H116. Anxiety Low 	> 	High 
H117. Hostility 	 Low 	= 	High 
HI18. Phobic anxiety Low 	> 	High 
H119. Paranoid ideation 	Low 	= 	High 
H120. Psychoticism Low 	= 	High 
H121. Global severity index (GSI) 	Low 	> 	High 
H122. The homophobia mean of the low group is significantly 
higher than the same mean for the high group. 
HI23 to H125 of the 'locus of control' subscales are 
tabulated. 
MEANS OF: 
SUBSCALES 	LOW GROUP HIGH GROUP 
H123. Internal scale 	Low 	< 	High 
H124. Powerful others scale Low 	> 	High 
H125. Chance scale 	Low 	> 	High 
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H126 to H128 of the 'self-consciousness' subscales are 
tabulated. 
MEANS OF: 
SUBSCALES LOW GROUP HIGH GROUP 
H126. Private self-consc. Low < High 
H127. Public self-consc. Low > High 
H128. Social anxiety Low > High 
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APPENDIX 4 
The idea underlying role reversal is still little 
understood. First let us try to separate 
roleplaying from role reversal. If an individual 
takes the part of a doctor, a policeman or a 
salesman, the part of his father or of his mother 
in order to 'learn' how to function in these 
roles, that is roleplaying. But if he and his 
father or his mother 'change' parts, the father 
becoming the son and the son the father, this is 
role reversal. 
3.1— Moreno (1975b, Vol. 2, p. 141) 
The 'blackbox experiment' is a common classroom science 
roleplay. In this experiment students are given 'black' boxes 
with the question: "What's in the black box?". The students 
('being scientists') have the task of discovering what is in the 
box by whatever means available - except by opening the box. 
Through an observational and deductive process the 
student-scientist comes to a conclusion as to what is in the 
box, such as lead, cotton-wool, a vacuum or air. Traditionally 
the box is never opened; it remains a 'black-box'. 
In this roleplay the student and the box are separate: the 
student is the observer of the box and makes 
hypothetico-deductive statements about it. By this process he 
can not identify with certainty what is the content - only with 
certainty what the content is not. Knowledge of the content 
remains hypothetical and subject to further research. 
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A 'position', a 'point of consciousness from which we 
perceive' is called 'point of view' (Stanton, 1965). This 
roleplay epitomizes what is commonly called the 'objective' 
point of view. The student takes the outside-observer role in 
relation to the black-box: the objective attitude (point of 
view). As readers of this scene we have been put by the author 
into a specific point of view. The reader is also an 
outside-observer of the student with the black-box. (This 
'objective' point of view is shown in Figure 1 as the uninvolved 
observer). 
Other scenes are imagined. Suppose for example, a student is 
set the task of finding what is in the black-box when the 
black-box is another human being. This may just repeat the 
previous design, as for example, when the student investigates 
as though the other is a closed (black) biological system. 
Alternatively, he may investigate as though the other is an open 
(interactive) biological system by examining its imports and 
exports. He cannot do this, however, without altering the 
original paradigm or rule of the black-box. The a priori 
definition of the black-box changes from a closed to an open 
system. 
At yet another level of investigation, this 'scientist' may 
examine the imports and exports of this other human being, not 
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by observing them as might a scientist measure air exchange, but 
by the other's imports and exports in relation to himself. Words 
spoken and heard by two persons in conversation are 
interactional. Generally, when I speak to him - I am the 
subject, when I listen to him - I am the object. When I listen 
to him, he is no longer the black-box, he is the subject: the 
status of the black-box has changed from object to subject. And 
vice versa. (Alternating between subject and object is the point 
of view shown in Figure 2). Being an object in relation to 
someone as subject is roleolayinq. Taking the point of view 
whereby the other is object (not subject) is roletakinq, that 
is, taking what is commonly called the 'objective' attitude. (In 
practice this 'objectivity' is akin to standardization. Anastasi 
(1982, p. 15), for example, discusses so-called 'objective 
tests' as 'standardized achievement tests'). 
In the examples given so far, the other is not myself: the 
black-box is some person or thing which has its own separate 
existence. (This is the interpersonal or social frame of 
reference). The student-scientist has not, however, exhausted 
the possibilities for black-box investigation. He is his own 
black-box: he is both subject and object. (This is the 
intrapersonal or psychological frame of reference). Moreno calls 
role reversal the alternation between the self as subject and as 
an object to that subject. These are points of view of self with 
their respective frames of reference. Existentially, no one can 
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role reverse with another person 	no one can 'be' another 
person (Moreno, 1975b, p142). I can, however, roleplay him and 
vice versa, but I cannot role reverse with the other or vice 
versa (without the suspension of existential reality). 
Man is in a curious position in this black-box universe. He 
not only can investigate other black-boxes but is himself a 
black-box. Mankind is in the curious position of being both 
subject and object and, it seems, this equivalence of opposites 
(being both subject and object) has great potential for 
confusion. This confusion seems to arise because of man's 
unwitting capacity to shift points of view - points of view 
which implicitly enter into observations and conclusions. These 
unwitting shifting attitudes may become uncontrolled variables 
as different frames of reference. 
The student can roletake or roleplay with the black-box. If 
the black-box is the subject (the student becomes an object to 
the black-box) this by definition is roleplaying. If the 
black-box remains an object to the student, this by definition 
is roletaking (he takes the 'objective' attitude). The author in 
this description takes the 3rd person omniscient observer role - 
the standard 'objective' viewpoint. Subjectivity and objectivity 
are points of view: attitudes which affect how reality is 
constructed. Different frameworks of reality are constructed 
from these different points of view. 
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The purpose of these examples is to identify these two 
frameworks (originally as points of view) and the resulting 
confusion that is both conceptual and semantic and which arises 
from the unwitting alternation between points of view. One 
framework identifies observed ('subjective') and observer 
('objective') roles: this difference creates a roletaking - 
roleplaying dimension, a 'between-person' or social framework. 
This is the traditional 'objective' scientific framework - a 
social construction of reality. 
The two points of view of this social framework 	are 
operational ized in Moreno's sociodrama. Sociodrama 
operationalizes the dimension of self as roletaker in figure 1 
to self as interactive participant in figure 2. 
The other (psychological) framework identifies within a 
person both the subjective and the objective points of view, 
that is, the equivalence of opposites. This is a 
"within-a-person" or "person-as-subject" framework: 'role 
reversal' between subjective and objective attitudes (points of 
view) is central in this psychological framework. This is 
reality as constructed by the subject - this is the phenomenal 
framework - reality constructed by the individual. This is the 
framework that is structured by the persons grammar unified 
theory of reality. 
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The three points of view of this psychological framework are 
operationalized in Moreno's psychodrama. In the discussion which 
follows below, the roletaking - roleplaying dimension will be 
shown to operate within the person-as-subject as the person 
takes either the social role, i.e., 3rd 'person' roletaking, or 
the sociodramatic role, i.e., 2nd 'person' roleplaying). 
It is the exposition and integration of both the 'objective' 
and 'phenomenal' frameworks into one unified theory of reality 
and the application of this theory in empirical test in the 
context of homosexuality that are the substantive issues of this 
thesis. With current theories sexual preferences remain 
enigmatic. These 'objective' theories could not explain me to 
myself because the 3rd 'person' point of view which they 
operationalize excludes my 2nd 'person' point of view. To 
operationalize both these 2nd and 3rd 'person' object relations 
requires a frame of reference oriented in the 1st person 
subject. This theoretical and empirical study is thus a 
framework of reality from within (e.g., an esoteric Christian 
tradition) and not a framework of reality from without (e.g., 
the Mosaic tradition). These are two different 'objective' 
frameworks. This duality is evident in the confusion of sex and 
gender generally (and gender identity and sexual identity 
specifically). 
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If the sex and gender literature is scientifically meaningful 
and applicable to sexual preferences, then this literature 
should explain me to myself. It did not do so. The persons 
grammar is how the subject structures reality from 
experientially different points of view. This should therefore 
help structure and bring meaning to terms such as sexual 
identity and gender identity. 
There are two adult people - A and B: I am A, he is B. I have 
here attributed to B a male sexual identity. This is my 
attribution about him - this concept of male sexual identity is 
part of my psychological functioning (including my language). 
When I look at myself - in a mirror for example, I see a similar 
male sexed object - and attribute to myself a male sexual 
identity. This is my attribution about myself - I see myself as 
a sexed object. I attribute to B and to A a sexual identity. In 
this construction B may not in fact 'know' that B is male - 'he' 
may not have formed this (sexual) identity. 'Objectively' (in 
this 3rd person attitude) sexual identity is an attribution 
about someone else based on the objectively observable features 
of their biology. This includes 'myself in the mirror' - myself 
as an object. 
This 'labelling' of others is pragmatic and remains an 
assumption on my part. This is part of a reality I create. If I 
see B with the appropriate male biological features it seems 
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reasonable to make this assumption. This 'working hypothesis' is 
pragmatic, for example, the same rationale is used to identify 
oranges, apple, cats, dogs, cars, buses, and other objects. It 
would be an unusual reality that relied completely on, for 
example, an orange 'knowing' that it is an orange before I could 
say it is an orange. When therefore, I say 'this is an orange', 
or 'he' (inferring a sexual identity), this is my construction 
of reality. This construction emphasizes my relation to these 
objects - my knowledge of identities. 
The identification of 'boy' and 'girl' at birth is an 
assumption. These newborn have a biologically determined sex but 
they have not yet formed psychological knowledge (identity) 
about that sex. It is a convention that babies are referred to 
as 'he' or 'she'. This is a projection by the speaker. These 
projections are hypotheses I make about someone's reality. If 
this socially constructed reality is held to rigidly (such that 
this 'reality' becomes the 'Law') then there is little room for 
the individual to discover in a heuristic way (self-discovery) 
what 'his' identity is really. In effect, the person becomes a 
roletaker - taking the prescribed role of 'the male - boy' or of 
'the female - girl'. Identity may then be confused with these 
social roles. 
To know I am (biologically) male requires the enactment of a 
male sex role - such as standing and using a penis to urinate. 
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It is through doing these and other 'male' actions that a child 
learns 'he' is a male. (Moreno describes these roles associated 
with physiology and anatomy as psychosomatic roles. He regards 
these as preparatory to the formation of the psychological 
experience of body, in this case, 'male body'). Sexual identity 
is the experience of one's body being male (or female). A person 
who does not experience their body may intellectually know they 
are male or female and assume this knowing is their sexual 
identity. This is equivalent to the 'objective' point of view 
where sexual identity is assumed from a taught knowledge of 
biological sex. 
Being a male requires during childhood the enactment of roles 
regarded as socially appropriate for boys (to be masculine). 
Historically, these roles have been different to roles which 
have been prescribed for females to become girls (feminine). In 
this conditioning social process the social role has its origin 
in the biological sex of the child. The child has masculinity 
and femininity (social sex-roles) in so far that the child 
conforms to the expected roles of 'boys/men' and 'girls/women'. 
Social sex-role is related to biological sex. 
That biological sex identifies sexual identity is an 
inference. This inference is commonly made in everyday 
conversation, in the sex literature, and in the body of the 
thesis. To make this inference - that biological sex identities 
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sexual identity - is pragmatic. This inference may be said to be 
generally correct but that this generalization does not 
necessarily apply to the individual. Thus an individual may be 
masculine (social sex-role), male bodied, and intellectually 
know they are an example of the male category (and which 
together could be called 'male identification'), and still have 
little male sexual identity - that is - have little heuristic 
experience of their own maleness. Clearly, social sex-role is 
related to biological sex, and, sexual identity is related to 
biological sex. This is an example when M and N appear to be 
correlated, but where M is related to 0 and N is related to 0. 
Individually there are clearly limits to defining sexual 
identity by biological sex. 
This pragmatic approach which parallels common social 
practice is used in this thesis. The results show a relationship 
between social sex-role and biological sex (which is not 
surprising given the method of constructing this measure). 
Sexual identity may not develop even given the prior existential 
facticity of biological sex. Pragmatically, given the number of 
subjects in each of the groups, it is assumed that biological 
sex does indicate a difference in sexual identity such that 
homosexual males and heterosexual males have a sexual identity 
and that heterosexual females have a different sexual identity. 
(If homosexuality and heterosexuality are themselves different 
sexual identities, or are systematically related to different 
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sexual identities, then sexual preference should be'empirically 
related to biological sex. This thesis shows that this is a null 
relation: homosexuality and heterosexuality are not empirically 
related to biological sex, and therefore, not systematically 
related to sexual identity). 
Gender is a grammatical term and refers to the classification 
of nouns into kinds (such as undifferentiated, male, female, and 
androgynous). Gender also has sex as a colloquial meaning in 
which case sex and gender are synonymous. 
To know I am 'a person' (a self) requires during development 
the formation of a sense of self which is differentiated from 
the existence of other persons. This individuated self is that 
entity which is 'I and me', that is, 'myself'. This is the self 
(trinity) which emerges with the unification of the 1st and 2nd 
'persons' of grammar and not the self-conscious 3rd 'person' 
observer self. The gender of this conscious entity - the self - 
is referred to as gender identity. 
Conventionally a person (self) has been considered to be 
gendered in a way that is congruent with biological sex. This 
untested assumption is evident in the gender literature whereby 
the biological male is generally regarded as being male gendered 
(and so on for female). (This assumption of sex and gender 
congruency is extensively discussed in Study 3. If sexual 
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preferences are related to gender identity then homosexuality 
and heterosexuality should be empirically related to gender 
role, and by inference, to gender identity. Studies 1 and 2 
demonstrate this proposed relationship: the origins of sexual 
preferences are in gender identity. Study 3 identifies the 
nature of that gender identity in homosexuals and 
heterosexuals). 
Sexual identity and gender identity are not the same as 
colloquial understanding would have one believe. Sexual identity 
is an experienced knowledge of being biologically male (for 
example) and has its origins in the biological segregation and 
differentiation of the sexes. Gender identity is an experienced 
knowledge of the gender of oneself and has its origins in the 
differentiation and integration of the self. (This difference 
between sex and gender is discussed in more detail below). These 
identities are measured in this thesis by the objectively 
observable expression of sex role and gender role from which 
appropriate inferences of identity are made. This apparent but 
unreal duality of sex and gender has been confusing. The enigma 
of homosexuality and heterosexuality is at least partially 
resolved by this conceptual clarification of sex and gender. 
That man lives a duality is a common theme in religious and 
scientific literature. This theme is well stated by Kelsey 
(1972, p. 51): 
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The belief that man is in touch with spiritual 
reality can be held naively, and also by people 
who think about it with great care. Some people 
have held this belief who found, as in Hinduism 
and Buddhism, that the spiritual alone has 
reality, while the physical world is only illusive 
appearances or "mayan. And some have discarded it, 
equally convinced, as in the nineteenth century, 
that only the physical is real and the spiritual 
is illusion. Once men have begun to think about 
the problem, it is very difficult for them to bear 
the tension of relating to two such different 
realms of experience. 
The integration of this apparent duality of reality - of a 
spiritual-religious point of view and a physical-scientific 
point of view - into one unified theory of reality would be 
important scientifically and religiously. Kelsey does point out 
the essential difficulty of doing this - the 'tension of 
relating to two such different realms of experience'. It is this 
duality, and consequent confusion, which is herein addressed as 
the interpersonal ('objective') and intrapersonal (phenomenal) 
frameworks. 
What and where is the origin of this confusion? The following 
history is in sketch form only. I claim no expertise in 
religious or scientific history. 
A History of Duality 
Uncommon in that part of the world at the time, the Jewish 
Mosaic tradition identifies them as a distinct culture. 
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Surrounding traditions are pantheistic. For the Jews there is 
only one God (Yahwah which has the literal translation of 
'I-am-ness'). A person's relation to this God is like that of 
one person to another unknown but observing person. This God is 
outside of oneself and can only be reached through a correct and 
complex observance of the (religious) Law. This God takes the 
observer role in relation to the person (as does the uninvolved 
observer in Figure 1). This is the 3rd person 'objective' point 
of view. 
The Mosaic relation between self and God, with its implicit 
construction of reality, was challenged by Jesus of Nazareth. 
This man, through the 'heresy' and 'blasphemy' that he teaches, 
identifies one of the most profound and long-lasting schisms in 
the human personality. His thinking and teaching mark a vaste 
before and after difference. Bo++ (1986, p. 179) says: 
The man Jesus of Nazareth revealed such greatness 
and profundity in his humanity that at the end of 
a long process of meditation the apostles and 
those who knew him had to say: only God himself 
could be so human. .... As of that moment, the 
apostles, who were Jews, left off being Jews in 
order to become Christians. The Jews held the 
absolute unity of God as a fundamental doctrine of 
their faith. 
Jesus marks a dramatic change in man's thinking. In the Mosaic 
tradition man is observed by a unitary and remote God: God 
cannot be a man and a man cannot role reverse and become God 
because God is existentially another Being. With Jesus, God 
285 
appears divided because He is now part of (each) Man. Since 
however He is part of Jesus the man, Jesus can role reverse with 
Him (Father): thus "The Father and I are One" (John 10:30). Now, 
with Jesus, the subject and the object are different meta-roles 
within the one person. Role reversal - the interaction of 
subject (Father) and object (Son) is fundamental to the 
Trinity of the Christian God. 
This Trinity is paradoxical since there is simultaneously the 
systemic unified whole and the subsystems of three divine 
'persons' (meta-roles). The Trinity of the Christian God unifies 
both the whole (the One in the Mosaic tradition) and the Three 
Divine 'Persons' in One. The Trinity has been a mystery, that 
is, confusing. This confusion seems to parallel the duality of 
the subject and object being the same and yet different, as 
happens in role reversal. This duality is evident in the 
relations between sexual identity and sex role, and between 
gender identity and gender role. 
Moreno (1971) uses the term 'I-God'. This distinguishes an 
individual's whole personality (the 'I-God') from the 
universalized 'objective' God that is implied by our existence 
in this 'black-box' universe. The 'I-God' is herein called the 
'self' and is inferred by the three attitudes of persons grammar' 
to this self. 
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Jesus is historically in apposition to the (religious) Law. 
In his actions the Law with its frame of reference in the 
implied but remote universal God is brought into juxtaposition 
with a Christ whose frame of reference is in an internally 
present and experienced 'Abba' (Father). This frame of reference 
implies the point of view of the subject (Abba) and the point of 
view of the object (Son) who is experiencing and identifying 
with that subject. The term Son is used ambiguously to refer to 
Jesus who is a Son amongst people (interpersonal or social 
realm) and also to the 2nd 'person' of the Trinity which is a 
meta-role within the individuated personality (intrapersonal or 
psychological realm). This ambiguity between the social and the 
psychological is a recurrent dualistic - and confusing - theme. 
Jesus marks a historical discontinuity in the construction of 
reality. His theory and teaching enables a unified construction 
of reality. His genius is not to supplant the Mosaic 
construction but to integrate this universal 'objective' social 
construct of reality into an individuated and even more 
encompassing and unifying psychological theory of reality - the 
Trinity. 
Science 
The 'objectivistic' paradigm (frame of reference) of the 
Mosaic tradition and the 'subjectivistic' paradigm personified 
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by Jesus are dual philosophical themes pre-dating Christianity. 
Man's duality as roletaker and roleplayer is paralleled here in 
this comment by von Bertalanffy (1968, p. 253): 
It seems to be the most serious shortcoming of 
classical occidental philosophy, from Plato to 
Descartes and Kant, to consider man primarily as a 
spectator, as ens cogitans, while, for biological 
reasons, he has essentially to be a performer, an 
ens agens in the world he is thrown in. 
Moreno's psychodrama (which includes roleplaying and roletaking) 
has its origins in the philosophy of Plato. Kelsey (1972, p. 57) 
links Christianity with Plato and says: 
Plato's theory of how the two realms of reality 
interact, and how men come to know these two 
realms of reality, was clearly consistent with the 
experiences of both the Old and the New 
Testaments. .... Plato gave the clearest and most 
systematic account of this theory of man in 
contact with both spiritual and physical worlds, 
These dual realities parallel dual scientific paradigms. In 
an overview of the new physics Zukav (1979, p. 55) says: 
The concept of scientific objectivity rests on the 
assumption of an external world which is "out 
there" as opposed to an "I" which is "in here". 
(This way of perceiving, which puts other people 
"out there", makes it very lonely "in here"). 
According to this view, Nature, in all her 
diversity, is "out there" as objectively as 
possible. To observe something objectively means 
to see it as it would appear to an observer who 
has no prejudices about what he observes. 
Zukav also attributes the problem of this objectivity to a 
'prejudiced' attitude of the observer - the 'subjectivity' of 
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the observer. It is however the assumption of a particular point 
of view and the consequent construction of reality - the 
paradigm inherent in this 'God', 'Nature', or reality as an 
external phenomenon - that remains implicit and scientifically 
untested. These two paradigms are confounded in the sex and 
gender literature; they are tested in Studies 1, 2 and 3 using 
sex and gender concepts and measures. 
Combs and Snygg (1959, p. 16) also recognize two broad 
frameworks in psychology: 
Human behavior, may be observed from at least two 
very broad frames of reference: from the point of , 
view of an outsider, or from the point of view of 
the behaver himself. .... This is the "objective," 
or "external," frame of reference. The second 
approach seeks to understand behavior by making 
its observations from the point of view of the 
behaver himself. ... This frame of reference has 
been called the "perceptual," "personal," or 
"phenomenolgical" frame of reference . 
According to Combs and Snygg (1959, p. vii) the phenomenal 
paradigm is new, however, its origin seems to be traceable to 
Plato and to the beginings of Christianity, even if its meaning 
and relevance have been somewhat confused in the ensuing 2,000 
years. 
These same authors (Combs ac Snygg, 1955) emphasize the 
phenomenological frame of reference as the 'point of view' of 
their book. This is both correct and false and this point has 
remained a stumbling block to the integration of religious and 
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scientific thinking. Combs and Snygg (1955), this author, or 
anyone else, cannot capture the phenomenological point of view 
by a 3rd person point of view - although it can be described - 
as Combs and Snygg (1955) do. This standardized description is 
however not the phenomenon itself - it is abstraction from it. 
Description of an experience is not the experience. 
Jesus describes role reversal. He found that 'Father' 
(subject) and 'Son' (object) could reverse roles but that this 
'act' a way of thinking - is an interiority. This is the 
interior or psychological realm - a way of thinking - that He 
calls the Kingdom of God. In life ones interiority can only be 
directly experienced by oneself - no one can actually role 
reverse with another. (Inferences about another, about sexual 
identity for example, can however be made). It is the 
description of this 'action' which has been difficult and a 
point of contention in science and religion, arguably not 
because the phenomenon does not exist, but because the 
scientific 'point of view' precludes it except as a description. 
An abstract description is not the 'real' thing, just as the 
symbol 'tree' is not a tree. (Try, for example, describing the 
taste of an orange to a person who has had no taste of an 
orange, or of 'red' to a born-blind person). It is through the 
genius of Moreno's psychodrama method that role reversal is 
possible in an externalized 'objective' way and in a way that 
can be meaningfully experienced by others. 
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It may be useful at this point to summarize and clarify. 
There is no argument in the literature about the presence and 
nature of two broad frameworks: there are various names but 
'objective' and 'phenomenal' are apt. There is some agreement 
that these frames of reference are usually kept separate 
tension and confusion being the result for the unwary. Kelsey 
(1972, p. 36) asks: "Is there any real alternative to these two 
ways of thinking?". There is little doubt that Man lives a 
duality. The maintenance of this duality seems related to Man's 
failure to wittingly experience and understand role reversal. 
The Trinity (persons grammar) 
The Trinity is composed of four elements and four relations. 
The object - God, Trinity, or self - is one element. The Divine 
'Persons' are three more elements - all objects. The Father, the 
1st 'person' of grammar is an object - and the subject. This 
particular object has a specific and inalienable identity - the 
subject. The subject has an identity (Moreno's psychodramatic 
role). The 2nd and 3rd 'persons' (Moreno's sociodramatic role 
and social role respectively) are objects having specific 
meta-relations with the subject. 
The first of the four relations is that between self and 
subject. In the Trinity this identifies the Father as one of the 
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identities of God (self). In the persons grammar this is the 
'I-I' relation of self and first 'person' (subject). The subject 
is the personification of one of the identities of the self. 
The second relation is that between the 1st 'person' 
(subject) and 2nd 'person' (object). In the Trinity this is the 
relation between Father and Son: the rolecreating subject and 
the roleplaying object. In the persons grammar this is the 
'I-you' relationship of direct encounter: a meeting. In the mind 
(the Kingdom of God) the 'I' and the 'you' are of the same 
person and so role reversal is possible. The objective 
expression of this is a way of thinking (consciousness) that has 
its frame of reference in the subject. This relation defines the 
conscious experience of self, an experience which is abstracted 
to the 'phenomenal' frame of reference. 
The third relation is that between the 1st 'person' (subject) 
and the 3rd 'person' (object). In the Trinity this is the 
relation between Father and the Holy Ghost (Spirit): the 
rolecreating subject and the roletaking object. In the persons 
grammar this is the 'I-he' null-relation of segregation. Within 
the mind the 'I' and the 'he' are of the same person: 'he' is as 
though an object separate to himself. He takes the 'objective' 
point of view towards himself: 'he' seems to be outside of 
himself just as God is outside of a person in the Mosaic 
tradition. 
292 
The fourth relation is that implied between the 2nd 'person' 
and the 3rd 'person'. In the Trinity this appears to be a 
relation between the 2nd 'Person' (Son) and the 3rd 'Person' 
(Holy Spirit). The relation is between two previously identified 
elements - the roleplaying 2nd 'person' ('you') and the 
roletaking 3rd 'person' ('he'). The roleplayer (who is in 
relation) and the roletaker (who is in null-relation) thus 
represent extremes of 'relatedness' which should differ as does 
a scale. Moreno (1971, p. 168) identifies this scale as an 
"axiological scale" of spontaneity where the "ideal exponent of 
one pole is a totally spontaneous creator, and the ideal 
exponent of the other, the total cultural conserve", that is, 
the most and the least spontaneity respectively. Spontaneity is 
the essence of the 2nd 'person' roleplayer and its absence the 
essence of the 3rd 'person' roletaker. The 'Holy Spirit' is a 
bond (as in 'religio' - to bind). Its fullest expression is the 
bond of the Son to manifest in roleplay the creativity of the 
Father. 
Doyan (1986) in "Love before the law" says (p. 53): 
It suffices that in his human consciousness he 
finally attributed his being and his human 
activity to that mysterious Subject within him 
whose identity remained unfathomable and which 
infinitely transcended all that he could manifest 
of it in his life. His deep conviction of the 
presence of God within him embraced the mystery of 
his Person, which for him coincided with the 
mystery of God. 
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Here Doyan identifies the subject as presence within the person 
and that, in Jesus, there is a manifestation of the subject 
which coincides with the mystery of God. Jesus experiences this 
subject interiorly: the locus of his identity is within him. He 
is both subject and object - he is one. A person who manifests 
this conscious integration of subject and object attracts the 
term Prophet, Buddha, or Christ, and so on. In Moreno's terms 
this model of Man is the 'creative genius'. 
In summary, the persons grammar (Trinity) is a systemic model 
of human personality composed of elements and relations between 
those elements. The wholeness of the self-system integrates a 
duality: one way of thinking with its relatedness to the subject 
and objectified as roleplaying, and, another way of thinking 
with its dissociation from the subject and objectified as 
roletaking. Integration occurs with the increasing ability of 
the person to move between their subjective and objective 
functioning. This (internal) role reversal is a real 
'phenomenon': it can be experienced and it can be described. 
Existential role reversal is not possible and because of this 
Moreno developed psychodrama method. 
Except in psychodrama method where the protagonist is the 
subject, the subject has remained scientifically and religiously 
elusive. (Labelling people as 'subjects' in a scientific study 
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does not satisfy the objection that these people are performing 
in the scientist-observer's experiment and therefore the 
scientist is the true subject just as an actor playing Macbeth 
plays a part in Shakespeare's drama). The persons grammar 
(Trinity), a religious-scientific systems model, enables the 
interactive reciprocal relation of role reversal to be brought 
to an empirical test. This test utilizes an experimental systems 
design proposed by von Bertalanffy (1968). 
A systems design 
A system can be defined as a set of elements 
standing in interrelations. This means that 
elements, p, stand in relations, R, so that the 
behavior of an element p in R is different from 
its behavior in another relation, R'. If the 
behavior in R and R' are not different, there is 
no interaction, and the elements behave 
independently with respect to the relations R and 
R' (von Bertalanffy, 1968, p. 55). 
Central to this definition is 'interaction' which can be 
stated as a hypothesis: If --- there is interaction, then 
the elements behave differently. If the elements p2 and p3 (see 
Figure 10) behave differently in respect to p1, then this 
supports the theory that the subject (0) and object (p2) have 
an interactive relationship and the theoretical viewpoint that 
the subject and object are the 'same' and 'different'. The same 
object is different and this difference is related to a 
systematic difference in position (point of view). (Just as a 
'person' has gender identity and gender role is its objective 
expression). It is argued that this paradox is best understood 
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as a role reversal. An experimental design based on this 
definition is shown in the following diagram. 
pl 
sexual preference 
(inferred gender identity) 
p2 
gender role 
P 3 
sex role 
Figure 10. 
An experimental design using a systems model. 
This is the design used in Studies 1 and 2 of this thesis. 
The statistical analyses show that roleplaying (p2) is 
empirically related to sexual 'preference (p1) whereas roletaking 
(p3) is not. The elements p2 (gender role) and p3 (sex role) 
vary predictably in their behaviour with respect to pl 
,(homosexual, heterosexual). R' and R are shown to be different: 
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gender role is systematically related to sexual preference 
whereas sex role is not. 
It is concluded that sexual preference is related to the 
gender identity of the subject. Homosexuality and 
heterosexuality are gender-role-playings (literally playing in 
gender role). Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate that sexual preference 
is related to the gender identity of the subject and not to 
their biological sex, and by inference, not to their sexual 
identity. 
For measurement purposes (by Fruend et al, 1974) sexual 
preference is not included in gender role. These Studies show 
that sexual preference is very much part of an adult gender 
role: it is an objective expression of the gender identity of 
the self. 
While these two Studies address the origin of sexual 
preference, the nature of that (gender) identity remains 
untested. The pragmatic approach in the literature has been to 
assume congruency of sex and gender identity in heterosexuality 
and incongruency in homosexuality. 
The design proposed by von Bertalanffy (1968) is also used in 
Study 3. Whereas in the previous studies variation in the 
elements is used to demonstrate the proposed relations, in Study 
R" R' 
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3 variation in the relations are shown to be predictably related 
to variation in the elements. In this study three levels of R 
are hypothesized to be systematically related to objective 
differences in p and not to a subjective difference in p. This 
design is shown in Figure 11. 
pl 
homosexual males 
(all with same gender identity) 
p2 
high 
relatedness 
(identification) 
Figure 11. 
P 3 	 p4 
.middle low 
relatedness 	relatedness 
(dis-identification) 
An experimental design for Study, 3 using a systems model. 
The relation between 'being homosexual' (pl: gender identity) 
and identifying with that 'being' (p2-p4: homosexual 
identification) is systematically varied. The relations R - R' - 
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R" show increasing levels of interaction (relatedness). 
There are two hypotheses. First, differences in homosexual 
identification should not be related to differences in 'being 
homosexual': there should not be variation in pl (gender 
identity) between the three homosexual male groups. 
Differences in level of homosexual identification (p2-p4) are 
theoretically related to the 'axiological scale' of spontaneity 
(discussed above). This scale is not unidimensional: it is a 
scale of interaction of spontaneity with creativity. Spontaneity 
is discussed in the main body of the thesis as an esoteric 
freedom. This freedom should be negatively related to anxiety. 
The second hypothesis states that increasing identification with 
self (relatedness) is associated with less anxiety. In Study 3 
both hypotheses are tested across three groups of homosexual 
males who differ in degree of relatedness to self. Both 
hypotheses are empirically supported. 
Studies 1 and 2 show that the homosexual male and 
heterosexual female have the same gender identity, an identity 
different to the heterosexual male. Study 3 identifies the 
nature of these gender identities. 
This Study demonstrates that this identity is male in 
homosexual males and heterosexual females, and, female in 
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heterosexual males. Interpersonal sexual attraction mimics the 
subject-object relation within the self - the preferred sexual 
partner is shown to take the role of the 2nd 'person' in 
relation to self as subject. In this sexual roleplaying the sex 
of the preferred object mirrors the gender of the self as 
subject. In male homosexuality, the male as a sexed object 
mirrors the gender identity of the homosexual male subject. In 
heterosexuality the sexed object mirrors the gender identity of 
the subject. Overall then, these three Studies address the 
origin and nature of sexual preferences. 
Homosexuality is the overt content of this thesis. The 
conclusions can go beyond this since the analysis also tests the 
dual frames of reference. These Studies put the "two great 
frames of reference" (Combs & Snygg, 1959, p. 10) to empirical 
test. This has been done in two ways: one by prediction of 
hypothesized relations from known elements (Studies 1 and 2), 
and also by the prediction of hypothesized elements from known 
relations (Study 3). 
Moreno (1975b, p. 141) believed 'role reversal' to be little 
understood. A historically documented antecedent of role 
reversal is the 'Father and Son' of Jesus. Role reversal thus 
needs further elaboration in religious, educational, scientific 
and therapeutic systems, and the principle of role reversal 
interaction - applied much more extensively. 
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These Studies demonstrate the change in the construction of 
reality proposed by Jesus. Socially - the 'objective' point of 
view - Jesus is (a) Christ. Within the personality of the human 
there is the 2nd 'person' ('Son'). These Studies show that 
developing this sociodramatic (2nd 'person') role within 
ourselves - that is, becoming roleplayers - is central in the 
development of the integrated self and in the bonds of social 
behaviour. 
Much has been said in this thesis concerning meta-theory. The 
confusion evident in the gender and sex literature springs from 
the confounding of the 'two great frames of reference' and some 
clarification has been necessary before applying this to an 
integrated theory of gender. A theory of gender is proposed 
which follows on from the theory of persons grammar. 
An Androgynous Theory of Gender 
In "The kingdom within" Sanford (1970, p. 173) says: 
It is inevitable that, in the growth of our 
personalities, much that potentially is part of us 
will not be developed. Our early identification 
with the mask effectively excludes a large portion 
of our total personality. Our identification with 
our masculinity, if we are men, or femininity, if 
we are women, will also exclude much of our 
potential. 
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Sigmund Freud's theories have attracted the criticism that they 
have been developed from the study of neurotic and not normal 
people. If Sanford is correct then to develop theories of human 
development based on 'normality' is also self defeating. A new 
model of Man is required. 
Freud in 'On sexuality' plays with the idea of 'psychical 
hermaphroditism' (Strachey, 1977, p. 52) but found he could not 
demonstrate a relationship between this and anatomical 
hermaphroditism. He is also interested in bisexuality and says 
(p. 142): 
Since I have become acquainted with the notion of 
bisexuality I have regarded it as the decisive 
factor, and without taking bisexuality into 
account I think it would scarcely by possible to 
arrive at an understanding of the sexual 
manifestations that are actually to be observed in 
men and women. 
Freud's notion of bisexuality As originally invested in a 
biological framework; care must be taken in interpreting this 
statement. For him bisexuality is nearer to 'a biological 
hermaphroditism' than are current notions. Since Kinsey's et al 
(1948) 'continuum' bisexuality is generally regarded as 
intermediate between heterosexuality and homosexuality and not 
directly linked to biology. Jung (1964) is also interested in a 
psychical bisexuality and developed the concepts of 'anima' and 
'animus'. The Eastern concepts of yin and yang are similar 
principles. There is much precedent for regarding the human mind 
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as being in some way psychologically 'bisexual'. 
Sex refers to the biological self as a sexed object. The idea 
of sexual development as the biological segregation and 
subsequent differentiation of male and female sexes is not a 
useful concept applied to psychological growth occuring by a 
different (interactive) process. In other words, Freud's 
'psychical hermaphroditism' may well be notionally correct but 
is expressed in biological rather than in psychological terms. 
• A segregated sex is generally observable in (though not yet 
experienced by) the newborn. In contrast to this sexual 
dimorphism gender identity is undifferentiated. A differentiated 
male or female gender identity is shown in this thesis to be 
explanatory of adult sexual preference. Implicit in this 
construction is the differentiation of gender identity as either 
a male or a female identity. (This construction seems to arise 
in a mechanistic ideology discussed below). 
At birth the newborn is psychologically an undifferentiated 
universe - the self is unformed, there is an undifferentiated 
(hence androgynous) gender identity. In the course of 
development male and female identities emerge from this 
undifferentiated matrix giving the person their experience or 
sense of gender. This is the second universe. It is from the 
differentiation and subsequent integration of these identities 
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that the unified and androgynous self emerges. This is a third 
universe. 
There 	are 	four categories of gender: undifferentiated 
(androgyny), male, female, and androgyny (integrated). The first 
universe 	of 	human 	development 	is 	characterized by an 
undifferentiated androgynous gender identity. The second 
universe is characterized by differentiation of male and female 
identities. The third universe is characterized by the 
integration of the differentiated male and female identities 
into an androgynous whole. Such a theory clearly implies that 
the third stage of integration - cannot be accomplished 
without the prior differentiation of both the male and female 
identities. Consequently, the emergence of the androgynous self 
is contiguous with the successful differentiation of both the 
male and the female principles in the one individual and not on 
the segregated pattern evident in homo- and hetero-sexuality. It 
is in this sense that both homosexuality and heterosexuality are 
'deviancies' (i.e, not deviancies in a normal sense but 
deviations from a teleological androgynous self). 
The 	androgyny 	theory 	of the self is a teleological 
(developmental and evolutionary) theory of Man. The journey of 
the self is towards androgyny and departures, however 'normal', 
indicate a failure of interaction (creativity with spontaneity). 
That both homo- and hetero-sexuality are both equally 'normal' 
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(i.e., equally deviant) is shown in this thesis by the failure 
(also evident in the literature review) to show a significant 
difference in objective measures of pathology between the two 
preferences. 
This theory is related to the 'kingdom' of the persons 
grammar (Trinity). Jesus spoke in parables of everyday events 
and addressed in his audience what he called the 'kingdom of 
God'. He intends by his parables to say something about this 
'kingdom'. His teaching is esoteric (from the Greek 'eso', 
meaning 'within'). When asked by some Pharisees about the 
lawfulness of divorce Jesus addresses the esoteric integration 
of 'man' and 'woman' by literalist analogy to 'marriage' and 
'divorce'. He makes his position clear on the differentiation 
and integration of male and female gender identity! he says 
"What therefore God hath joined together, let not man put 
asunder" (Matthew, 20:6). Here the self (god) is both male and 
female - the self is androgynous. Jesus warns against the 
prevention of this integration. 
In summary the androgynous theory of gender proposes an 
androgynous (and consequently) bisexual self, via 
undifferentiated, differentiated, and integrated stages. Homo-
and hetero-sexuality, developing only one gender, are only 
partial expressions of the second differentiated universe. The 
absence (or underdevelopment) of a gender identity in 
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homosexuals and heterosexuals is indicative of an absence or 
loss of spontaneity. This may perhaps be attributed to a 
conditioning and identification with the 'mask' of biological 
sex which both creates and maintains a segregationist-sexist 
attitude. If so, it is important to identify and rectify this 
ideology so that the self can develop properly. (This ideology 
will be briefly addressed below in 'sex research' and 'gender 
research'). 
This ideology is identified and tested in the body of the 
thesis as the 3rd 'person' (i.e., roletaker). The roletaker has 
a null-relatedness to self and is associated with anxiety and 
psychoticism. In the semantics of psychology this is 
dissociation and in the semantics of religion this is sin. It is 
this ideology leading to the assumption of the 3rd 'person' 
attitude and how it leads to the segregation of male and female 
that is now addressed. 
Knowledge 
Roleplaying and roletaking implies two different theories of 
object relations, and therefore, dual systems of knowledge. 
Fundamental to knowledge from roleplaying is differentiation. To 
differentiate is to constitute a difference between, to render 
unlike, to discriminate, and to recognize a difference between. 
The development of the 'male' and 'female' (gender identities) 
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from the undifferentiated is such a process. In this process the 
'male' is differentiated from the undifferentiated (chaos), and, 
the 'female' is differentiated from 	the 	undifferentiated 
(chaos). (In this process 'male' is not differentiated from 
'female'). This process recognizes the relationship between the 
development of the identity and the initial (undifferentiated) 
chaos from which it develops. Knowledge in this process is the 
'I-am-ness' of developing identity. 
Fundamental to knowledge from roletaking is segregation. To 
segregate is to isolate, divide into separate groups, become 
isolated or separated. The development of male and female sexed 
objects is such a process. In this originally biological process 
the male is differentiated from an initial but segregated whole 
(zygote). (And similarly for the female). The sexes are already 
segregated by their characteristic sex chromosomes. Following 
this biological development, the psychological development of 
sexual identity develops from an already segregated and 
differentiated universe. Sexual identity involves a prior 
division (segregation) between male and female followed by 
separate development. 
The concepts and semantics of sex and gender arise in 
fundamentally different processes of growth and invoke 
fundamentally different theories of knowledge. Fundamentally 
important conceptual issues are poorly recognized and 
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operationalized in the sex and gender literature. 
It may be useful to emphasize some basic concepts. One is a 
distinction between closed and open systems, the other 
distinction is between living and non-living things. 
The distinction between open and closed systems is 
fundamental to the persons of grammar theory: the self as an 
interaction of the 1st and 2nd 'persons' (i.e., within the 
field) is an open system, in contrast to the closed system of 
the 3rd 'person' (who is outside the field). This distinction is 
becoming more important in science generally says von 
Bertalanffy (1968, p. 161) in his conclusions: 
The model of the organism as an open system has 
proved useful in the explanation and mathematical 
formulation of numerous life phenomena; it also 
leads, as is to be expected in a scientific 
working hypothesis, to further problems, partly of 
a fundamental nature. This implies that it is not 
only of scientific but also of 'meta-scientific' 
importance. The mechanistic concept of nature 
predominant so far emphasized the resolution of 
happenings into linear causal chains; a conception 
of the world as a result of chance events, and a 
physical and Darwinistic 'play of dice' 
(Einstein); the reduction of biological processes 
to laws known from inanimate nature. In contrast 
to this, in the theory of open systems (....), 
principles of multivariable interaction (....) 
become apparent, a dynamic organization of 
processes and a possible expansion of physical 
laws under consideration of the biological realm. 
Therefore, these developments form part of a new 
formulation of the scientific world view. 
And (p. 165): 
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...., precisely that criterion which fundamentally 
distinguishes living systems from conventional 
ones is generally ignored or bypassed. 
The use of a 'mechanistic' concept which ignores this 
distinction will be identified in 'sex- and gender-research' 
(below). 
The distinction between living and non-living is a 
supposition related to apparent differences in organization: 
As a rule, the organization of physical wholes, 
such as atoms, molecules, or crystals, results 
from the union of pre-existing elements. In 
contrast, the organization of biological wholes is 
built up by differentiation of an original whole 
which segregates into parts. (von Bertalanffy, 
1968, p. 68). 
Growth in living and non-living systems are fundamentally 
different. The application of 'union' to living systems is 
inappropriate. This mechanistic concept should first be shown to 
be applicable before it is operationalized (explicitly or 
implicitly) in biological, social and psychological research. 
In this construction the physical system has a particular 
organization of wholes built up from pre-existing parts whereas 
von Bertalanffy identities the organization of living things 
with segregation. While I have discussed the relevance of 
segregation to the development of biological sex, and therefore 
to sexual identity, this thesis is primarily concerned with 
another organizational pattern of living things. This is 
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integration, a pattern characterized by interaction, whereby 
creativity is organized by spontaneity. There are then different 
organizations of living and non-living things, and within living 
things there are recognized fundamentally different growth 
processes of segregation and of integration. 
Much of the confusion in the sex and gender literature, and 
the enigma of homo- and hetero-sexuality, is probably 
attributable to the inappropriate application of 'mechanistic' 
concepts. This construct implicitly construes to man a 
non-living status. 
There also has been a failure to identify the development of 
sexual identity with prior biological sexual segregation. 
Instead, sexual identity has become identified with a social and 
psychological segregation of the biological sexes. It does not 
follow that these social and psychological differences, arising 
in early social segregation of the sexes (i.e., sexism), are 
related to sexual identity. This is a tautology: the differences 
arise, at least in part, because children are exposed to 
different learning environments based on their sex. This 
differential learning is not theoretically related to sexual 
identity. (These are associated however in the pragmatic 
assumption that sexual identity is defined by biological sex). 
It does follow however that the social and psychological 
personality traits of the individual help define the nature of 
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the self, including the gender of that self. 
There also has been a failure to identify the development of 
gender identity with integration. Instead, gender identity has 
become identified with, and is expected to be congruent with, 
(one) biological sex. Here the self as a sexed object usurps the 
experience of the self as a subject: the self as an object 
repeats the Mosaic objective tradition where the contents of the 
'black-box' (oneself) remain enigmatic. To be oneself requires 
the integration of those apparent opposites subject and object: 
those two objects 'I' and 'you' who may encounter each other 
within the personality. Here the personality is an open system 
and an open system which may develop a conscious sense 
(identity) of self, including own gender (and consequent sexual 
preference). 
There also has been a failure to identify the relation 
between sexual identity and gender identity. Sexual preferences 
identify a relationship between gender identity and the 
biological sex of the preferred sex partner. (This relationship 
has been shown in this thesis to be congruent. To the extent 
that biological sex implies the development of one or other 
sexual identities there is no relationship between own sexual 
identity and the biological sex, or inferred sexual identity, of 
the preferred sex partner). Sexual identity is an identification 
with ones own body including its sex (and refers to 
311 
psychosomatic role development). Gender identity refers to the 
experience of oneself being gendered (and to the integration of 
psychodramatic and sociodramatic roles. 
Sexual identity implies the previous development of a 'sexual 
role' (psychosomatic male or female role) and is part of the 
sense of 'body'. This identity is necessarily tied to sex. 
Gender identity is necessarily tied to the nature of the self: a 
self which integrates body, including sexual identity, within 
the whole (body, social, psychological) self. Gender identity is 
thus inclusive of sexual identity, just as gender is a more 
generic term than sex. 
In summary, in an open system an identity is nominally 
defined by its essence so that male (for example) is defined by 
(or identified with) that which differentiates maleness from 
no-maleness. In a closed system, however, an identity is 
operationally defined by the differentiation of male from 
female. This operant measures the difference between males and 
females. This mechanistic attitude is evident in the sex and 
gender literature. The purpose of the following review is to 
identify more clearly that attitude. 
Sex Research 
Sex roles are operationally defined as a contrast of traits 
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between male- and female-sexed subjects. Consider the following 
hypothetical characteristics (X, Y, and Z). 
CHARACTERISTICS OF 
MALES FEMALES 
BOTH MALES AND FEMALES X X 
ONLY MALES V - 
ONLY FEMALES 
Maleness can be defined, first, by comparison to null-maleness, 
that is, by X and Y. Second, maleness can be operationally 
defined by comparison to femaleness, that is, by Y. Here it is 
argued that X and Y define maleness whereas Y, the operant used 
in the sex literature, identifies only a difference between 
maleness and femaleness. While V is a characteristic of Male 
(and a null-characteristic of Female), it is erroneous to equate 
Male with Y. 
In practice this second method has produced a situation in 
the literature whereby masculinity (Y) becomes instrumentality 
and femininity (Z) becomes interpersonal warmth. Masculinity and 
femininity cannot be equated with instrumentality and 
interpersonal warmth, as this method implies, without seriously 
distorting language. This conundrum is better interpreted as an 
artefact of an inappropriate mechanical methodology. (This 
method seems to follow from the assumption that a whole can be 
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divided into parts since, mechanically, parts can be summed to 
make a whole). The sex role literature is confusing and, it 
seems, little significance is attached to this important 
methodological reductionism. This method does not operationally 
define masculinity (or femininity) in an experientially 
meaningful way. 
This method produces mutually exclusive categories and 
defines andrognyny as Y plus Z. Since by definition V and Z are 
mutually exclusive, this construction of androgyny is 
problematic. At best this view, as represented in the 
literature, construes androgyny as a balance between two 
mutually exclusive opposites. Prior segregation, followed by 
differentiation into either male or female, pre-empts a sexual 
androgyny. Androgyny and sexual identity are antithetical. 
In humans there are two categories of sex (and of sexual 
identity) - male and female. In this literature there are 
however four categories: undifferentiated, male, female, and 
androgynous. This conceptual confusion arises as a consequence 
of an inappropriate methodology and theoretical framework. A new 
psychological framework of sex research is required and one in 
which segregation is prior to differentiation of different 
identities. 
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Gender research 
Gender roles are operationally defined as a contrast of 
traits between similar sexed subjects. Consider the following 
hypothetical characteristics (A, B, and C). 
CHARACTERISTICS OF MALE 
HETEROSEXUALS HOMOSEXUALS 
BOTH MALE GROUPS A A 
ONLY HETEROSEXUAL MALES B - 
ONLY HOMOSEXUAL MALES 
In this example gender identity is heterosexually defined by A 
and B, and homosexually defined by A and C. Gender identity can 
be operationally defined as a difference-score, as B or as C. 
The second method leads to the belief that the gender 
identity of heterosexual males is B and of homosexual males is 
C. In this construction gender identity is either B or C. This 
reductionist method ignores A in the construction of gender 
scales. 
While sex has two categories, gender has four. Gender 
research, using this rationale, recognizes only two mutually 
exclusive categories - male and female. In this rationale a 
bisexual person (who is theoretically androgynous) cannot exist 
and this difference-score way of measuring gender identity 
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precludes their identification. This is similar to the earlier 
sex role construction of masculinity and femininity as opposites 
(as is Eysenck's masculinity - femininity scale used in this 
thesis) and where a person could be masculine or feminine, but 
not both. The possibility of androgyny is operationally excluded 
by the use of this rationale. 
The results of this thesis show that homosexuality and 
heterosexuality are the expressions of male and female gender 
identities measured by this operant. In this study bisexuality 
was not an issue. Very few subjects identify as being bisexual. 
A loss of gender identity characterizes homosexuality and 
heterosexuality and this is not just an artefact. This loss of 
spontaneity is probably related to a sexist way of thinking 
operationalized in this method of gender role research. 
This rationale does not define gender identity in an 
experientially meaningful way. To explore and identify the 
differences between an apple and an orange says very little of 
either the apple or orange. To do so says more (but in a null 
way) about their common label as fruit. To explore the 
differences between homosexual and heterosexual perhaps says 
less about these identities than it does about their common 
label of sexual preference (though again in a null way). Such a 
difference is however related to an equivalence in heterosexual 
females and it is this identity in both homosexual males and 
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heterosexual females that is shown to be explanatory of their 
equivalent preference for male-sexed partners. 
Fruit 	is 	to 	apple-and-orange 	as 	androgyny 	is 	to 
male-and-female. To explore the differences between apple and 
orange is a difficult way of proceding to fruit. It would be a 
difficult teaching and learning technique to approach the 
concept of fruit through the differences of (for example) an 
apple and an orange. The concept of fruit rest not on the 
differences between fruits but on their essential similarities. 
To approach fruit through its null definition (differences) does 
not lead to an experience of, or understanding of, fruit. The 
concept of fruit implies a commonality between objects which are 
at once objectively different and yet objectively similar. (And 
thus paralleling the subject/object relation of interaction and 
integration). The concept of fruit ignores the differences and 
identifies the relatedness amongst apples, orange, grapes, and 
other 'fruit'. 
In this thesis the rationale used is that male gender and 
female 	gender 	may both develop from an undifferentiated 
(androgynous) universe and that both may subsequently be 
integrated into a differentiated (androgynous) universe. In this 
rationale the developmental absence of an identity or identities 
is therefore interpreted as an absence or loss of spontaneity to 
develop that identity. In other words, there is a failure of the 
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self to develop perfectly where 'perfect' has the meaning of 
wholeness. This failure, evident in homo- and hetero-sexual 
preferences, may have its origin in a 'sexist' attitude which 
divides the self, a priori, into mutually exclusive (segregated) 
parts. 
A whole self which is differentiated into three 'persons' is 
an a priori assumption used in this thesis. The persons grammar 
(Trinity) provides a prior and unifying theory of reality. 
Relatedness is here important: just as apple and orange are both 
fruit because of their similarities and not because of their 
many differences. In this theory the whole is greater than the 
sum of the parts simply because the whole includes not only the 
explicit similarities but also the implicit differences. 
SUMMARY 
The purpose of this appendix is to supplement the empirical 
approach of the thesis with some elaboration of theory and to 
further link this work with its history and with similar though 
more current work (particularly Moreno). A unified systems 
theory of personality is proposed that has dual frames of 
reference. These dual frameworks are shown to have their origins 
as different points of view and are systematically related to 
dual psychological concepts of gender and sexual identity. An 
interactive experimental design (von Bertalanffy, 1968) has been 
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used to empirically test this theory and the hypotheses that are 
derived from it. In particular the hypothesis that sexual 
preferences are related to gender identity is strongly 
supported. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The role-reversal of subject and object as 	esoteric 
meta-roles is considered an example of interaction in contrast 
to the segregation of subject and object and the consequent 
dissociation measured as anxiety and psychoticism. It is 
concluded that interaction (including role-reversal as the 
psychological expression of this concept) is poorly understood. 
The psycholological expression of this concept, in the 
psychodramatic interaction of creativity and spontaneity, 
warrants further interest. This concept has had utility in this 
thesis in the explanation of the origin and nature of sexual 
preferences. Furthermore, this concept is shown to be strongly 
related to psychopathology in general, and anxiety and 
psychoticism in particular, and so should be of major interest 
to those concerned with health. 
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